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 This thesis analyses the complex relationship between the arms 
industry and the British Government from 1900–1917. How did the 
British Civil Service convey strategic industrial policy in peacetime and 
what was its effectiveness in wartime through ordnance contracts and 
Westminster policy? The methodology follows a chronological analysis of 
both Governmental and industry documentation to see both sides 
holistically, through demand and supply, of a high–grade, non–commodity, 
durable good: artillery tubes. This thesis will utilize previously secret and 
unpublished records from both the Royal Navy and British Army 
procurement programmes to analyse the underpinnings of peacetime 
supply and wartime demand, institutional and personal relationships, 
industrial capacity, the effects of wartime shock under the Admiralty and 
War Office, and the creation and effectiveness of the Ministry of 
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GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
BA  British Army 
B.L  Breech Loading 
CY   Calendar Year   
Calibre The length of the barrel as a ratio to the projectile diameter 
CSOF Chief Superintendent of Ordnance Factories  
DNO  Director of Naval Ordnance 
Cwt.  Hundredweight, 112 pounds 
EOC Elswick Ordnance Company (Also known as Armstrong 
Whitworth) 
F/S  Feet per second (measurement of velocity)  
FY  Fiscal Year 
GHQ  General Headquarters  
HM  Her/His Majesty’s  
Lb.  Pound (unit of weight) 
MGO  Master General of Ordnance 
M.L  Muzzle Loading 
MV  Muzzle Velocity 
PRO  Public Records Office (superseded by TNA) 
Pr.  Pounder, a measure of the size of the artillery projectile 
Pence  in Pre-decimalization, 12 Pence made a Shilling  
Q.F  Quick-firing, ammunition and powder together 
P&E  Proof and Evaluation 
RCF  Royal Carriage Factory, Woolwich 
RGF  Royal Gun Factory, Woolwich 
RN  Royal Navy 
Shilling in Pre-decimalization, 20 Shillings made a Pound 
TNA  The National Archives of the United Kingdom 









MAP 1. BRITISH INDUSTRIAL AND POLITICAL LOCATIONS, 









CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
My original contribution to knowledge is an analysis of British 
industrial orders and output for artillery tubes, from the perspective of the 
British Government from 1900 to 1917. Artillery were defined as the 
hollow cylinders that either on their own or in conjunction with other 
tubes, made artillery barrels. All previous studies of British ordnance in the 
period under analysis were written from the point of view of private owned 
industry, mainly the companies Vickers and Armstrong. This thesis utilizes 
British governmental sources to analyse the role of both the Government 
and the Trade. This perspective has never before been analysed and 
reveals a different understanding and also comes to different conclusions as 
to the effectiveness of the efforts of the British Government as a whole and 
of the arms industry in particular. Much of the research in this thesis runs 
counter to existing historiography, primarily due to the availability of new 
sources by this author. Due to the secret and technical nature of the 
documents, they were not released until more than 50 years had passed 
after the end of the First World War. The Ministry of Defence, the 
successor of the departments studied, began to release the documents 
through The National Archives beginning in the mid–1970s through the 







release, it is understandable that previous authors came to different 
conclusions based upon the information available to them at the time of 
their research and publication.  
This thesis analyses how Britain equipped its armed forces from 
1900 to 1917. The two dates were chosen for specific reasons. 1900 began 
a period of intense study of ordnance and the lessons learned from the 
Boer War. 1917 represents the end of First World War for new work on 
British gun contracts. After April 1917, American requirements for 
creating an American Expeditionary Force took over excess British and 
American industrial capacity, and British numbers of guns remained 
relatively static until the Armistice was signed in November 1918. As will 
be demonstrated, the majority of orders for ordnance were placed in 1914 
and early 1915 with deliveries into the summer of 1916. After that point, 
contracts were scarce for most ordnance except the larger, and less 
numerous, heavy guns. As capacity had been created by then, little can be 
learned about industrial policy by looking at events later than mid–1917.  
 This thesis takes a narrow view of the subjects studied. It only 
discusses artillery from the 13–pr. and larger through to the 15–inch 
super–Dreadnought battleship guns. Importantly, the thesis examines the 
production of ordnance from the contemporary perspective of both the 







issues of ordnance from the ‘joint’ perspective. This thesis does not deal 
with other ordnance such as small arms, trench mortars, guns lighter than 
the 13–pr, guns above 15-inch, naval mountings, gun carriages, propellants, 
shells, or other expendables. It also does not discuss anti–aircraft and anti–
dirigible guns. As well, this thesis is about the strategic decisions and 
policies enacted by the Government and its uniformed officers and civil 
servants. This is not a thesis focusing on the supply side of production, 
except in places where it is critical to understanding governmental policies. 
As well, this thesis does not discuss operational uses of artillery, ending its 
interest in guns once they are proofed and accepted by the services, unless 
use affects the actual industrial, manufacturing, and business of procuring 
weapons. The use of weapons, including tactics and operational history, is 
simply outside the scope of this thesis, and there is already an extensive 
historiography on the use of ordnance for both services.  
No matter the period in time, navies and armies cannot fight wars or 
defend the peace without being armed. Acquisition and procurement is the 
most overlooked and understudied sector of the wheel that drives the 
sovereign ability to conduct war. It is certainly the case for historians of the 
First World War that not only industry, but also the State’s ability to 
leverage production in industrial warfare has largely been misunderstood 







This thesis illuminates British strategic industrial policy from 1900–
1917 and its strategic effects both intentional and unintentional. Artillery 
production as a microcosm allows several specific analysis benefits, 
including a constant group of government and industry players before, 
during, and after the conflict due to the inherent high costs of entry into 
production. The subject also allows an analysis of public/private 
production of similar goods. The period selected also allows the second 
chapter to discuss the pre–war policies set by Parliament from the start of 
the cordite era at the turn of the century to full scale mobilization. At the 
other end, by the conclusion of 1917, ordnance contracts placed in 1914 
and 1915 in the United Kingdom and the United States were being fulfilled 
and the forces engaged on the Western Front were numerically consistent 
and fully equipped. The only new equipment was for replacement 
purposes. As well, the structures of civilian purchasing staffs had matured. 
This role of Civil Staffs is a wholly understudied and integral part of 
understanding all relationships and legal requirements to meet sufficiency. 
As a note, the work makes a distinction between ordnance and 
munitions. For the purposes of this thesis, ordnance is, in economic terms, 
a durable goods product, whilst munitions are expendable goods. In other 
words, ordnance is considered the platform (artillery) itself while the 







products that are intended to be used once. This paper will be focused on 
ordnance industries, and not the narrower munitions issues, except when 
necessary to explain larger issues.  
Methodology 
This thesis was not originally intended to challenge and revise the 
successes or failures of the War Office during the first year of the First 
World War and the circumstances surrounding the creation of the 
Ministry of Munitions. It was originally devised to understand the human 
nature in a Clausewitzian sense of government procurement from the most 
modern conflict that a full set of records are available for.  
The research methodology for this thesis has been undertaken in 
multiple stages. The first stage was to gather all of the trade contracts for 
ordnance from Fiscal Year 1900 through Fiscal Year 1914. This gave a 
baseline of peacetime capacity as well as trends of British ordering. In 
addition, the annual audit reports of the Ordnance Factories conducted by 
Charles Harris were critical in compiling an accurate report of costs as well 
as the cost and pricing data that allowed for a view of prices between the 
trade and Woolwich. The Trade contracts were held at The National 
Archives of the UK at Kew, London (henceforth known as TNA) under 







records are held in two places, first as annual votes, and second as the 
audits of their annual books. These latter documents offer the most 
reliable year to year accounts. Both are held at the Parliamentary Archives.  
Next, a review of the policy documents that educated the thinking of 
the Civil Service was undertaken. The Report of the Government Factories 
Workshops Committee, also known as the Murray Report of 1907, was 
the most important of these, although other ones also coloured the 
understanding of what exactly ‘business as usual’ was defined as for 
procurement of artillery in particular.  
The papers of the President of the Ordnance Committee, or after 
1907, the Ordnance Board were closely examined. These papers, found 
under SUPP 6 of the National Archives, have never been used in any 
historical work to analyse the industrial aspects of ordnance. The 
Ordnance Papers, and especially the Annual Report of the President of the 
Committee/Board, are the single source for all new ordnance, research, 
international espionage, and gun failures for a particular year. They are 
exceedingly technical in their nature, but if read through multiple years the 
researcher can notice trends and systematic issues. The papers were at the 
time given very small circulation, with only about two dozen copies printed 
per year. The copy that survives is often that of the Secretary. These copies 







redacted reports created by the Board were given to the trade, usually on 
problems specific to their own manufacturing techniques or failures of guns 
they made. The papers were classified until the mid–1970s, and even now, 
the detail makes utilizing them as a source difficult due to the sheer volume 
of information.  
Corporate Archives 
This thesis has also looked at corporate archives. Dr Graham 
Honeyman, CEO of Sheffield Forgemasters generously opened the 
archives for the first time to external research. This archive contains several 
accounts books for salaries between 1900 and 1925 although there is little 
left of technical or business matters that are pertinent to this thesis. Those 
looking at a full study of pay between Woolwich and the Trade would find 
this archive of particular use.  
The largest remaining archive for the trade is the Vickers-Armstrong 
corporate archive. This is actually located in two different areas, with the 
primary holdings at the Cambridge University Library, although a 
substantial holding, primarily dealing with Armstrongs, which it subsumed 
in 1927 is located at the Tyne and Wear Archives in Newcastle. These 
archives were deposited the 1970s and 1980s as part of the shift in 







The Armstrong archives in Newcastle is dominated by the 
shipbuilding portion of the business. This has been reported by many 
historians, including Ian Buxton and Clive Trebilcock who have spent 
substantial portions of their careers understanding these particular 
resources. Unfortunately, the records of the Elswick gun plant are scant. 
They also add little to contradict HM Government’s archives at Kew.  
The Cambridge University holdings of Vickers contain almost no 
relevant works for this thesis. The corporate published notes of board 
meetings survive in part, although accounting ledgers are existent for one 
year in this period. Also, almost no records of the River Don plant survive, 
and certainly nothing of a technical nature. There is not enough at 
Cambridge to contradict the Government’s record on gun manufacture.  
Secondary Sources 
Finally, the secondary literature was reviewed. This was done last as 
to not influence the interpretation of primary sources. This has been a 
useful methodology as many of the secondary sources were based upon 
either the Official Histories (which as will be mentioned later are 
untrustworthy in some instances,) and other works such as David Lloyd 








The literature on this subject has been lacking in both analytical 
substance and specificity since the Armistice. This has to do with three 
primary factors. First, the historiography of the arms industry to this date 
have been written primarily from the perspective of the Trade, through the 
corporate archives. The Trade archival material on gun making 
disproportionately did not survive, and therefore a large amount was not 
available for historians. Second, the British Government’s archives were to 
a large extent not declassified until after much of the historiography was 
written, and historians therefore had to rely on the previously mentioned 
sparse corporate records or the Ministry of Munitions Official History, as 
will be mentioned below. The classification was due primarily to the 
technical nature of the reports. Third, to be properly understood gun 
making requires a different set of skills from every other part of the 
armaments field such as shell production or small arms manufacture. The 
author must not only have a working understanding of ballistics and physics 
but also be able to contextualize the bureaucracy and situations of the 
Government staffs, which has been missing in serious historiographical 
discussion.  
Economic historians such as Clive Trebilcock in The Vickers 
Brothers: Armaments and Enterprise 1854–1914 (1977) and David 







(1996) have examined the output of British industry quantitatively although 
pre–war numbers compared to wartime numbers are like apples and 
oranges due to the percentages spent on different classes of output. In 
particular, the economic study of ordnance is difficult because of 
macroeconomic data being unable to differentiate between purchases of 
new artillery and expendables such as munitions. Without separately 
analysing every portion of the parliamentary budget line of “warlike stores”, 
strictly economic studies will not reveal the full rationale behind British 
industrial output. Trebilcock especially has written the most important 
works that colour the historiography, although he wrote primarily from the 
side of the Trade, as well as writing his major works just before the 
declassification of much of the Government’s key documentation into the 
archives.  
Political and social historians as well have contributed to the topic, 
although the inherent limitations of the two disciplines also leave much to 
be desired. Such historians such as Kathleen Burk in Britain, America, and 
the Sinews of War, 1914–1918 (1985) and David French in British 
Economic and Strategic Planning: 1905–1914 (1982) have written on the 
strategic effects of certain policies, with the former dealing specifically with 
the Anglo–American relationship and the latter with economic strategy. 







minimized to a great extent. This is extremely difficult to do when talking 
about a very technical subject such as ordnance.  
A particular subset of British economic historians have also looked 
at the mobilization of industry as well as the long term industrial views of 
British industrial ‘decline.’ This was a particularly popular view in the 
1970s and 1980s in Britain. The most well–known of these are Correlli 
Barnett and Chris Wrigley. Both wrote mainly in the late 1970s through 
the 1980s. Barnett’s most notable work The Audit of War: The Illusion 
and Reality of Britain as a Great Nation (1986) looked at failures in the 
Second World War, although started his analysis from the 1870s. The 
work is not as important specifically though for the topic as Wrigley’s essay 
The Ministry of Munition: an Innovatory Department which can be found 
in Kathleen Burk’s War and the State (1982).Wrigley’s sources for the 
work included many of the unreliable sources such as the Ministry of 
Munitions Official History but also the Lloyd George Papers, and memoirs 
by political leaders of the period who would defend their positions in their 
own writing. Unfortunately, Wrigley’s analysis is an exercise in hagiography 
as he perpetuates old myths without actually researching the underlying 
assumptions. Wrigley did not use a single War Office source, which led to 
the predictable conclusion that the War Office was entirely wrong and the 







Wrigley have negated much of this work. Historians such as David 
Edgerton, William Rubinstein, Peter Payne, and Bruce Collins have 
progressively dismantled the thesis put forth especially by Correlli Barnett.  
Corporate historians have looked at the role of the Trade. 
Unfortunately, these works almost to a whole were commissioned by the 
companies they are about. Therefore they tend to give a non-
confrontational view of how the company worked with the Government. 
As corporate histories, these works tend to glance over the war as a small 
part of the overall work, and cannot give the detail needed to shed light on 
the subject at hand. The primary two examples in this case are JD Scott in 
Vickers: A History (1962), Marshall Bastable’s Arms and the State (2004) 
and O.F. G. Hogg in The Royal Arsenal (1962). One of the major flaws of 
the corporate histories of armaments firms, especially by Scott and 
Trebilcock, are their interpretations of the firms acting as monolithic 
organizations instead of separate plants within a central corporate structure. 
Many of these histories spend more on corporate structure than the 
product line. In this way, gun manufacturing is wrapped into the larger 
armaments sphere where it unfortunately has been interpreted as having 
the same issues, needs, and constraints as small arms, machine guns, 
armour, or even projectiles. Unfortunately, this interpretation has 







the other lines of business, primarily shipbuilding, to great detriment. It 
ignores the scientific and production management that is specific to the 
largest and most demanding elements of the defence base by 1914. 
Kenneth Warren’s Steel, Ships and Men: Cammell Laird, 1824–1993 
(1998) is one of the better corporate histories of the ordnance firms that 
break down the lines of business. The need to cover long stretches of time 
tends to be the greatest weaknesses of these works, which leads to few 
pages being spent on important events such as First World War.  
A dangerous element of the corporate histories that is particular to 
the ordnance industry in Britain has nothing to do with the time under 
study, but the subsequent fifty years. Vickers purchased Armstrongs in 
1927 and subsequently became the single surviving gun maker after the 
competition, mainly Coventry Ordnance Works, although others such as 
Beardmore closed or amalgamated, all eventually being merged in the 
1990s as British Aerospace, now BAE. Historiographically, Vickers 
dominates the secondary literature, yet this is not representative of the 
industry as a whole. As will be demonstrated, it was actually the exception 
to the industry in many cases. Vickers’s dominance in business, especially 
after 1919, was what led to their success, and therefore to corporate 
histories which dominate the literature. The dominance of Vickers has a 







Military historians have also entered, not surprisingly, in the 
aforementioned subject. The vast swathe of First World War literature has 
gone into great detail about the Royal Regiment of Artillery, the Shells 
Crisis of 1915, as well as artillery doctrine. Unfortunately, the recurring 
theme of all is the focus of artillery’s effects on operational conflicts, mainly 
on the Western Front. These historians almost wholly focus on combat 
arms to the detriment of staff work, especially that of a technical nature. 
Part of the stance was that there were only a handful of Royal Artillery 
officers who had technical ordnance experience above their traditional 
operational and tactical experience. Even fewer historians have researched 
the technical issues of ordnance procurement. Military historians have also 
completely ignored the role of civil servants in the War Office and their 
effects on operational efficiency. Ian Hogg was probably the most prolific 
of writers on the technical elements of land-based artillery and his book 
Allied Artillery of World War I (2004) analyses the subject in detail, 
although the lack of footnotes or academic rigour of citation does not allow 
the book to be utilized for scholarly purposes.  
Naval history is seriously lacking in the same respects as military 
history. Although Jon Sumida with In Defense of Naval Supremacy: 
Finance, Technology, and British Naval Policy 1889–1914 (1989) does 







revolutions in armaments that occured parallel to the period in question. 
Ian Buxton has written extensively on the technical side of naval 
architecture and the naval shipbuilding industry in Britain, although he has 
assumed much of the conventional thinking on how the aspect of how guns 
were procured for the Royal Navy without the War Office records. Ian 
Hamilton in The Making of the Modern Admiralty (2011) has executed a 
sweeping history of the Admiralty bureaucracy, although no work has yet 
been completed on the Royal Navy Contracts department and Director of 
Naval Ordnance civil staffs, in particular. Hamilton’s is still the best book 
currently available of the evolution of any Civil Staff on Whitehall. There 
does not appear to be a single work from the naval perspective on the 
relationship between the Director of Naval Ordnance, the War Office civil 
staffs (who bought all naval guns for much of this period), and Woolwich 
and the trade. Due to the nature of the naval war, including relatively few 
naval battles, there is even less operational history than the military efforts.  
By far the two most important authors cited in the secondary 
literature of all the disciplines mentioned above are Clive Trebilcock’s The 
Vickers Brothers: Armaments and Enterprise 1854–1914 (1977) and ‘The 
British Armaments Industry, 1890–1914: false legend and true utility’ in 
Geoffrey Best’s edited work War, Economy, and the Military Mind (1976) 







the historiography, and are cited in virtually every secondary work since. 
Therefore, even new works on the subject are based upon works that are 
now over four decades old. Most importantly, although ground–breaking 
in their day, the works of Trebilcock and Scott did not incorporate the 
classified government records that were not wholly released until the 
1990s. Their dominance based upon one perspective (the trade) of a much 
more complex situation has led to the subsequent skewing of all secondary 
works, many of which are surveys and comparative studies of larger topics 
in which British gunmaking is but a small part.  
Primary Sources 
The Official History of the Ministry of Munitions was published 
right after the war in 1922. It consists of eight public released and four 
‘classified’ volumes released later which have become the most widely cited 
text by every school of historian listed above. It was hastily pieced together 
between 1918 and 1922. In it the work of the War Office and its leader, 
the late Lord Kitchener, were downplayed. The untimely death of Lord 
Kitchener whilst the Secretary of State for War gave David Lloyd George a 
political opportunity as the story could not be openly challenged by one 
side. The mythology of Lloyd George and the Ministry was forged at that 







perpetuated by the 12 volumes, especially that about the first year of the 
war and the state of industry in May 1915, is in direct contradiction to the 
official documents released in the last 30 years that are housed at TNA. 
The historical section deposited their papers and chapter drafts under the 
Ministry of Munitions papers, MUN series, which now reside at TNA. (As 
a note to the reader, The National Archives is the rebranded title of the 
old Public Records Office (PRO) that is often used in older works to cite 
the same documents.) It is telling that even the drafts of the historical 
branch were classified for 50 years.  
This thesis from the beginning of research has tried to ignore work 
written after 1918 on both sides to come to an unbiased conclusion as to 
the reality of industrial mobilization for gun production. This is the 
primary reason for a heavy reliance on archival papers as well as the use of 
previously unused sources such as the Ordnance Board. This thesis has 
tried to get beneath the political level to understand what was actually 
happening, by those who were making the daily decisions. Because of this, 
this thesis intentionally does not rely on the memoirs of political leaders, 
unlike all other works written directly about the subject.  
The only real contemporary challenge to Lloyd George’s version of 
events to the British wartime effort was to come from a three-volume series 







Major General Stanley von Donop, who was the Master General of 
Ordnance during Kitchener’s time at the War Office, was requested to 
write notes on the former Field Marshal’s performance in the first year of 
the war in regard to industrial mobilization. Lloyd George while Prime 
Minister personally intervened against the publication of his notes in 
October 1919, stating that they were ‘not suitable for publication, in that 
they constitute in substance an attack on the Ministry of Munitions and this 
will inevitably lead to a controversy between Departments which will be 
detrimental to the public service.’1 There are at least two copies of von 
Donop’s original paper submitted to Sir Arthur, one of which can be 
found in the Lloyd George Papers in the House of Lords Archives under  
LG F/191/2/2 and the other in Stanley von Donop’s papers housed at 
TNA under WO 79/84. Importantly, both copies are identical except for 
the markings in pencil of certain sections of each of their respective 
owners. The censorship of the only remaining high ranking critic of the 
Prime Minister cleared the way for only one dialogue: that of the published 
Ministry of Munitions Official History. It should be noted that the Ministry 
of Munitions did not shirk from attacking the War Office for its policies in 
the official histories, thus making public a toxic situation.  
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This thesis is not meant to be a repeat of what was censured almost 
100 years ago, although many of the sources used by von Donop in his 
defence of Kitchener are used in this thesis, along with some that he 
considered too controversial to use. These add to the voluminous technical 
information that predated his time in the position which lasted from 1913 
through 1916, thus making this thesis a rebalanced and complete view of 
the subject, incorporating for the first time all documentation from 
multiple departments over a span of almost two decades.  
This thesis follows a chronological layout. The first seven chapters 
discuss elements of pre–war policy in theory and practice. The last three 
chapters analyse the ability of British industry to perform the policy in 
practice. The chapters as a whole will demonstrate what peacetime policy 
was, how effective that policy after wartime shock, and for the reasons that 








CHAPTER TWO: BRITISH GOVERNMENTAL POLICIES ON 
DEMAND OF ARTILLERY, 1900–1914 
 
‘War is competition; there is no standard of excellence for anything; 
it does not suffice to have good material, good soldiers, and good officers, 
if the enemy has better material, better soldiers, and better officers.’  
– Brigadier General William Crozier, US Army.2  
 
Introduction 
When William Crozier wrote to the United States Congress in his 
1902 annual report, he distilled the essence of how the then nascent 
century would evolve. He understood that the product of the Second 
Industrial Revolution was an increased efficiency of industry worldwide, 
and that the professionalization of the world’s officers and enlisted men 
meant that a true industrial war was not out of the question. He also 
wanted to impart to those policy leaders in his audience that industrial 
policy and thought had to be an integral element in strategic thinking in the 
new century for any country.  
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This chapter will discuss the underlying culture within which the 
British Civil Service and military officers managed British defence industry 
policy as it pertains to the procurement of artillery tubes for the Royal 
Navy and the British Army. This chapter analyses the demand side of the 
ordnance industry, or in other words what the military needed and what 
policies and decisions were made to satisfy those needs. The underlying 
purpose of this chapter, in conjunction with chapter three, is to build an 
understanding of what the British strategic position was in regards to 
artillery at the outbreak of war, thus leading to subsequent chapters that will 
discuss how effective these peacetime policies were when the supply chain 
was stressed and demand was escalated.  
Governmental industrial policy must be two–fold. First, industry 
must be able to produce the material needed for the ordinary operations of 
a peace–time military at a cost that is reasonable to the taxpayer. Second, 
industry must be able to produce the material needed for the extra–
ordinary operations of war at a rate that is reasonable for the user, in this 
case the Royal Navy and the British Army. This paradox, and its 
management, is one of the most difficult of sovereign tasks. Throughout 
history, especially in the industrialized period of the last 200 years, those 
who have succeeded usually thrive, and those who have not, lose. It is this 







historical context of the British experience from the conclusion of the Boer 
War (1899–1902) to the American entry into the First World War in the 
spring of 1917.  
The policymaker’s task in managing the paradox is seemingly 
straightforward. The armed forces must be equipped, and the industrial 
might that is needed to create and sustain the force must not be such a 
burden to the economy as to overly affect commercial practice while also 
not cost so much as to unduly burden the tax base. By the end of the 19th 
century, every western country had developed their own style of how to 
proceed. Each tailored the base to the particulars of the localized culture 
and resource abilities. What follows in this thesis educates and enlightens 
policy decisions followed by the United Kingdom through the medium of 
artillery tube demand and production.  
Bureaucratic and Political Foundations 
All acquisitions inevitably start with the political needs of the state, 
and to understand its decisions, inevitably it must be known how the 
leaders were placed in their positions. Since the Glorious Revolution in 
1688, Great Britain has generally worked under a constitutional monarchy. 
Nominally headed by the Monarch, a King or Queen, the Government 







of Commons and the House of Lords. The former operated on the basis 
of elected representation of the enfranchised population, composed 
traditionally the wealthy and increasingly an expanded percentage of the 
population gained enfranchisement. 1715 saw the passage of the Septennial 
Act which mandated elections of the House of Commons no more than 
seven years from the first meeting.3 The House of Lords through the end 
of the Edwardian period in 1914 was composed of hereditary peers.  
The vast majority of the power of Government resided in the 
Cabinet, an organization based on the results of the last election, and in the 
likely case in this period of no single party gaining the absolute majority, 
the ability of parties to create a coalition Government, which would be led 
by the Prime Minister, who was often the head of the majority party, but 
not always. The Cabinet consisted of Members of Parliament (MPs) as well 
as peers from the House of Lords, who were assigned as political overseers 
of civil service led departments. Of these the ‘Great Offices of State’ hold 
the most power and seniority. These consisted of the Prime Ministership 
(through the joint title First Lord of the Treasury), the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, the Foreign Secretary, and the Home Secretary. Many other 
members made up the Cabinet, with varying degrees of work, for both 
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bureaucratic and party purposes. One of the novelties of the Cabinet was 
that once a Member was appointed, the group made decisions for the 
Government as a whole, as compared to those making decisions based on 
the sole needs of their particular assigned responsibility.  
Finance 
The control of the purse is arguably the most important aspect of 
any government. Therefore an analysis of governmental industrial policy 
must start with the financial constraints placed upon it. By the 1880s the 
funding of the government became the primary way in which the House of 
Commons kept the civil service in check. The civil service, through 
departments of the Government, provided the daily administration 
required. The Admiralty and the War Office, the administrative constructs 
of the Royal Navy and the British Army respectively, for example, were 
run primarily by civilians. It was this corps of professional career 
bureaucrats that contained the skills required to interpret, manage, and 
execute the systems required to keep the respective fighting services 
outfitted and in the field in fighting order. The procedure for funding 
government followed several steps including: creating an estimate in the 
Office, political secretary approval, submission to the House of Commons, 







expenditure. This process seems simple, but any of these steps could derail 
the entire system. 
Votes 
The processes of creating the budgets were relatively straightforward. 
‘Army and Navy estimates are prepared under the direction of the 
Secretary of State for War and the Board of the Admiralty whose 
signatures they bear. These Estimates are submitted to the Treasury for 
sanction before presentation, but they are laid out before Parliament by the 
Ministers of the War Office and Admiralty respectively.’ This annual 
process was started by a letter sent by the Treasury to the Accounting 
Officers in their respective Departments requesting the estimates to be 
delivered in draft form to the Treasury by 1 December. The Treasury then 
scrubbed the numbers and ascertained all details to support the requested 
number. Interestingly, the Treasury instructed Departments to create new 
budgets every year instead of relying on previous years as baselines. This 
would have required a program to be continually justified throughout its 
life.4 
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The nature of the Estimates process would have been complicated 
and foreign to all but the most seasoned senior clerks in Departments. 
Therefore, the Treasury, through the Exchequer and Audit Departments 
Act of 1866, provided Treasury staff to those Department employees 
assigned with estimate work.5 The Act was designed to create uniformity 
through the financial offices of the Civil Departments and introduce a 
standard of accounting hitherto non–existent on a Government–wide 
scale.6 It became apparent by 1872 that the increasingly complex nature of 
the budgetary process required extraordinarily skilled accountants. Those 
Department accountants charged with creating the Appropriations 
Accounts were therefore entitled Accounting Officers, and with the title, 
were the only ones with the authority and personal accountability to certify 
the Estimate of the Department.7 This Treasury Minute also formally 
renamed those who had held the title of ‘accountant’ to ‘Clerk in charge of 
the Accounts’, thus eliminating any possible confusion on important 
matters of accounts. Through experience gained by the 1866 Act, the 
House of Lords came to the opinion that the Accounting Officer should be 
a permanent member of the Department given the authority by the 
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Department to represent the said department before the Parliamentary 
Committee of Public Accounts8 
In 1883 the details of the extent to which the Accounting Officers 
were to be held personally responsible came into question. At that point, 
The Treasury let it be known in a circular that they were, through any 
legally binding finance law, required to take responsibility for every 
payment in their Department.9 This difference, although subtle, meant that 
the Accounting Officer was to be held responsible for all financial 
transactions, from the Estimate through the final audit. This also meant 
that, through association, the Accounting Officer served as the responsible 
party for all contracts and business transactions conducted by the 
Department. When the Accounting Officers were placed in responsibility 
for all expenditure, they were also de facto meant to be the overarching 
authority of all appropriation, obligation, allocation, and payment. 
Therefore, the powers of warrant of the contracting officers and other 
business personnel were channelled and granted either formally or through 
inference, to the Accounting Officer.  
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In regard to personnel, every civil and military position had to be 
accounted for on a yearly basis, reporting both increases and decreases to 
billet balance and financial estimates in comparison to previous estimates. 
Departmental Accounting Officers were required to present reports on 
their human capital to a full audit before the Treasury signed off on the 
Estimates.10 In the two uniformed Departments, War Office and 
Admiralty, the accountability in detail usually lay in the hands of divisions 
broken up for budgeting reasons. These divisions were called Votes. Each 
Vote represented dedicated money that could not be spent outside of the 
restrictions of the appropriations acts unless authorized by the House of 
Commons. Ordnance fell under the vote of ‘warlike stores’ which classified 
everything that was essentially not a commercial item, such as firearms, 
artillery, propellants, torpedoes, munitions and the like. In the War Office 
as well as the Admiralty budget, this held the traditional ‘Vote 9.’ Votes 
were also inclusive, and covered funds that were going to be expended 
both in the Trade and at the Royal Factories. When the Treasury created 
the Votes for the War Office and Admiralty during the Second Boer War, 
the War Costs were not included in the normal Vote, and were included in 
                                           







a supplementary Vote that could better align with accounting practices as 
well as making a difference between ordinary and extra–ordinary costs of 
the services.11 
The Treasury maintained control over departments through three 
tools: Control over Estimates, control over the expenditure under Votes, 
and the control of details.12 In this regard, the Chancellor had the potential 
for great power in the Cabinet, and could drive major policy in the 
Departments through the power of the purse. Of these three, the control of 
expenditure had the greatest effect on ordnance, although the control of 
details greatly influenced capital investment, an issue that was important to 
the control of the Government Factories.  
Budgets 
Each budget covered a Fiscal Year (FY) from 1 April until 30 March 
of the next. It was traditional for the Government to use the year in which 
the budget ended as the budget year if only one number was used. For 
example, a budget that started on 1 April 1902–30 March 1903 would 
usually be cited as the 1903 FY. With very few exceptions, all funding for 
the purposes of the Government followed the FY as opposed to a 
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Calendar Year (CY) which would have spanned from 1 January–31 
December.  
Budgets covered 12 months of expenditure only. All funds had to be 
at least allocated and obligated, that is, spent, or put on a contract, by the 
end of March every year. Once the end of the FY was reached, all 
unobligated funds would expire and revert back to Treasury accounts. 
Large, multiple year contracts such as shipbuilding were also allocated one-
year funds, and thus the contract would cite the entire number, and reserve 
the funds in an allocated pool, although they might not be paid out or 
expended for several years for example at the point of acceptance of the 
goods delivered. The Vote would fully fund projects at the start. It does not 
appear that the Treasury placed any restrictions on the expiration of 
obligated funds output, meaning that capital asset contracts such as 
shipbuilding do not appear to have an arbitrary end date by which contract 
invoices had to be closed.  
As part of the control over the expenditure under vote, funds from 
the same FY could not be transferred from one Vote to another without 
the authorization of Parliament and the Treasury.13 This process, called 
virement, was put in place on the War Office and Admiralty budgets 
                                           







through ‘Mr. Monk’s Resolution of 4th and 5th March 1879.’14 This 
resolution was, strictly speaking, a shift of power from the Departments to 
the Treasury, which had the ultimate real say on virement. Thus a surplus 
in one portion of the budget could not meet a deficit in another. This 
restriction limited the absolute control of Departments to manipulate 
budgets or spend monies that were not specifically coloured for the said 
purpose. At the end of each FY, the Treasury Audit Office would analyse 
each Vote’s obligated and spent amounts to verify the maintenance of 
proper expenditure of public funds. This audit was a long–standing 
requirement, first entering the Navy Votes in 1832 and the Army Votes in 
1847.15 The audit was an independent and comprehensive study of the 
books, with the auditors having freedom from the chain of command and a 
guarantee against the censorship of any part of the report. Audits had to 
take into effect not only the voted Parliamentary Estimates, but as well any 
Acts or Orders in Council that refined or specified particular Votes.16  
Once the Votes were approved, the services could start the work of 
obligation. For the Army, Vote 9 represented warlike, &c, stores. For the 
Navy, Vote 9 was Naval Armaments. These two votes are the only parts of 
the financial budget of interest for the topic of this paper, although 
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commands such as Woolwich would have pulled their funds from many 
different Votes from several different Departments to properly conduct the 
wide ranging businesses conducted there.17  
Bureaucracy 
In the case of the British Army, the passed vote was then managed 
by the civil staff of finance at the War Office, whose headquarters was 
located in Whitehall, a street near the Houses of Parliament in London 
where many governmental offices are located and which has become 
synonymous with Britain’s central governments. The Army Finance 
Department was, after reforms in 1905, a voting member of the newly 
formed Army Board, under the title of Financial Secretary to the War 
Office. The office of Financial Secretary after 1905 was held by an MP 
although the position never sat on the Cabinet. The Assistant Financial 
Secretary, a position created in 1908, was a senior civil servant, Sir Charles 
Harris. Under him, three departments managed all funds for the army: the 
Director of Army Finance, the Director of Financial Service, and the 
Director of Contracts. Each of these in the period studied were manned by 
senior civil servants, with their responsibilities for each determined by 
statute. Within these three offices, the finance office had six Principals 
                                           







assigned to it, all civil servants. Although the offices were reorganized, the 
same Principals were essentially in the same post from 1905 until 1914. As 
well, the Director of Contracts was assigned one Assistant Director of 
Contracts, acting in the same manner as the Accounts and Finance civil 
servants. Under these, there were on average eight clerks, which would 
have also included various under clerks, and boys. What is striking is the 
small scale of this office, which dealt with all transactions of currency, from 
budget creation, to contracts, to payroll. The entire finance department was 
in all likelihood under three dozen staff from top to bottom.18  
In the case of the Royal Navy, the Admiralty was structured in a 
similar manner to the Army Board, primarily because the army copied the 
idea from the proven bureaucracy of the Admiralty Board. The Admiralty 
bureaucracy was headed by the Controller of the Navy, usually a Rear 
Admiral, assisted primarily by the Accountant General of the Navy as well 
as by the Director of Navy Contracts. The most striking departure though 
from the army’s organization was the size of the staff dealing with financial 
issues. In 1900, the naval civil staff consisted of two branches: the Contracts 
Department and the Accounts Department. The Contracts Department 
consisted of two directors, two chief clerks, four clerks, eight second-class 
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clerks, nine superintendent clerks, and four boy copyists. The second, and 
larger, office dealt with accounts, and consisted of one head, one 
department chief, nine superintendent clerks, fifteen assistant 
superintendent clerks, fifteen staff clerks, and one hundred twenty four 2nd 
class clerks, fifty–eight supplementary clerks, and twenty–six boy copyists.19 
This striking contrast in size between the tasks of contracts and accounts 
represented not only the bureaucratic apparatus that the Admiralty placed 
on accounts, but also the entrenched and long–standing nature of that 
office, which had been active since the 1830s.  
Bidding 
These two organizations within the framework set forth in 
Westminster legislation and policy set the basis for ‘business as usual’, a 
term often used by historians to describe the peacetime processes of the 
War Office. It was within this framework that all administration 
functioned. The demand by the Government for all goods, including guns, 
was forced into following the above procedures, through the above 
channels, for the entire period of study. How the administration designed 
its purchasing and procurement tactics, including how the government 
interacted with industry as well as specific unit demands and ultimately 
                                           







force structure would all be determined within the tight constraints of Vote 
administration.  
The actual bidding process is best described by a note written in 
1906 by the Admiralty staff.  
‘First, Admiralty demand, specifying descriptions and 
quantities of stores to be ordered, is passed to Chief Inspector, 
Woolwich, for him to insert particulars of specification, sealed 
drawing, &c. 2. Demand is returned by Chief Inspector to 
Admiralty. 3. Demand is passed from Admiralty to War Office for 
tenders to be invited. 4. Tenders are then called for by War Office. 
5 Tenders are received at War Office and there scheduled. 6. 
Tenders are examined by War Office Departments and then passed 
to Admiralty, with proposals as to acceptance. 7. Tenders are 
considered by Admiralty, and returned to War Office with a 
notification of their Lordships’ decision. 8. Tenders are accepted by 
the War Office, and copies of tenders supplied to Admiralty.’20  
 
In general, 1/3 of all orders for guns were given immediately to the 
Royal Ordnance Factories and 2/3 to the trade, which until after 1905 was 
composed of Vickers Maxim and Armstrong Whitworth. For smaller guns 
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(those under 6 inches) in general the lowest bidder received the contract, 
but for larger guns, 50% of the remaining order was given to each of the 
two firms equally.21 The procurement of the 3–inch quick firing Vickers 
gun, along with the competition for new field guns created a massive 
headache for the Treasury Solicitors over the 1904 Christmas season. The 
situation of Vickers and Armstrongs was stated as: ‘There is, moreover 
evidence that Messrs Armstrong and Messrs. Vickers have for some time 
past been more friendly co–operation than in a state of rivalry as regards 
supplies to His Majesty’s Government, and therefore this Department 
welcomed the offer of Messrs Cammell, Laird & Company Limited to 
equip themselves for the making of guns as more genuine competition 
would thereby be ensued’22 This slightly changed in April 1908 when the 
Chief Inspector of Naval Ordnance was created as an attempt by the 
Admiralty to get closer to the business of procurement, although the office 
was only of marginal success in the short term.23 By then, though the 
Admiralty had dropped their protest of allowing Cammell Laird to bid for 
contracts, and in February 1906, the Admiralty and the War Office agreed 
to allow competition from outside the traditional late Victorian suppliers.24 
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As a matter of British bidding policy, orders were almost exclusively 
placed with British firms. All warlike stores after 1900 were placed with 
domestic suppliers, although this was a matter of policy more than legal 
requirement. Foreign purchases of non–warlike stores required the 
approval of the Financial Secretary for final permission. The most 
common foreign orders year on year were for horse shoes and acetone, 
both of which were more economical to produce outside the UK.25 This 
was shown in a case in 1902 where it was approved, but only because the 
domestic source was 142% of the foreign bid.26 Domestic sourcing became 
the bidding policy for warlike stores throughout the peace.  
Policy 
The election cycles in the first decades of the century demonstrate 
changes in the government majority at Westminster. The 1900 General 
Election brought the Conservative Party with their Liberal Unionist Party 
coalition to power, first from the election until 11 July 1902 under the 
leadership of the Marquess of Salisbury (Robert Gascoyne–Cecil), and 
then from 11 July 1902 until 5 December 1905 under the leadership of 
Arthur Balfour. The 1906 General Election saw the return of the Liberal 
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Party establishing a majority government. This Government was led by Sir 
Henry Campbell–Bannerman until April 1908 when Herbert Asquith 
replaced him as the Liberal Prime Minister. Asquith and the Liberal party 
survived the 1910 General Election and remained in government until 
1915.  
Policy after the Boer War came from many different areas. The 
reforms to save money were paramount, although the need to reequip 
combat troops was also the top need of the army. This project would 
eventually lead to a £1,000,000 expenditure to reequip the Royal Horse 
and Royal Field Artillery Regiments, the largest British Army contract in 
history to that date.  
Ordnance played an odd role as a unifier in regards to military and 
naval staffs. Unlike every other purchase or piece of equipment deployed 
by the forces of Britain, ordnance had DNA from both the salt of the sea 
and the dust of the deserts. In this period, every decision regarding 
ordnance was reviewed, analysed, and approved or dismissed by 
representatives of both services. This oddity is best represented through 
the lens of a report from the Committee Appointed to Consider Various 
Questions Concerning the Methods of Inspection and Delivery of Naval 
Ordnance and Naval Ordnance Stores. This committee, if it had been to 







exclusively of naval officers, but instead the group was composed of three 
naval officers, three Army officers and two Whitehall civilians. 
Represented were men in some of the highest technical positions in the 
British Government, including: the Master–General of Ordnance, the 
President of the Ordnance Committee, the Director of Naval Ordnance, 
the Director of Artillery, the Superintendent of Ordnance Stores (Naval), 
the Chief of the Financial Department, War Office, and the Accountant 
General of the Navy. Each of these positions held key pieces of the puzzle 
that was ordnance. Each piece contributed in its own way to produce and 
purchase everything that exploded at sea and on land.27  
The Master General of Ordnance 
The Master General of Ordnance (MGO) was the most powerful 
individual in the government in regard to ordnance policy. The Master 
General of Ordnance position had existed in many different forms for well 
over a century, first as the Master General of the Ordnance part of the 
Board of Ordnance, which was dissolved in 1855 after the Crimean War 
debacles in supply. The position was then rebranded Director of 
Ordnance, and finally the 1904 Esher Report and reforms made the 
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reflagged office of Master General of Ordnance (without ‘the’ in the title) 
the fourth military member of the six–member Army Board.28 As a voting 
member of the Army Board, he was to represent the design, manufacture, 
and use of all weaponry and associated equipment. Between the Master 
General of Ordnance and the Quartermaster General, all equipment 
required to field the British Army was represented. 
The Master General of Ordnance was tasked with the design and 
policy of all ordnance for the government. The task was in reality executed 
by a group of serving officers from both services. This was an unusual case 
of interservice synergy that military and naval historians have missed in this 
period. This group was an inheritance from the old Board of Ordnance, 
and the Master General of Ordnance appointed the group’s head. The 
President of the Ordnance Committee and, after 1907, The President of 
the Ordnance Board was the Master General of Ordnance’s representative 
in the technical aspects of ordnance. The Committee/Board of Ordnance 
was a truly diverse group of officers as members and civilian associate 
members who were charged with running the daily and strategic functions 
of all things ordnance. The Presidency of this group traditionally rotated 
between a naval and army flag officer, with the other service providing the 
vice president of the group. After the Boer War, though the presidency 
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was dominated by a string of generals, although due to the composition of 
the group, this appears to have not altered the balance and bias of the 
group in favour of one service over another. The Board was the lead 
agency in running experiments, testing, inspection, interaction with the 
trade, specification, and design for all British ordnance.  
Importantly, the Ordnance Board has received no historical study of 
its role in the British military hierarchy. Its papers, held under the SUPP 6 
headings at The National Archives, have been scantily researched. This is 
especially true for histories of the British Army. Traditional histories of the 
service primarily deal with operational history, which often focuses on the 
role of the infantry, with little understanding of the role of the Royal 
Regiment of Artillery within the larger context. There have been recent 
studies on the evolution of artillery tactics, most notably Sanders Marble’s 
British Artillery of the Western Front in the First World War (2013). Such 
books though do not engage with how ordnance was designed or 
manufactured, nor with technical issues such as the cost or useful life of 
guns.  
The historiography of the Royal Navy is by the very nature of the 
service, more interested in manufacturing issues. Ian Buxton is currently 
the preeminent writer on the British naval shipbuilding industry as a whole 







(2013) co–written with Ian Johnston, discusses the ordnance trade, 
especially Vickers and Armstrongs, although many of these studies are 
based upon secondary works that are now quite aged and based on 
mediocre research.  
The contrast between historiographies reflects the greater capital 
intensity of the naval service. Officers and the general public were more 
aware of the industrial needs of the navy. In Britain, the peacetime army 
has traditionally been small, and before 1900 manufacturing occurred 
within the confines of Government–owned factories, with low public 
prominence. Only in wartime did the army require vast industrial 
resources on the scale of a peacetime navy. In addition, very few army 
officers were engaged in managing the army’s industrial supply , and thus 
fewer people had experience in it.  
The Service Technical Chiefs and Staffs 
The Director of Naval Ordnance was the chief naval lead in all 
things explosive. Traditionally a Royal Navy Captain billet, the DNO as the 
office was known, was a very powerful force in the bureaucratic hierarchy 
of the Admiralty. The Director of Naval Ordnance made the leap between 
the ordnance deployed in units afloat and the experimental, research, and 







The Director of Artillery was the professional head of the three 
regiments of artillery in the British Army; the Royal Horse Artillery, the 
Royal Field Artillery, and the Royal Garrison Artillery. The Director of 
Artillery managed the requirements in the field and all other professional 
development of the Royal Regiment of Artillery. The Director of Artillery 
was the bureaucratic head of all gunners, although he was not the 
operational leader, the role that befell the Commander of Artillery, also in 
peacetime a Brigadier General.  
The Superintendent of Ordnance Stores was the Admiralty’s 
operational expert for ordnance. Theoretically under the power of the 
Director of Naval Ordnance, the Superintendent was the manager of all 
delivered ordnance assets to the Navy. His input into experimental and 
pre–production equipment was limited, and he was almost never consulted 
directly by the Board of Ordnance, although he was often consulted by the 
Director of Naval Ordnance in the above’s submissions to the Board.  
What is of most interest to historians is the lack of input the 
Director of Artillery and the Superintendent of Ordnance Stores had on 
managing the industrial base. Once either officer created a requirement, 
they had little chance of formally steering what end product the user 
community received. The annual reports of the Ordnance Board and 







Archives, suggest that little input was asked for and little was given. In large 
measure this was because both the Board/Committee and the operational 
leads, the Director of Artillery, and the Superintendent reported to the 
Master General of Ordnance (the Superintendent through the Director of 
Naval Ordnance). This was most clear in the War Office, where the 
operational leads were not under the same member of the Army Council. 
This potentially, and in reality did, provide the best ordnance to British 
forces based on scientific study, and not on bureaucratic bias. This key 
foundation must be understood to comprehend all decisions of 
procurement as well as any strategy dealing with armaments on both surf 
and turf.  
The Financial Staffs 
If money is power, then the Chief of the Financial Department, War 
Office was one of the most powerful men on Whitehall. The Finance 
Department of the War Office was the land warfare lead for not only the 
budgeting process but also the manager of finances for the Royal Factories 
as well as the liaison between the War Office and the Treasury. This 
position was held from its creation through the end of peace and beyond 
by Sir Charles Harris, one of the senior, long–term, civil servants who 







The Accountant General of the Navy was the Admiralty counterpart 
of the Financial Department, War Office. The position was also one held 
by senior civil servants. It had been established as part of the Admiralty 
reforms of the late 1820s and early 1830s that attempted to professionalize 
and streamline the staff work involved in managing the massive 
bureaucracy that was the Royal Navy.29 Its holder was supposed to answer 
directly to the Parliamentary Secretary, although as much financial work 
was long–term, the real power still remained with the Civil Lord.30 He was 
to advise the Board of Admiralty on financial issues as well as performing 
the audits that would confirm his independent status. This role in 
particular created and disseminated the free flow of accurate and up–to 
date information on all financial issues through the sea service.31  
Parliamentary Reporting 
In 1903, Parliament released the Report of His Majesty's 
Commissioners Appointed to Inquire into the Military Preparations and 
Other Matters Connected with the War in South Africa, which has since 
been known as the Elgin Committee Report. The findings and suggestions 
from this document were far–reaching, and set the strategic parameters as 
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to how the land forces were to be organized, and therefore how they would 
be able to be utilized. A far–reaching report such as Elgin’s might as often 
as not have been shelved, had it not been for the composition of the 
committee that wrote it. For the purposes of ordnance, the report affected 
the technical branches little.32  
The following year the War Office (Reconstitution) Committee met 
to look into needed reforms within the Army in light of the Elgin Report.33 
The Esher Committee, as it became known, proposed a massive reform of 
the combat arms, although, as in the Elgin Report, the technical staffs (and 
especially the ordnance staffs) would remain relatively unreformed. There 
were what appeared to be large shifts in reorganization of the staffs, but 
these shifts had little to do with the actual workloads or assignments. The 
Ordnance Board was to have all the powers that had been in the 1855 
reforms of the Board of Ordnance. The Master General of Ordnance 
remained the ultimate power over the Woolwich Arsenal complex and his 
inspectors remained in their assigned positions.  
The Ordnance Committee (and after 1908, the Ordnance Board) 
represented the true technical knowledge for the government as a whole. 
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The Committee/Board consisted of technical members of both the Army 
and Navy, and their decisions tended to represent the interests of the 
government as based on sound scientific principles, responsible fiscal 
prudence, and the two services joint effort of requirements in technical 
matters. The group met to discuss and act upon problems and strategies, as 
well as foreign intelligence for all ordnance issues.  
Challenges of Ordnance 
Ordnance in the period under study was the most technical element 
in any army or navy. It also was left almost exclusively to the military, to the 
exclusion of the civil service. The skills required of an officer engaged in its 
design, production, inspection or management differed greatly from any 
other engineering skill. It was even more exotic to officers of the line, the 
eventual end users. All operations require equipment, and more often than 
not, the limitations of its design commanded doctrine as a whole. 
Ordnance officers through the development of technology had to be the 
lead innovators of the service, through design, production, or as managers 
of acquisition. Although naval architects might sketch out battleships, 
without well–executed ordnance, a ship of war is no more than an 
expensive ocean liner. Likewise, field guns that lacked range or mobility 







Although British taxpayers wanted to give their soldiers the best, 
ordnance staffs still dealt with economy, a byword for both cost and price. 
The latter is simply the amount of Pounds Sterling required for the needs 
of the service. The former is a much more difficult concept to appreciate, 
even in hindsight. Every expenditure by the Treasury required not only an 
assessment of pros and cons, a best-use analysis, and other economic 
appreciations, but also a concerted calculation of political worth to all 
stakeholders of the process. This appeared in influences from party 
platforms to individual Members of Parliament to the user communities to 
members of the trade at all stages of the supply chain. In almost every 
funding debate, the Hansard is filled with these sorts of questions. In the 
cost realm, the price of military expenditure can sometimes be secondary 
to real and perceived issues at the forefront of a host of groups and 
individuals. These calculations became driving points for the post–Boer 
War army and navy.  
Murray Report (1907) 
1907 saw a major rethink of how the Government acquired warlike 
stores. The Murray Report was the latest in a series of reports and 
committees since at least the reopening of gun orders to the Trade. Many 







plant. The government accountants always looked to save money wherever 
possible, and the Woolwich Arsenal especially was seen as a place not only 
for experimentation, but also for possible income. These studies were as 
diverse as the complex itself, from a 1902 War Office report on the 
management of the factory to a critique of the need for the Birmingham 
Small Arms Factory, which was sold off as excess in 1905.34 Woolwich and 
the other factories were the largest and most complex of all government 
owned facilities, with their only competitor being the Admiralty yards.  
The analysis of the 1907 report was conducted by the Government 
Factories and Workshops Committee, known more frequently as the 
Murray Committee, after its chair, Sir G.H. Murray, the Permanent 
Secretary to the Treasury. The committee was given the task of finding if 
the government factories could be run more efficiently and if any closures 
could be conducted. The committee took a holistic view to the system and 
then analysed every factory individually.    
The copy of the report sent to the War Office for comment, as one 
would expect, offers more insight into the reception of the report than the 
report itself. The report analysis was written on 27 May by the Permanent 
Secretary of the War Office, Col. Sir. Edward Willis Duncan Ward, a full 
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month before public publication. According to his analysis, the most 
important finding of the committee was the idea of a need for a minimum 
permanent staff for the arsenal.35 The policy was suggested with the 
understanding that enough work would be available to keep that minimum 
number efficiently employed. Striking this balance would be the most 
difficult of tasks at Woolwich, as the War Office was uneasy about 
producing commercial items in what overseeing Parliamentarians 
considered government subsidised factories, as their constituents could 
argue that the Royal Factories were undercutting the commercial 
competition with an unfair advantage. On the other hand, in peacetime, 
and especially after the recapitalization of the Royal Artillery, there simply 
was not enough work to go around and keep the factories with enough of a 
backlog to justify maintaining thousands of highly skilled employees in 
peacetime. Nonetheless, the civil servant accountants were well aware that 
there was a cost involved in losing seasoned machinists, forge masters, and 
draftsmen apprenticed in the most exacting, demanding, and most 
industrially advanced trade in the world: gunmaking. They also knew that if 
certain capacities were lost in either machinery or manpower it was 
unlikely that the capacity could be regained within a generation, if ever. In 
addition, the same civil servants had seen the actual figures for the amounts 
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spent in the 1899–1902 emergency, which was well in excess of ordinary 
expenditure. Many, including the War Office chief auditor, Charles Harris, 
believed that part of the Boer War excess was in part not maintaining a 
proper level of peacetime ordinary expenditure before 1899. Accordingly, 
the largest element of this ordinary cost was skilled labour. This was 
accounted in the War Office stating the absolute minimum of peacetime 
employment at 12,000 in Woolwich, compared to the committee’s 
10,600.36 The total amount employed at Woolwich, what that workforce 
did to maintain needed skills, and who would pay for it would not go away 
any time soon. The Murray Report would have far reaching consequences 
for not just Woolwich but the entire industrial base for years to come.  
Ordering policies 
One of the most interesting portions of the Murray Report was a 
challenge to the location of the plant at Woolwich. The Government had 
just sold off the Birmingham Small Arms Factory to a private firm, the 
Birmingham Small Arms Company. Parliamentary ‘concern’ also aired the 
issue of whether the Government complex at Woolwich should also go the 
same way. The committee was adamant on their standings that Woolwich 
was ideally suited for the job, and based this on the argument that although 
                                           







labour was more expensive in London it had the invaluable benefit of 
providing a surge capacity needed during wartime mobilisation until trade 
plants that relied on unskilled labour could be converted to military 
production. The committee would have been acutely aware of the tenuous 
situation of the East End of London by this time. The financial crisis 
caused by the failure of the banking and investment firm Overend Gurney 
in 1866 forced the liquidation of most of the Thames shipbuilders, and the 
last major shipbuilder on the Thames, Thames Ironworks, permanently 
closed its doors in 1906, effectively ending a major source of income and 
employment for the surrounding neighbourhoods.37 Yarrow Shipyard left 
the Thames in 1908 for Scotstoun, on the Clyde, as part of the 
Government sponsored reforms in armaments that created the Coventry 
Ordnance Works, which will be considered in more detail in the next 
chapter.38 The Admiralty had already submitted formally its concerns 
during and after the Boer War as naval orders were unable to be inspected 
and dealt with in an overcrowded arsenal. The Admiralty wanted to 
completely divest itself of the arsenal as late as 1906, but financial reasons, 
along with new construction projects eventually maintained the status quo.39 
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The shutting down of the Arsenal would have cost over 5,000 engineering 
jobs and would have severely distressed the London labour market. The 
committee proposed little in changing the status quo, primarily because 
they understood that the importance of the Arsenal went far beyond the 
immediate area or even the armaments industry.  
The Royal Gun Factory and Royal Carriage Factory, Woolwich, 
were never designed to be able to compete on parity with the trade. The 
factories had two main purposes, both of which the committee found 
outweighed the costs of maintaining it. First, Woolwich acted as an 
insurance policy in time of conflict. As the factories were kept at a higher 
state of reserve than any commercial plant could ever be kept, the unused 
plant could be immediately used to start military production in a conflict 
whilst the trade retooled their factories for government orders. This was 
expected and planned to take six months. Second, as these plants 
produced the same products as were being purchased from the trade, the 
experts at Woolwich could be used to determine if pricing was fair and the 
quality through inspection was at a sufficient level. This second point 
became more important as the Government purchased technically 
advanced guns, especially for the Admiralty.40  
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The Admiralty on the other hand was in the middle of a quandary. 
It was modernizing the fleet with new vessels of all sorts, and new guns of 
all sizes were needed. Unfortunately for the Admiralty, as its orders were 
not seen to be as urgent as those of the ‘fighting’ service during the Boer 
War, it was required to restrict orders. The Admiralty also believed that 
Woolwich was too important for the overall efficiency of the country’s 
industry. Not only was the site a manufacturer, but it was also the primary 
inspection, repair, and storage facility for all British ordnance. Although it 
was not as pressing for the army, the size of naval guns forced almost 
exclusive use of transport via barge from Woolwich to wherever new 
equipment was needed, primarily Portsmouth. The navy as early as 1906 
requested a committee to look into this single point of failure as a likely 
choke point in time of war.41  
Obsolescence 
The expenditure of munitions during the Boer War would have 
been utilized as a way of getting rid of old stock. After the introduction of 
quick firing, or QF, artillery starting in 1896, the British field artillery had 
become obsolescent. Quick firing artillery combined into one platform the 
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advances of the second industrial revolution into one deadly machine. The 
quick in the name came from the introduction of fixed munitions: that is 
both the propellant (cordite) and the projectile were sealed into a single 
object, thus removing loading steps. These guns also included a 
recuperator based on either alone or in battery with springs, hydraulic, or 
pneumatic assist in countering the recoil and returning quickly a gun to 
firing position.42 The older 15–pr breech–loading guns that the British 
Army were equipped with in South Africa would have had no place in a 
front–line arsenal in a European war. The Royal Artillery saw no future 
with the 15-pr equipment, and set up a committee before the war was even 
out.  
In a memorandum written in 1909 by Richard Burdon Haldane, the 
then Secretary of State for War, ‘their (Regular Army with its Reserves) 
main thesis was the following: That the sole object of any military system in 
peace is to provide for a state of war, and the test of any peace organization 
must be its power… to place forces and maintain efficiently’43 If this was 
indeed the strategy for using British troops, then the country would have to 
maintain an organic capability to supply such troops. Both stated objectives 
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required an industrial base to be ready to produce on the first day of a 
conflict, a difficult task that would test policy makers. It would also require 
a permanent and persistent industrial footprint for the military, an idea that 
marked a change from Victorian ideals and political desires.  
Reforms in the Services 
This industrial footprint would have to be managed by those in the 
government who understood the technical nature of arms procurement. 
The executive tasked with managing the ordnance resources (as well as 
many other non–warlike stores) of the army was the Master General of the 
Ordnance. The Master General of the Ordnance had been, since 1855, on 
an ‘a Board consisting of–1, Secretary of State; 2, Secretary at War; 
3, Master General of Ordnance; 4, Commander in Chief; 5, Inspector 
General of Fortifications’ as well as chairing the Board of Ordnance44 The 
Master General of the Ordnance was also in charge of the Ordnance 
Factories, setting standards, and overall command of much of the 
procurement by the government. In general, this command was headed by 
someone who had served earlier in their career with the Royal Regiment of 
Artillery, the primary customer of the goods and services under his 
command.  
                                           







The Royal Navy was somewhat more insulated from sudden public 
emotional swings of interest in their industrial base. As naval guns were 
seen as an integral and non–severable requirement of a warship, their need 
was more recognized as a key portion of the effectiveness of the fleet. As 
well, a psychology of scale must have also played some part, as the massive 
scale of the navy’s floating structures would have awed and inspired, but 
also made the point that these vessels were a far cry from the commercial 
requirements of merchant shipowners, and would have limited the 
criticism of ‘armchair admirals’ who might have thought they knew better 
than the designers and users based at Whitehall.  
Sub–Contracting 
The Government had a policy of ordering pre–manufactured inner 
‘A’ tubes as well as outer ‘A’ tubes for larger guns from the trade for use in 
final manufacture at the Ordnance Factories. These tubes when mated 
together, the inside inserted within the outer one, created the basic artillery 
tube. The Government’s subcontracting of raw forgings was primarily to 
widen the industrial base to firms who could not build whole guns, but had 
the ability to produce high quality finished forgings which could then be 
used by the Royal Gun Factory to produce the final completed guns. This 







Army Contracts Department though felt that they were getting the worse of 
the deal. In 1905, it became apparent that a ‘ring’ existed among the 
suppliers, which cost the government more than it should have to buy 
forgings.45 The ring had existed for several years, and during the Boer War, 
Messrs Taylor of Leeds went some way to breaking it by not selling their 
forgings at the elevated rates, which was noted by the Director of Army 
Contracts in his end of war report.46 Taylor’s position, though, was 
compromised when they also conformed with the ring and increased prices 
in FY 1903.47 Of note, a ring for gun wire had been attempted in 1901, 
although it was not successful.48  
The Government had the ability to produce ‘A’ tube forgings for all 
guns in the arsenal in the period between 1900 and 1914 through the 
foundry at Woolwich at least in theory, but it chose not to exercise the 
option for guns above 6–inch in bore diameter. This was based upon a 
policy set forth in an 1885 pledge to steelmakers that was ‘confirmed’ in 
1891 and 1900.49 The Director of Army Finance, Sir G.D.A. Fleetwood 
Wilson, determined that the firms were indeed defrauding the government 
through a rigged bidding process, and determined that the Royal Gun 
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Factory would resort to opening up the foundry for the smaller tubes if 
prices did not drop. The contract solicitation for the 7.5–inch gun tubes 
was rescinded that year as a direct result, and as a sign that the War Office 
would not do business with those who they saw as not acting in good faith.50 
It is not clear if indeed the Royal Gun Factory foundry made billets for the 
7.5s in 1905, and the first 7.5–inch guns ever made at Woolwich came in 
FY 1906 when one 7.5–inch Mark II was delivered, followed by twelve in 
FY 1907, six Mark IIs and six Mark Vs.51 In FY 1908 the Government 
decided to try to make a 12–inch forging for the first time, which required 
sourcing the steel from the trade. As a whole, the Trade refused to sell the 
necessary raw materials to the Royal Gun Factory. After this rejection, a 
meeting of steelmakers was called to discuss the practices, and eventually 
Beardmore and Armstrongs were willing to supply the steel.52  
Naval Issues 
The introduction of HMS Dreadnought to the world in 1906 
changed permanently the ordnance industry. The new battleships required 
many more capital guns, (those of 12–inch bore diameter and above) than 
were before. These guns were more expensive to procure and maintain 
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than were previous generations of battleships. The relative and not 
absolute nature of armaments, especially for navies meant that this 
investment was a requirement of a world power. The issues associated with 
a large–gun supply chain would become normal for the remainder of the 
battleship era. The introduction of the all big gun battleship created 
challenges for all sides, but especially staffs, as the management of design in 
a quickly evolving world of technology required technical staffs both in and 
out of uniform who could get the best out of industry capability as well as 
managing the funding requirements for the new classes of ship required to 
mount them.  
Amazingly though, the Dreadnought’s guns were a product of the 
previous century. The massive 45 foot (at the bore) guns were constructed 
of carbon steel inner ‘A’ tubes, which had started to give the Admiralty (or 
more specifically the Director of Naval Ordnance) second thoughts about 
the high-velocity projectiles now entering service. Reports began to trickle 
back in 1902 reporting splits in guns or failures on yearly gunnery 
exercises. These guns had survived the initial proof before acceptance, 
which was between 23 and 27 per cent above the standard combat 
pressures in the breech.53 This worrying setback caused the Director of 
Naval Ordnance, on the advice of the Master General of Ordnance and 
                                           








the Inspector of Woolwich, to implement nickel into the manufacturing 
process. This had already been done with several countries that had built–
up naval guns, unlike the British wire wound guns, primarily the United 
States and Germany. 
New Materials 
In January of 1903 the trade was asked about their experience and 
willingness to utilize nickel steel. Vickers, Elswick, T. Firth and sons, C. 
Cammell and Co., J. Spencer and Sons, Beardmore and Sons, Taylor, 
Bros. and Co, and Ince Forge all responded. With the exception of 
Taylor, all could supply nickel steel, although the specifications as to 
percentage of nickel, tensile strength and elastic limit were all over the 
map, and it was apparent no constant had been developed by the trade yet. 
Ince was removed from the list of manufacturers in FY 1904 as they were 
unable to produce their own steel.54 Standard operating procedures that 
come with the maturation through the use of and experimentation with 
manufacture had also not been decided on. For instance, the firms could 
not decide if oil–hardened nickel steel was best, with Vickers even asking 
for ‘liberty to oil harden or not at their opinion’55 Although little was 
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discovered, the Committee decided to order a few inner A tubes for the 6–
inch Mark VII, the primary gun for all experiments, and the results would 
be discovered in 1904.  
Accuracy and Gun Failures  
In 1904, there was a massive gunnery exercise in the Mediterranean, 
designed to test shell velocities for new gun tables. Obviously the 
calibration of guns was a very important issue for the Admiralty, and much 
more important than works previously written have suggested. ‘The desire 
to eliminate all possible causes of error is shared by every thinking 
artillerist’56  
‘The inherent error of the gun is a factor that is commonly 
neglected. The inventor of a telescopic, or of a delicate orthopaedic sight, if 
uninstructed in its effects, would argue that if he succeeded in hitting the 
bull’s–eye of a target at a long range, he should be able to plant shot after 
shot on the same spot. The gunmaker, however, will tell him that want of 
accuracy in the gun will render such a thing impossible. When all possible 
corrections have been made there will always remain these two, viz., 
atmospheric conditions and the inherent error of the gun. The first can be 
met, as has been suggested, by accurate observation of fire; the second will 
                                           







be minimised more and more as our knowledge of the construction of 
guns and projectiles, and propellants, increases.’57 
Letters were sent out to contractors in 1905 asking whether this 
transition from carbon to nickel steel was practicable for the supply chain. 
Armstrongs’ response was wholeheartedly positive although Vickers 
challenged the specification, believing it was too stringent. No further 
evidence seems to be available as to whether Vickers actually conformed or 
not to the Government specification. Vickers’ response seemed to be the 
start of frustrating relations between contractor and government, and this 
tension would put them directly into confrontation throughout the period 
studied.  
Nonetheless, accidents with primary and secondary guns still 
happened. On summer exercises on 23 June 1905 HMS Magnificent had 
one of her 6’ guns fail catastrophically. It appeared from the casualty report 
to the Master General of Ordnance that it had less to do with the material 
than training, as the breech was opened improperly after a misfire, but this 
nonetheless surely did not reassure the MGO. That same summer, hang 
fires from quick firing guns (likely 12–prs) on Hyacinth and Irresistible 
added to the difficulties and poor morale of both designers and users. 58 
With three guns failing, one fatally, in one summer exercise, how much 
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longer would the Royal Navy stand by before forcing redesigns of their 
guns? 
The effects of this decision created a compressed learning curve for 
British manufacturers with the new material, and as more production 
results were analysed quick advances in gun design occurred. The advances 
help explain the succession within a decade of battleship guns evolving 
from 12–inch guns to 13.5–inch and finally the 15–inch guns, all equal to 
or in excess of 45 calibres. (In artillery a calibre is the diameter of a 
projectile. The term is used to measure the length of a barrel. For example 
a 12-inch, 40 calibre gun would have a 40-foot long barrel from the start of 
the rifling.) These high shell-weight, high velocity, very high pressure guns 
would have been impossible under the technology of the carbon tubes. 
The technical issues of each of these problems will be discussed in full in 
chapters five and six. 
The determination of the Admiralty to have more control over their 
orders became more pronounced in the period leading to 1914. By the 
1908–1909 fiscal year, the Admiralty had for the first time allowed 
contractual control of warlike stores, which led to the Admiralty making 
more direct contact with the trade both financially and as to design. In a 
note declaring the design element of this new policy the ‘DNO, 17.4.09, 







naval guns would be obtained by them in direct consultation with the gun–
making Firms, the design proposed for adoption being subsequently 
referred to the Board for the benefit of their remarks, in accordance with 
O.B. Instructions Paragraph 2IV. (b) The practice of referring to the 
Board any point in connection with paragraph 2 I. of the same instructions, 
would be continued.’59 The Admiralty was carving out more autonomy of 
design. This was finally allowed as the large guns that the Admiralty were 
designing had previously also been used by the Garrison Artillery to 
defend the coasts and harbours, although these defences were now for all 
intents ad purposes finished, and the Navy became the only customer of 
the large guns.  
The new Admiralty powers were challenged several times between 
1908 and 1912, when the Chief Superintendent of Ordnance Factories and 
the Army Contracts Department protested to the Admiralty for not placing 
a ‘fair share’ of orders with the Ordnance Factories, as per the 
requirements of the Murray Committee, as well as the long–standing 
practice of giving the Trade and Woolwich a ‘fair share’.60  
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The Boer War 
From the perspective of artillery, the Boer War of 1899–1902 was to 
be fought as the last vestige of the 19th century. Analysts after the war, both 
in and out of Parliament, argued that the Royal Ordnance Factories alone 
could not produce enough quantitatively for the South African campaigns. 
This failure, both real and perceived, of the War Office became the 
mental image for committees through at least 1907.  
The Boer War created two very different conflicts for planners 
depending on which side of Whitehall they worked. The War Office, 
which was assigned with fighting the conflict on land, had not only to 
manage armies on the other side of the globe, but also their suppliers at 
home. The Admiralty however had to keep the world’s largest bureaucracy 
ready around the world with restricted industrial resources. The challenges 
of each would drive their post–war policies of how to mitigate risks and 
fight the next war.  
Haldane Reforms 
The Haldane reforms in 1907 created the nucleus of both the 
British Expeditionary Forces (BEF) as well as the Territorial Army. 







formation, the reforms did almost nothing to address the demands of 
artillery. The Royal Artillery used equipment ordered under the Royal 
Artillery rearmament in March 1905 discussed in the next chapter. The 
older styles of guns were wheeled out of storage to the Territorial Army 
(TA) whilst the new BEF had been outfitted with the new 18–pr and 13–pr 
quick firing guns. The TA was designed to be a reorganization of several 
units, including the militia and the yeomanry. Therefore, it was not 
planned for them to need front–line artillery in their defensive role. Most 
striking, no field or horse artillery would be ordered from the trade from 
the reforms well into the next decade, with the exception of the 
replacement howitzers.  
Allocation 
Arguably the most important government policy throughout the late 
Victorian and Edwardian periods was the policy of allocation. It was the 
Government’s policy of purchasing from both the Trade and the 
Government Factories, based on a percentage. The percentages were 
based both on past experiences as well as the needs of economically 
keeping each stakeholder with the legitimate margins to stay open and 
competitive. For guns, the percentage was pegged in 1907 to be one–third 







the Trade. For other trades such as munitions, the percentage was much 
higher skewed to the Government.61 Notwithstanding, the Government was 
not above breaking the allocation rules when it made fiscal sense. For runs 
that would not be economically expedient, the orders usually went to the 
Royal Gun Factory, so that the Government would only have to pay for 
one set of tooling. These percentages were based on actual weapon 
numbers and not on cost alone. This consistency in the ordering position 
theoretically allowed the private Trade to plan capital investment and to 
lower risk. Unfortunately, Army orders were all but consistent. In regard to 
field artillery, not a single 13–pr or 18–pr was ordered from the Trade after 
March 1906, and the last order above a single gun was made in March 
1905.62 Fiscal Year 1904–1905 represented the heyday of the arms 
industry, when 576 18–prs were ordered as well as 144 13–prs from the 
Trade.63 This represented an expenditure of £600,584 in orders to the 
trade, as well as an additional £146,283 to the Ordnance Factories for 
additional guns. Overall, the order for the Recapitalization of the field 
artillery was £1,602,339.64 
The only other orders for the British Army that came from the 
Trade consisted of the new 4.5–in quick–firing howitzers. This howitzer 
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was the first system designed by Coventry Ordnance Works to be accepted 
by H.M. Government and therefore, the company was given priority in 
purchase to the detriment to Armstrongs and Vickers. The first order in 
FY 1908 for five howitzers was placed at a relatively premium price of £430 
per gun. The main replacement order was placed in FY 1910 for 64 
howitzers, broken down into 32 for Coventry, and 16 for each of Vickers 
and Armstrongs. Interestingly, Coventry’s accepted price of £354 was 
substantially higher than the accepted price of £248 and £250 for Vickers 
and Armstrongs respectively.65 The latter two also proposed a price that 
was suspiciously close and suspiciously low, which might explain the lower 
numbers for each ordered by the government.  
With the Trade lacking the Army orders in the post–1905 period, 
the Trade required that the naval orders provide work. With this, the Navy 
complied en masse. The relationship between the Admiralty and the War 
Office in regards to ordnance was probably closer than any other single 
aspect. This was primarily down to the Army Contracts Office placing all 
orders for the Admiralty until officially 1907, although records show that in 
practice it did so for all years with the exception of Fiscal Years 1910–
1912.66 Although technically the Admiralty opened their own contracting 
shop, they were denied by the Treasury in April 1907 for a one-year trial 
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for Admiralty staff to place their own orders, with the rationale that the 
duplicate work would not be in the best interests of the Government as a 
whole.67 It was not until 27 March 1908 that the Admiralty was given 
permission to purchase their own warlike stores, with the 1908–09 Vote.68 
This permission was in all likelihood revoked due to a July 1912 
Treasury/War Office decision that the Admiralty placed an unfair share of 
orders with the Trade to the exclusion of the Ordnance Factories. 69 This 
balance of orders dominated Admiralty/War Office high level discussions 
and arguments, all of which had to be submitted to the Treasury Solicitors 
for settlement. This is the most obvious demonstration of Treasury control 
over the services, although many more cases existed.  
Changes in Business 
Although the army civil contracts staff executed ordnance contracts, 
the ordnance Votes for the Navy were still managed by Admiralty staff. 
The control over how to spend the Votes caused friction several times in 
the first decade of the century. In December 1901, The ‘Navy agreed to 
inform the W.O. (War Office) of their orders to Armstrongs & Vickers for 
Gun Mountings on the condition that the W.O. supply Admiralty with 
                                           









particulars of h. f. orders for garrison & siege Mtg.’70 The shared 
information on orders placed within the services maintained that 
competition and unnecessary price bidding was put at a minimum. As well, 
it represented a nascent management of the supply chain so that one 
company did not gain an unnecessary competitive advantage over the 
other. In February 1903, the services were forced by the Financial 
Secretary of the Treasury to share blacklists with each other, that is, of 
contractors who had been banned from submitting bids to the Government 
due to poor performance on previous contracts.71 After the incorporation 
of Coventry Ordnance Works, the Admiralty wanted to limit their 
competition in guns to the Ordnance Factories, Armstrongs, and Vickers, 
which the Army strongly opposed. The matter could not be settled 
between the two services so was sent to the Treasury for decision. The 
Treasury responded on 2 March 1906 that the War Office policy of free 
competition for all those who could compete was the best approach for the 
Government, and forced the Admiralty to include all in the competitions.72 
Part of the argument put forth by the Admiralty at the time was due to a 
battle between the two Whitehall civil staffs on the role of patents and how 
this affected the choice and capacity of the industrial base. This will be 
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discussed in more detail in subsequent chapters. The decision showed 
vividly that the preferred and possibly only arbitration on policy was the 
Treasury, making the office a powerful player in regards to industrial 
policy.  
Annual Reporting 
Most annual reports dealing with ordnance and the ‘warlike stores’, 
as they were secret, were channelled through the Financial Secretary to the 
Treasury. This position was a low–level job for a junior Minister who 
almost never sat in the Cabinet. The holder though had access unrivalled 
by any other position in the Government. The post was a clearing house 
for all financial matters, as well as matters that might at one time need 
funding. In the procurement world, that include everything. As the first 
person to see the reports, the Financial Secretary also had the first contact 
with agencies over clarification or comments. In Herbert Asquith’s Liberal 
Government, the position was particularly powerful, as the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, David Lloyd George, was not terribly interested in the daily 
aspects of the job. One of his Financial Secretaries, Charles Hobhouse, 
quipped in his journal, ‘Lloyd George will look at no papers, and do no 







went off golfing, leaving Murray and myself to deal with the matter.’73 In 
these cases the political secretaries took on power well in excess of their 
stated titles and party rank.  
Most important of all personalities were the civil staffs who quietly 
but consistently carried out their duties while their political and military 
colleagues rotated. The civil staffs, as mentioned earlier, had statutory 
authority for particular tasks that made their long–term service the 
institution of core knowledge. These positions were mainly in finance and 
related tasks that were thankless for those in military service and could 
more easily end careers than enhance them.  
Conclusion 
It is within this base that the demand for ordnance stood on in July 
1914. The War Office had not placed a substantial ordnance order to the 
Trade in half a generation. The Admiralty continued placing orders for 
some of the world’s largest steel castings and finished guns at an increasing 
rate. Policy had developed greatly from the crisis of the 1899–1902 period, 
with the Admiralty building ever larger strategic imperial reserves while the 
Army had fully re-equipped six divisions with some of the heaviest guns 
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that could be put into the mobile field of battle. Nonetheless, the needs of 
the services are just one half of the story. The demand had to be met with 
an industrial base that could build what the country needed. The country 
thus relied on both the Trade and the Royal Factories to execute the will of 
the people, or at least the politicians.  
Demand was based upon the legal, cultural, political, and risk 
frameworks that existed in the United Kingdom in the Edwardian period. 
The experiences of South Africa were the baseline for most services in 
determining how they would outfit, recapitalize, build reserves, and interact 
with industry. The Murray Report would be the predominant single piece 
of policy not only for the Ordnance Factories, but by the Trade as well. 









CHAPTER THREE: BRITISH GOVERNMENTAL POLICIES ON 
SUPPLY OF ARTILLERY, 1900–1914 
 ‘Trade price and trade cost are different things. I do not see any 
reason why you should not have the prices of every trade–made article in 
which you are interested. Personally, I do not remember such a request 
coming forward to the War Office’74  
–Sir Charles Harris 
      
One cannot have arms without suppliers. No matter how strong the 
demand is, without those who can supply the ordered products in a timely, 
cost effective, and technically proficient manner, the armed forces are 
useless. Supplying a force can take many forms, with sources from 
domestic to international and state–owned to private industry and 
everything in between. In the case of British forces, the strategy of 
procurement was decided through the policies set forth in the 
Parliamentary debates seen in the previous section, paired with necessity, 
international need, and opportunity.  
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This chapter will discuss the governmental and industrial factors 
influencing supply from the armaments industry in order to understand 
what capacities and capabilities the government buyers had to work with, 
and what drove designs for everything from post–Dreadnought battleships 
to field artillery. The chapter starts with an historical overview of the trade 
followed by an in–depth analysis of manufacturers from 1900 to 1914 from 
the perspectives of management and capacity. The role of exports and 
government policy will also be analysed. The largest sections of the chapter 
deal with technology and how it affected armaments. All of this will 
illuminate the capacity and history of Britain’s ordnance trade before July 
1914.  
Historical Supply Chain 
From 1862 until 1888, the British Government did not purchase a 
single service gun from the Trade as a matter of policy.75 The Royal 
Factories, based at Woolwich, in south–east London produced the entirety 
of the Government’s orders. It was not until technology advanced, along 
with persistent lobbying from the engineering industry, that the 
Government Factories lost their monopoly. From 1888 until the turn of 
the century, the new breech–loading guns entered the Government’s 
                                           







armouries and vessels and changed armaments for Western Europe and 
the world.  
The post–1888 relationship with industry is most important to this 
thesis. The Government maintained a close relationship with suppliers. 
This was a product of circumstance as much as anything. The 
requirements in plant outlay demanded massive investment in specialized 
machinery that was not commercially viable for any purpose or customer 
other than government orders. Throughout this period the relationship 
between customer and supplier was complementary, and not one of 
dependence, as the Government Factories had the necessary capacity to 
execute all the needs of the services and were able to produce all that the 
trade could. As long as the state maintained the element of control, a 
‘military–industrial complex’ could not arise as the state remained the key 
factor.  
Unlike most industries and plants that produced warlike stores, gun 
making required an exceptionally large proportion of high–skilled labour. 
The Murray Report in 1907 mentioned this several times as a primary 
reason why the Royal Gun Factory was unable to find much labour 
economy in peace due to the skilled and valuable people who worked 
there. Ordnance production required large numbers of engineers, or 







labour force, especially in the Trade, were the embodiment of years of 
artisanship in the United Kingdom.  
The supply chain of ordnance was as evenly spread out as could be 
planned. From the Thames, to the River Clyde; from the east coast to the 
west coast, and even the inland heart of steel making, located at Sheffield, 
each location gave particular advantages and disadvantages, including 
labour, raw materials, and proximity to political and economic power. 
Each also represented the style of business that their particular region 
encapsulated.  
In addition to the highly skilled labour force, a recurring theme of 
the producers of armaments was the vertically–integrated nature of the 
industry in which they operated. The producers were some of the largest 
industrial companies in the country and had the ability to cast and forge all 
the necessary parts in house, without having to go to second–tier suppliers 
for smaller components such as inner barrel tubes, although from time to 
time some did when it fitted business needs. The very nature of ordnance 
required investment in plant not required for any commercial need. For 
instance, plants had to have the ability to move barrels in excess of 50 
tonnes to simply manufacture, requiring everything to be titanic in scale 







The Mature Trade  
Sir W. G. Armstrong Whitworth & Co. (Ltd.) was the worldwide 
originator of all–steel artillery, and was arguably the greatest engineering 
company in the world by 1900. Armstrongs, as the firm were known on a 
daily basis, was based in Elswick, near Newcastle upon Tyne. In technical 
documents, the name of Elswick was also used, especially by the Ordnance 
Committee, to differentiate from their offices and plant at Openshaw, 
Manchester. The Manchester offices were assumed when Armstrongs 
purchased Whitworth, a long–term competitor. The majority of the guns 
produced by Armstrongs were produced at the Elswick site, although the 
Openshaw facilities were able to also produce much of the Armstrongs line 
of ordnance. The firm could design and build everything in the British 
arsenal during the first decade of the 20th century. Sir W.G. Armstrong had 
modernized the Royal Arsenals from 1859–1863 when he was the 
Superintendent of the Royal Gun Factory, Woolwich. His had a large 
presence in shipbuilding for the Admiralty and through their several plants 
around Newcastle were able to build an industrial empire that continued 
after the death of its founder in 1887. The company was the primary 







of the company were greatly influenced by the scale and regularity of 
orders coming from Whitehall.76 
Armstrongs had been the primary ordnance designer outside of 
Woolwich from the 1880s through the start of the 20th century, although 
this primacy was fading after the Boer War. No evidence for this fall from 
grace is in the records, and their quality of work was certainly the best in 
the trade, if rejection rates alone are looked at.77 Armstrongs also led the 
transition to nickel steel, which will be discussed more fully in the next 
chapter. Armstrongs’ capacity and quality ensured the company as a world 
leader throughout the period. By examining their export orders, 
Armstrongs supplied many rising and established world powers around the 
globe who did not have the industrial capacity to build their own weapons 
of war. After 1899, the firm was led by Sir Andrew Noble, a fellow of the 
Royal Society, the premier club for scientifically minded men in Victorian 
England.  
Vickers (Ltd.) was also a leading design and manufacturing house for 
Government contracts, as well as the British leader in arms exports to 
foreign states. Located in Barrow–in–Furness, (today in Cumbria) their first 
business venture into the armaments sector was not in artillery, but in 
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machine guns. Vickers first paired with the American inventor Hiram 
Maxim in 1884 to produce the weapons in England.78 The originally South 
Yorkshire and later Cumbrian company in the 1880s and 1890s created 
and furthered the original wire–wound gun designs that would become the 
dominant construction technique for British ordnance. Vickers, like 
Armstrong, were heavily engaged with shipbuilding for the Admiralty and 
helped to dominate the 1890s armour market that drove further 
experimental metallurgical work with newly possible blends that would 
make it into their gun designs later. Their River Don Plant in Sheffield, 
Yorkshire, provided the guns for both the domestic and, importantly for 
the company, foreign markets.79  
The Vickers staff was dominated by James Dawson, a former 
Lieutenant of the Royal Navy who had been picked by Vickers from the 
staff of the Royal Gun Factory. Dawson had technical knowledge of the 
latest research and design being conducted by the Government as well as 
important pricing data. His intelligence would be the driving factor for the 
company for the next 20 years. With Dawson, Vickers branched out into 
designs for all sizes of guns, including designing all the big–guns for the 
Admiralty in the second decade of the century. Vickers, like Armstrongs 
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also built ships out of their Cumbria plant, although unlike their Elswick 
competition, they did little outside of armaments, focusing on defence 
engineering only. This business model was one that the company 
flourished in, but it also forced them to be much more aggressive with the 
Government than Armstrongs, a trait that would appear again and again. 
Vickers had similar capacity in sheer size to Armstrongs, and could make 
anything needed in house, and if they did not, they would expand, 
assuming a business model of tailor to the Government’s needs or die.  
Several other works based around Sheffield produced parts of 
ordnance for the primary manufacturers. Firms such as Cammell Laird 
from their Cyclops Works, Sheffield, John Brown at Atlas Works, and 
Hadfields from Hecla Works, as well as other steel manufacturers were 
crucial to the overall industry, although because they were still primarily 
commercial firms, providing smaller components, they were both less 
represented in governmental correspondence and not represented in 
design competitions. These firms are almost wholly absent from the 
historiography. They were also rarely mentioned in contracts as they acted 
as subcontractors of larger orders and, except on rare occasions, these 
contracts were not considered important to record. Unfortunately their 
study falls outside of the general scope of this thesis, although it is an area 








The Royal Factories consisted of a group of Government owned 
industries engaged in producing a wide variety of goods. The works were 
primarily located at Woolwich, in southeast London, although other parts 
of the group included the Royal Small Arms Factory at Enfield, the Royal 
Gunpowder Factory works at Waltham Abbey, and even the Royal Army 
Clothing Factory at Pimlico, London and the Post Office Factories. The 
Woolwich works included the Royal Gun Factory, the Royal Carriage 
Factory, the shell filling factory and Royal Laboratory. The running of this 
complex enterprise fell to the War Office, finely balancing a myriad of 
political, fiscal, and military decisions as to its daily operation. All factories 
operated under a joint mandate, with all ordnance factories producing 
goods for both the Royal Navy and British Army. Both services also 
therefore helped fund the factories through their annual Votes. Each of the 
factories ran effectively as a semi–independent organization, with each 
factory getting its own budget votes for its operation, through the larger 
service budgets. For the scope of this study, we are only interested in the 
Royal Gun Factory.  
The Royal Gun Factory, Woolwich was the primary Government 







was very different from the other parts of the Woolwich complex as it was 
the only factory to use almost exclusively skilled labour. Woolwich utilized 
this skilled labour force as the primary means of maintaining accurate price 
estimations, as it was the only site in the whole of the government that had 
built artillery types that were being tendered for bidding in the trade. 
Woolwich also maintained the inspectors who were in charge of accepting 
or rejecting any work submitted under contract from the Trade. This 
extremely important task would have been much more difficult to do 
without understanding all of the ins and outs of the systems that were being 
submitted.  
In British India, the Indian-Government owned Cossipore 
Manufacture commenced working on quick–firing guns soon after the field 
artillery specification was created in 1905. It was hoped that the Gun 
factory at Cossipore, Calcutta would be able to supply 18–pr. and 13–pr. 
guns during 1906–190780 Yet by May of 1907, it was reported that 
difficulties had been met at Cossipore in producing the new guns. India’s 
reliance on the Cossipore Gun Factory ‘for a local supply of guns, has not 
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worked up to the anticipated output.’81 Part of this struggle might have to 
do with the factory not being electrified until the 1911–1912 fiscal year at a 
cost of £4000 equivalent.82 The problem with the India plants was that 
there was insufficient skilled labour to perform tasks. For instance, the 
Royal Carriage Factory in Jubbulpore (now Jabalpur) was estimated to be 
able to work at only 10 per cent efficiency compared to a European 
factory, although the quality was of a European equivalent.83 As with most 
industrial issues, the underlying issues were more complex than the story 
on the surface. India had a performing trade school system, although the 
system demonstrated how difficult it was to create a skilled labour 
workforce that was able to do fine engineering work. The reports from 
India also show that the already limited workforce appeared to be 
comprised exclusively of converted Christians. This further narrowing on 
apparently ideological concerns hindered the usefulness of the imperial 
factories to aid in time of crisis or shock to the home industries. It was not 
therefore a surprise to find the Annual Reports of the Ordnance Factories, 
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especially the Royal Gun Factory, Woolwich Arsenal, producing guns of all 
sizes that were billed to the Indian service. This relationship and especially 
the important but understudied learning process of transfer of officers 
between India and Woolwich helped develop India’s skilled manufacturing 
industry with British expertise, but also provided London with ideas borne 
out of necessity on the rugged Indian frontier.  
Repair Work 
Woolwich also played an important yet underreported role of 
primary repairer of all ordnance both for afloat and afield. The 1907 
Murray Committee described it as ‘incontestable that repairs of all kinds 
necessitated by the wear and tear of the service, from a battleship to a rifle, 
are more economically effected by Government than by private contract. 
The amount of repair required in a given case can scarcely ever be gauged 
with any degree of accuracy beforehand, nor is it easy to devise any 
effective means of checking the items of the labour bill in the case of 
repairs done under contract’84 The role also extended to the task of relining 
of all ordnance. As guns wore out, their accuracy was greatly diminished. 
Instead of the guns being scrapping, British ordnance of all types was 
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designed to be rebuilt or relined to restore accuracy. This process included 
boring out the original rifling and inserting into the barrel a new sleeve or 
‘A’ tube with new rifling that mimicked the original specification. This 
process saved time and money in comparison to building new guns. The 
Royal Gun Factory served as the primary shop for relining for all services 
well into the 20th century. After an experience with 12–pound breech 
loading guns in South Africa, the Director General of Ordnance stated 
‘that, when possible, guns would be brought home, for repair to the 
approved designs.’85 This would remain the policy of the government in 
peace and war throughout the remainder of the period under study.  
The other reason that Woolwich preferred to do the work in house 
other than for fiscal reasons, was to understand better the underlying 
problem of why the piece failed or how different pieces wore out at 
different rates. This was done primarily by the Chief Superintendent, the 
Director, Royal Gun Factory, and the Chief Inspector, Woolwich, with the 
technical assistance of the Royal Laboratories. This process allowed for 
operational research to be incorporated back into the production cycle, 
with minor modifications occurring frequently after guns were rebuilt to 
bring them up the most recent drawings which incorporated these 
improvements. The learning and design provided by Woolwich was a large 
                                           







part of what made the Trade so successful in producing guns that were long 
wearing, accurate, and most importantly, safe to the user community.  
Unlike the trade, the Arsenals had to follow Treasury accounting 
rules. For instance, the Chief Superintendent could not expend over £100 
without the express permission of the Financial Secretary. This was 
exposed in 1903 as a weakness that would have to immediately be raised at 
the declaration of war.86  
Woolwich like all government factories, tended to have a different 
talent pool, especially in regard to managers. It was made known by 
Charles Harris in 1902 that the Royal Factories tended to promote 
personnel who possessed ‘inventive genius’ to management as a way of 
rewarding intellectual excellence. This was not the norm in the trade as a 
whole, and this gave both benefits and weaknesses to Woolwich. The 
management of the arsenal might not be as economical, but the quality of 
problem solving might be greater.87  
Woolwich was also hamstrung by governmental staffing rules that 
were not a problem of the trade. The bureaucratic staffs, and especially the 
clerks and senior civil staffs, were becoming increasingly difficult to keep. 
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Those who were willing to join the civil service were progressively more 
unwilling to work for the Ordnance Factories. Pay had not increased in 
over a decade by 1902, while at the same time pay and benefits had 
increased for those working a few miles away at the War Office. This was 
especially true for those who bore the brunt of the day–to–day work of 
running the complex, the Second Class Clerks, of whom there were ten 
allotted for the whole of the Ordnance Factories, including Enfield, 
Birmingham, and Waltham Abbey.88 Changes in the Civil Service as a 
whole had left Woolwich behind, and were compounded by inaction on 
the 1898 report written by Mr De La Bere, then the Accountant General 
of the Army. The Committee proposed an increase of £1,125 over the 
current salaries to gain and maintain the best recruits.89 In comparison, the 
contemporary cost for a single 6–inch Mark VII gun without breech or 
fittings was £1,645.90 The funding request, as well as permission to 
reorganize the staff, was approved by the Treasury in January of the next 
year, about a month after its submission. It also approved the transfer of 
one of the newly appointed senior clerks from the War Office to 
                                           
88 WO 32/9042 9042 FACTORIES: Royal Ordnance (Code 49(A)): Report of Ward 
Committee on clerical staff. 1. 
89 Ibid 3 







Woolwich, which was a somewhat unusual move that is unseen at any 
other point in the period under study.91  
The design branch of Woolwich was arguably the greatest, of all the 
manufacturers in the United Kingdom due to its sheer depth of resources 
as well as the ability to do research that was for non–profit based purposes. 
Woolwich had access to the whole process, from platform development 
through results of destructive and other testing, as well as the pricing data 
and other confidential information that no other manufacturer possessed.  
The New Trade 
The creation of Coventry Ordnance Works in 1905 was a direct 
response to a lack of competition between Vickers and Armstrong. The 
Company was formed as a Joint Stock Company representing the 
companies of John Brown with a one half share, Cammell Laird with a one 
quarter share and Fairfield Shipbuilding and Engineering Company while 
the final one quarter share to create a vertically integrated supply chain.92 
The company made its contracting debut on the massive rearmament 
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order for the Royal Field and Horse Artillery in March 1905, as well as 
becoming a provider for naval guns. The Government was so pressed to 
place the order due to the end of the fiscal year, that it was actually placed 
with Cammell Laird. According to records of orders placed, this policy 
continued through the first years of the Company, with Coventry 
Ordnance not receiving an award in their name until August 1907.93 
Regardless, it does not appear that they were allowed by the Admiralty to 
enter the armaments business.94 The company plant utilised the Coventry 
works purchased from Mulliner–Wigley which was rebuilt after the 
purchase with state of the art machinery to produce massive guns and gun 
mountings for the burgeoning Royal Navy. The company built their first 
order as part of the Field and Horse artillery rearmament, although quickly 
they were given contracts for 4–inch and 4.7–inch guns. It was said by the 
Director of Naval Ordnance in January 1906 that most of the equipment 
was shipped over from America, the company utilized heavily electrical 
and pneumatic tools, and it was showing promise on the orders that it had 
been given.95 Although this plant was supposed to be state of the art, it 
appears that at least for the first few years, the Cammell Laird–owned 
                                           
93 WO. 395/3 Supplement to the Report of the Director of Army Contracts for the year 
ending 31st March, 1908. 51. 
94 Hansard HC Deb 29 March 1909 Series 5 Vol 3 Question asked by Viscount 
Castlereigh. 39. 








Grimesthorpe plant in Sheffield was the primary site for manufacture of 
armaments and armour. It became an issue that appeared in the House of 
Commons debates in 1909 when it became known that the RN had not 
placed a single order for gun mountings until the 1909 Naval Expenditure. 
Their first order equipped HMS Colossus. 96 
The Parliamentary debates showed that the Commons did not 
either know of or take into account the reason for the Admiralty’s 
mounting policy. In 1903 the Admiralty, with the permission of the 
Director of Ordnance and Ordnance Committee, forwarded an agreement 
to Armstrongs and Vickers to mutually allow gun mountings to be 
produced without charge of royalties to the two trade members and 
Woolwich. This agreement saved the government thousands of Pounds 
Sterling a year as well as allowing free flow of the best designs irrespective 
of royalty amount. With this, the agreement clearly made the link that any 
other manufacturer would have to pay for the amount of the royalty as well 
as jigs and other works to produce them. Interestingly, the agreement 
seems to have been exclusively for gun mountings themselves, which in the 
form of permanent mountings, the Ordnance Factories never produced, 
and it was in direct contradiction to talks of patents in the documents.97 
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This was justified by Armstrong’s as new manufacturers had not paid for 
the experimentation of years of work to perfect designs and therefore it 
would be an unfair competitive advantage to let them enter.98 Although this 
would have limited competition, there was no other manufacturer (other 
than Vickers-controlled Beardmore) that could have produced gun 
mountings competitively in Britain.  
In 1905 the largest of Vickers patents came up for expiry: the Wellin 
Screw Breech. The Government had paid substantial royalties to Vickers 
including £180 per 12–inch gun, £150 per 9.2–inch, £ 80 per 7.5 inch, £50 
per 6–inch, and £40 per 5–inch gun for a total of £18,280 in 1903/1904 
alone.99 The breech even with the royalties did not perform as wanted, and 
had the problem of sticking when opening or closing. In addition, between 
1900 and 1903 Vickers paid £9,772 to Armstrongs in royalties for guns 
produced by Vickers, which was passed along to the government.100 At that 
point the Government led by the Director of Naval Ordnance believed a 
similar plan could be put into place to control capacity and continue with 
what was essentially a preferred supplier system. This plan would be 
vigorously put down by the War Office and the Treasury, and set up a half 
decade of control of policy by one branch, much to the consternation of 
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the Admiralty. The primary reason for this was the much larger contract 
for field guns that the War Office wanted competition with. The necessary 
evil of speaking as a single Government to suppliers would become a 
hallmark of the British way of procuring war material.  
To the duopoly of manufacturers Vickers and Armstrong, Coventry 
seemed to be a warning shot. Coventry had the same manufacturing 
capacity, and, after a few years, had the same contract bidding privileges as 
the heavily entrenched incumbents of the trade. Although it increased the 
overall capacity of the trade and therefore, Great Britain, there is no 
indication from the government that this served any purpose other than 
increasing competition within the Trade as a way to drive down prices in 
the peacetime bidding cycle. It does not appear that the decision had any 
real wartime purpose, unlike the policies augmented towards Woolwich. 
Furthermore, because of the lack of army orders after 1905 and the close 
management of naval orders, as well as the quickly evolving technological 
changes in naval guns, there is little or no proof that price was affected in 
any way by the introduction of Coventry (with the sole exception of the 
Coventry designed 4.5–in howitzer) in field pieces at least. As a note this 
statement is probably not valid for naval gun mounts, although they are 







There is no doubt that Coventry increased the overall capacity of 
ordnance in Britain. New and improved forgings were, by March 1913, 
coming out of both Coventry and Openshaw, the Armstrongs plant for the 
first time engaging in naval orders on a large scale. This was shown in the 
latter with much improved 13.5–inch inner ‘A’ tubes. Coventry, in a desire 
to not be left behind as naval guns grew, had rebuilt their furnace to work 
the 13.5–inch Mark V naval guns by enlarging it, which gave satisfactory 
results.101  
The final player in the ordnance field rose from the second–tier 
forgings suppliers to becoming a full–fledged naval ordnance producer. 
William Beardmore (Ltd.) had been producing gun forgings at the 
company’s Parkhead, Scotland forge for many years and was one of the 
suppliers of large forgings to Woolwich as well as Vickers. Vickers in 
reality was much more than a customer of Beardmore. In 1902, Vickers 
purchased fifty per cent of the ordinary shares of the Glasgow company. 
Supposedly the purchase came with the understanding that Beardmore 
would not enter the armaments industry, and remain a leader of the 
armour trade.102 The relationship created what essentially was a Vickers 
proxy, and the two companies spoke in tandem against any deviation in 
policy that was not in Vickers best interest. By 1908, Beardmore was still 
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not a competent design house. They requested to be placed on the List of 
Manufacturers of Ordnance, and were asked to design a 4–inch 50 calibre 
gun, which they did by coping a Vickers design perfectly, and even then the 
design had only been produced once, with the preferred design for the 
mark being an Elswick pattern. One order was given to see if they could 
produce a gun to design.103  
The company received their first complete gun contract in FY 1914 
for the new B.L. 15–inch naval guns for the Queen Elizabeth class 
battleships.104 With this order, Beardmore represented a very different 
theory of supply chain diversification than what the Government had 
pursued a decade earlier with Coventry Ordnance. Beardmore was not just 
an ordnance maker. Shipbuilding constituted their primary business and 
the Clyde shipbuilding business had never been better by 1910. They had 
received several orders from the Admiralty for capital ships and so 
understood well the processes and inspection required to maintain work 
with the Government. 
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Organized labour became a rising issue in the first decade of the 
century. In 1904 the subject of preference to union shops was lobbied in 
London’s governmental circles.105 The official tack taken by the 
government was that any labour would have an equal chance of getting 
contracts. Therefore, union shops and non–union shops would both have 
the ability to compete, and would be held on parity. It was a win–win for 
all, although in reality ordnance production was limited to a few locations 
and nearly every shop utilized unionized labour. 
The Royal Gun Factory, as with all of the 6,000,000 square feet of 
factory floor Woolwich complex, ran on an 8 hour system, working ‘from 
8 a.m. to 1 p.m., and again from 2 p.m. to 5:40 p.m. daily, except 
Saturdays, when work ceases at 12:40 p.m.’106 The factory’s labour, being in 
London, came under parliamentary scrutiny in 1908. It had come to the 
attention of politicians that the workforce had substantial benefits, and 
might be paid too much. The committee analysed if Woolwich employees 
were being overcompensated for their work in relation to those in the 
Trade elsewhere in London. It emerged that Woolwich workers’ base 
salary was actually well below the standard for the trade in the area. 
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Employees were paid a base weekly wage of 37 shillings, 6 pence for 48-
hour work weeks whilst the trade workers were paid 40 shillings for the 
same time, although the trade employees worked a 54 hour work week.107 
This base wage was supplemented by piecemeal wages. In looking into the 
fairness and full compensation of the workers, the Chief Superintendent of 
Ordnance Factories, Sir Hay Frederick Donaldson, found that of 8,123 
workers, only 112 did not earn their full rate in the last quarter. He also 
found that the plurality (45) of this figure were lads who did not have work 
because there was not enough work, and in regards to men, the leading 
cause (34) were of men who waited for work without leaving the shops. 
These were not particular to the factories as an exemption, but were the 
norm for the industry as a whole. Donaldson also found that the rates 
themselves were fair, with 2,309 rates being reviewed over the same time 
period, which lowered 1,078 of them, mainly due to improvements in 
technique. Interestingly, any employee could challenge the calculation, and 
a foreman could modify the rate if he saw it as not being correct.  
This was addressed again for the Government factories a few years 
later, when it was proposed to bring the factories at Waltham Abbey and 
Enfield on par with Woolwich rates, although only unskilled base wages 
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were looked at by the group. The base pay of 24 shillings was one more 
shilling than the suburban factories.108 From the Donaldson Commission 
above, it appears that unskilled labour was not employed in the Royal Gun 
Factory in particular, as this lower salary was not accounted for in the 
reports. The difference between unskilled and skilled labour is an 
interesting point to look at. The difference of over 50% between unskilled 
labourers and the skilled piecework tradesmen show that these were not 
simply replaceable workmen that the Royal Gun Factory employed.  
 This direct connection between the work done and remuneration 
was not only the most efficient and fair procedure, but also kept the 
workforce content, and certainly had the possibility to affect quality, the 
most important element in arsenal work. The government’s position was 
that employees should be compensated on their ability to produce, and the 
more efficient employees should be rewarded for doing their best work. 
What might be the biggest ‘cost’ to the way in which Woolwich 
compensated its employees was that the arsenal did not discharge 
employees at the first sign of downturn in work, unlike the trade. The 
employees at Woolwich had a more stable future, which, especially at the 
Gun Factory, was important in keeping skilled labour employed by the 
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Government. This was key in the ability and capacity of Woolwich to 
compete with the trade, but also to retain the critical skills ordnance 
required.109  
In regards to trade unions, the Amalgamated Society of Engineers 
was the strongest and largest of the labour associations within the skilled 
work force. Woolwich, although technically not a union shop, had union 
members on the shop floor. They appeared to act as a sort of bargaining 
unit, although were not effective as such before the war. Their petitions for 
a raise in 1908 were flatly rejected by Donaldson as not being in the best 
interests of the government, or London industry as a whole.110 The issue of 
unions was never a worrying problem, as the Amalgamated Society of 
Engineers had a good working relationship with the employers. This was 
probably a product of their members being relatively well paid as well as 
the membership in general being more educated and trained, and 
therefore older. This was a different experience from in some of the other 
industries around the country at the time, especially shipbuilding.  
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Gun Design and Workforce Skill 
The skill of the British engineer had much to do with the final 
design, execution, and use of guns. The seemingly simple task of wiring a 
gun was in reality about as complex as any engineering project of its day. It 
required immense skill that we would struggle with it today even with the 
aid of computers. Wire was an integral part of the design of British guns, 
and was the primary safety design feature. It allowed a margin in both gun 
pressure and a bit of lateral flex that did not interfere with the accuracy of 
the gun. Wire, due to the ‘mechanical work expended on it’, had more 
‘elasticity, tenacity, and ductility’ than the regular gun steel that it was 
wound around.111 Wiring a gun though was not a simple task. First, 
companies had to either source or make high quality carbon steel wire that 
was of sufficient quality to allow a force in excess of 50 tons of pressure per 
square inch to be imparted on it, as well as being flexible enough to be 
allowed to wind around a gun tube precisely so that it lay with no gap 
between strands. What made a difficult job almost impossible was the 
design requirement that each layer that was placed above the previous one 
had not to exceed the pressure of that laid down before it. This meant that, 
as the diameter of the barrel grew as it spun on its gun lathe, the engineer 
                                           







had to calculate the increased distance travelled per rotation, and adjust the 
feed so that it sped up at a rate that was proportional to the new diameter. 
If the operator kept the same feed rate, the wire would increase the tension 
due to it being pulled faster. The tension, the gun’s diameter, and lateral 
movements of the wire all had to be taken into account. In 1905 this 
difficult task was made even more tedious with the introduction of a 
tapered breech section of the tube. This was in response to the needs of 
both longer barrel life and increased ease in the relining process. The 
tapered tube meant that tension now would have to be watched and 
changed as each layer of wire went on, a departure when older designs had 
the same tension throughout each layer of the installation.  
The tapered approach to wired gunmaking was the height of skill for 
the British engineer. Skills in accuracy, precision, and manufacturing 
consistency made the British wire wound gun an efficient tool in war, but 
also represented in a microcosm why issues of capacity, labour, and quality 
supply chains were so important in British national security. These were 
skills that could not simply be created overnight, and the main 
manufacturers had spent almost two decades by 1914 building the capacity. 
Many skills in the ordnance trade could be quickly learned, and capacity 







force in heavy ordnance production would not be replaceable without 
considerable time, resources, and investment.  
Management 
 The blue collar workforce was not the only element of the 
Trade that greatly affected the abilities of the industry as a whole. The 
directors of the trade firms were extremely important not only for the 
management of production, but also as the face of the company to the 
customer. From a management perspective, ordnance posed a radically 
different means of business from other portions of the armaments trade 
and an even more radical departure from the steel industry as a whole. 
This was especially the case in the time period of study. Arguably, the 
period from 1900–1914 for gun making was completely unlike any other 
industrial evolution that had been seen before. The introduction of new 
metals and alloys required massive investment in metallurgy, both in staff 
and capital infrastructure. The introduction of longer, heavier, and more 
complex naval guns required ever increasing investment in plant capital, 
especially in regards to lathes, cranes, and forges. The introduction of 
nickel steel also meant that tooling and techniques that worked acceptably 
with carbon steel forgings might not work with the much tougher and 







have a chance of landing the next contract for the increasing barrel weight 
of ordnance ordered by the Admiralty. It is with this background that the 
management of the trade must be considered.  
As the youngest player in the field, Coventry had the most to prove 
to the Government to pry the duopoly away from the north. Herbert 
Mulliner became the first director of the corporation although his 
relationship with the Government quickly soured. As the corporation’s 
orders were less than was desired, the Board replaced him in 1909. His 
replacement in November 1909 was the newly retired Rear Admiral 
Reginald Bacon.112 Bacon was hired to rebuild the relationship with the 
Admiralty. As Director of Naval Ordnance, Bacon oversaw the design of 
the post–Dreadnought capital ship armament. Coventry had so much hope 
in him that they were willing to pay £7,000 annually, or put another way, 
£2,000 more than the Prime Minister’s contemporary pay.  
Armstrong Whitworth also had acquired several executive directors 
with military and civil pedigrees. Sir Percy Girouard joined the Elswick 
Plant’s payroll in 1912 after a distinguished career working as the Director 
of Imperial Military Railways. In the same year, Sir George Murray also 
joined the payroll. Murray had led from the Treasury the reforms and 
policies set forth in the Government Factories and Workshops Committee 
                                           







report, commonly named the Murray Report. Both of these acquisitions 
advanced the strategic views of the board as well as bringing in extensive 
contacts in the Treasury and Army.113 This revolving door, especially at 
Armstrongs, might seem suspicious, given that both of these men were well 
connected, although they had already achieved long careers and had 
reached the end of any chance of promotion. Murray would have been 
particularly unusual as he was the longstanding permanent secretary, and, 
knew the budgetary process better than anybody else, as well as the 
strategic needs of industry for the Government.  
Exports 
The role of exports in the Edwardian period played a not 
insubstantial role in the gunmaking business. Vickers and Armstrongs 
dominated the overseas market, competing for Asian, Eastern European, 
and South American contracts with the likes of Germany’s Krupp and 
Ehrhardt, France’s Schneider et Cie, and America’s Bethlehem Steel and 
Midvale Steel. Being on the list of approved government vendors could 
make all the difference between receiving a contract or not. The 
certification by the home government seemed to be a prerequisite for the 
developing world to place orders. The Government also seems to have had 
                                           







no problem subtly promoting British industries. For instance, in 1905 a 
Naval, Shipping, and Fisheries exhibition was held at Earl’s Court, in which 
it requested that the navy submit current equipment.114 The navy seems to 
have almost always complied with requests such as these if the available 
spare tubes were available.  
In regards to guns, the vast majority of guns by value sold to external 
customers came from the naval gun side of operations. In the Vickers 
drawing collection at the National Maritime Museum, Woolwich, there are 
several copies of drawings for export guns. These guns were made for 
places like Japan and Turkey, but as well for many South American 
navies.115 Not all of the drawings were actually finished in steel, but certainly 
the company had a thriving gun design and manufacturing department, as 
well as a world-class marketing department. The Royal Navy by policy 
ignored claims of performance from the trade published in trade journals 
for potential customers. This was primarily due to the trade exaggerating 
the technical capability for export models. Nonetheless, these orders 
brought in jobs to keep plants warm, and undoubtedly assisted in bringing 
down costs for the government, primarily through indirect costs. The 
government for its own part was usually more than willing to allow such 
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business, as it was mutually beneficial, although it did have a final say if the 
capability could cause potential political or military difficulty later.  
Exports were not limited to suppliers outside the realm. Although 
India provided almost all of its finished artillery at Cossipore, other 
markets did rely on British manufacturers to supply artillery for their 
warships and regiments. Canada was the largest of these markets, with 
Australia and New Zealand as well as South Africa purchasing artillery 
from British manufacturers. There is some evidence that Canada imported 
raw forgings as early as 1902 from manufacturer Hughes–Johnson, and 
they were inspected at Woolwich, although it is unknown what these 
forgings were particularly for.116 Canada placed an order in FY 1910 for 44 
18–prs and 24 13–prs, as well as 36 18–prs in FY 1913. These orders were 
for the outfitting of the Canadian Militia, and were directed, non–
competitive orders to Vickers. Begrudgingly, the Army Contracts Office 
acted as the intermediary and inspection point on behalf of the Canadian 
Government.117 This directed contract was likely a direct response to 
Vickers having an industrial presence in Canada. Vickers operated a 
shipyard near Montreal in the closing years of the Edwardian period, which 
could have influenced the central government. Any indication of this 
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though was never articulated by the Chief Superintendent of Ordnance 
Factories or by the President of the Ordnance Board.  
In addition, between 1911 and 1914 several other Commonwealth 
countries modernized their field artillery, and all guns were built by the 
Royal Gun Factory. These orders do not appear on the annual audits of 
the Ordnance Factories because they were paid for through 
Commonwealth funding, and not Vote 9 funding. Australia acquired 21 
guns in 1912–1913 and a further 39 in 1913–1914. New Zealand procured 
16 18–prs in 1912–1913 and eight in 1913–1914. In addition, 4.5–inch 
howitzers were being procured by the Commonwealth as well. Both India 
and New Zealand acquired eight each in 1912–1913, and India procured 
an additional 13 in 1913–1914. South Africa became the only user of the 
13–pr outside Great Britain and Canada by procuring 12 such guns in 
1913–1914.118 
Technology 
The 1890s saw a revolution in gun making. For the first time, high 
quality steel could be produced at reasonable costs. Adding to this, the 
introduction of chemically based propellants, known as smokeless powder, 
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eased or eliminated constraints that had plagued designers for decades. 
The evolution of propellants had three major effects on gun design. First, 
smokeless powder burned at a much slower rate than black powder. This 
allowed more energy to be transferred to the projectile, increasing the force 
imparted, and increasing the range and effectiveness of the system. 
Secondly, it created a much greater pressure inside the barrel, necessitating 
a shift to all–steel guns. Before this time, guns were made up of everything 
from gunmetal, (a specialized form of brass) to wrought iron and cast steel. 
The new pressures necessitated all–steel guns utilizing new metallurgical 
processes and materials that were first brought to light in the naval armour 
race that kicked off in the late 1880s and continued through the first 
decade of the 20th century. Thirdly, the new powder was not as corrosive as 
previous propellants. Earlier attempts to make efficient breech loaders, 
especially for small arms, were stymied by the frequent jamming caused by 
the fouling. It would not be possible to make efficient machine guns until 
this new propellant was invented. 
Undoubtedly, the introduction of smokeless, nitrocellulose and 
nitro–glycerine based powder had the greatest effect on designs. It enabled 
steel and manufacturing advances to be fully utilized whilst also 
encouraging the research and design assets to be focused on harnessing its 







their works were the largest in every regard. The initial problems with the 
new powder were based on its inherent instability as it was a chemical 
compound, and as such was prone to degradation. Each country tackled 
the new propellant problem differently, and therefore their gun designs 
were products of their powder, and not vice versa. It could be argued that 
the gun designs each industrialized nation produced were the mirror of the 
chemical and scientific community as much as the military community.  
In the nationalism-charged climate of the 1890s and 1900s, the 
ability to be self–reliant in war items certainly played into the powder issue, 
and by the end of the century, each country had settled on their basic 
propellant designs. Two schools of thought emerged, with powder being 
made to take extrusion or crystalline shapes. Britain would choose Cordite, 
a powder that was extruded into long strings that resembled pasta. This 
design allowed propellant packages to be tuned to the gun through 
changing the thickness and the length of the extrusion, thus changing the 
surface area. The weight and therefore theoretical maximum energy 
released was tested. This was to learn how to control the Cordite’s burn 
rate, a driving factor that affected not only maximum pressures created in 
the bore, but also the theoretical maximum velocities of the projectiles as 
they left the barrel. If propellant designers could control this the most 







velocity factors could allow lower pressures, and therefore less steel was 
required in the manufacture, a key element in field as well as battleship 
guns.  
One of the most difficult elements that enabled design was the study 
of internal ballistics. Internal ballistics focused on what happened to the 
gun and the projectile when a force was exerted. This force was in the form 
of the propellant releasing its energy through burning. If the burn rate 
could be tuned, the gun and projectile could be tuned for key performance 
parameters, including muzzle velocity, barrel wear, projectile weight, 
impact energy at the target, and accuracy. Cordite had to be very tightly 
controlled to confirm that its properties were in line with the standard 
specification. In 1906 the Principal Experimental Officer, Woolwich, 
Major J.H. Mansell, noted that between lots there could be variances of up 
to 15 feet per second in muzzle velocity, which could, on larger guns make 
a target miss by up to 300 feet simply due to the particularities of the 
powder.119  
When British staffs mulled over these ideas at the beginning of the 
century, the scientific studies were all but conclusive. It was said in the 
international community that cordite was inferior to nitrocellulose powders 
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created on the continent and America, although British tests were showing 
the opposite, with better results than propellants that were being imported, 
and cordite could be acquired at a third of the price.120 The ideal situation 
of course would be to find the propellant that offered the highest velocity 
with the lowest pressure.  
In regard to higher velocity, and therefore more kinetic energy 
imparted to the projectile, thus giving longer range and more damage to the 
target, this could be achieved by two primary ways: first, increasing the 
charge of the propellant, thus giving more initial energy to the projectile, or 
increasing the length of the barrel, which would give more time for the 
powder to impart the energy of the propellant to the projectile, thus 
increasing range as an exponential element of internal ballistics calculation 
on the system as a whole.  
Experts in the government spent great amounts of resources and 
time in exploring what was believed to be in the best interests of the 
services and the Treasury. The Master General of the Ordnance, the 
Director of Naval Ordnance, the Chief Superintendent of Ordnance 
Factories, the Superintendent of the Royal Gun Factory, and the 
Superintendent of the Royal Gunpowder Factory made up the cadre of 
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experienced individuals who had the job of delivering the best and most 
scientifically advanced equipment to British sailors and soldiers. This 
testing demonstrated a scientific prowess of high ranking officers as well as 
civil servants employed in high ranking permanent positions. The 
knowledge enabled strategic decisions to be made by those in uniform and 
for those in uniform, making informed decisions on equipment to the 
contracted trade, not vice versa as has been associated with technical arms 
in Britain since the 1950s.  
Designing Cordite Guns 
In the 1880s European naval architects developed new warships with 
armour that could counter explosive shells fired from new breech loading 
guns. The race was dominated by firms that could use new steel alloys and 
new techniques for rolling the massive armour plates required by 
shipbuilders. The technology in new materials was directly put into gun 
production. In an unusual example of the time, armour was left exclusively 
to the Trade, leaving the Royal Factories to their more traditional role of 
gunnery work. This probably had to do with the changing role post 1888 of 
the role of the arsenals as an insurance policy as armour would not 
represent a great need at the outbreak of war. It is also noteworthy to 







mirrored the policies of the American Navy. It is not a far stretch though to 
state that the international armour market was quickly becoming a 
commodity of very high quality alloy steel, much more so than the trends 
in gun making over the same period. It was not uncommon for buyers to 
go overseas for armour as it was effectively a commodity, although it was 
very uncommon to pursue foreign guns, both in the field and afloat.  
Britain had a history dating back over 30 years in regards to 
manufacturing techniques of artillery for all services in a way dissimilar 
from all other powers. By the late 1850s and early 1860s wrought iron and 
steel replaced bronze in artillery, although gun design quickly outstripped 
the technology available to produce large guns in one piece. Steel artillery 
design and production worldwide fell into two separate designs: built up, 
and wire wound. Built up guns were based on the original principles 
discovered by Armstrong in the first steel guns in the 1860s. It consisted of 
a group of stacking sleeves of steel, each sleeve shorter than the last, but 
also overlapping the smaller, longer sleeves below until a desired thickness 
was reached to manage gas pressures of the propellant.  
Armstrongs pioneered the wire wound guns, which conversely, were 
built around an inner ‘A’ tube that was hardened and rifled to the precision 
of the projectile, and wire was essentially wound around the tube until the 







be placed to protect the wires and give lateral rigidity to the entire structure. 
In the case of the 12–inch guns, there were 117 miles of wire wound 
around the ‘A’ tube to complete just one gun121. Both gun designs relied on 
compression of the subsequent outer jackets to create a force that worked 
better during the propellant’s burn.  
Gun design had to incorporate an understanding of all the forces 
involved in both production and firing. The artillery barrel was the most 
complex and technically demanding piece of equipment both on the high 
seas and the battlefield. A field gun had to be light enough to be pulled by 
six horses, resilient enough to fire 15 rounds a minute, yet strong enough 
to not explode at the pressures in excess of 50,000 PSI. As well it had to be 
durable enough to take 10,000 rounds before being sent back for relining. 
Naval guns had to withstand even increased pressures, and weight was not 
just a land based issue. The guns were some of the highest pieces in the 
centre of gravity of a ship. As well more weight in the guns meant more 
weight in strengthening the gun mountings. The balance of guns, especially 
as barrels became longer, became a great source of innovation for 
designers in both Woolwich and the Trade. The length of a barrel was a 
direct calculation as to the size of turrets on ships. On battleships, the size 
of the turret became the key design feature, as a wider turret meant the 
                                           







ship also had to be wider, and wider ships meant greater resistance in the 
water. Longer and heavier guns therefore had a great effect on the design 
of ships. Britain generally designed ships without restrictions as to width, 
although this also meant the British battleships were not designed to 
traverse the Panama Canal when it opened in the fall of 1914. This was a 
direct result of the size of guns on British battleships. Naval guns also had 
to survive a long career exposed to the elements of the sea. The slowest 
projectiles in the post–Dreadnought era on main armaments easily 
exceeded twice the speed of sound by the time they left the barrel. These 
barrels therefore had to take acceleration forces of a projectile accelerating 
at a 0–60 miles per hour rate in about one foot.  
Durability and rebuildability were foremost on the minds of the 
bureaucrats on the Ordnance Board. It was inevitable that if a gun served 
long enough, it would be required to be sent back to Britain to be rebuilt. 
Rebuilding artillery was a task that uniquely suited Woolwich, as the 
Government believed that each rebuild was different and therefore no 
accurate price estimate as to the work to be performed could be calculated. 
Therefore all work with very few exceptions was sent to the Royal Gun 
Factory. As the inspectors were also assigned to Woolwich, this had a 
double-edged benefit for the services. Not only from the aforementioned 







tubes to ascertain what had caused the wear and tear, to better incorporate 
into new designs. This information could be reported up to the Ordnance 
Board/Committee as well as down into the user community. Because 
inspection work was generally done by officers at the Colonel/Captain level 
and their Major–Lt. Colonel staffs, they had by the end of the Edwardian 
period perfected this learning cycle, gaining valuable experience and 
technical research, while also costing taxpayers less. It appears from the 
Murray Report that in the event of conflict, after Trade mobilization 
occurred, Woolwich would continue to perform this valuable service of 
relining and rebuilding artillery.  
Nickel Steel  
The introduction of high grade composite steel at the end of the 
century brought new challenges as well as opportunities. The primary steel 
took the form of nickel steel, although chromium, vanadium, and other 
trace materials were experimented with to harden steel. As was discovered 
though in a 1902 Ordnance Factory test, some such as vanadium were 







government experimented with adding carbon, manganese, silicon, 
vanadium, nickel, copper, and chromium.122  









As metallurgy expanded and matured in this period government and 
civilian research would continue to push knowledge of materials even 
further. Much of this change in gun steel was pushed down to the 
secondary suppliers who made raw forgings for the primary suppliers as 
well as Woolwich. This transition was not always smooth. For instance, in 
the 1909 FY alone, 104 tons of nickel steel was rejected for having 
segregation out of 1182 tons received.124 The steel due to its increased 
hardness and increased density required new procedures, and in some 
cases, new tooling, as old tools designed for carbon steel could simply not 
work the harder components. Entire processes had to be rethought of, 
including a curious case at Woolwich where specific gravity was 
incorporated into the initial stages of production to ensure the best 
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product.125 The process of accepting the new alloy steels will be discussed in 
the following chapters.  
Conclusion 
By 1914 British capacity was well established. Two senior 
commercial companies dominated the private trade, with Vickers and 
Armstrongs both being able to produce all sizes of ordnance of equal 
quality in their factories in Sheffield and Elswick respectively. Each of the 
companies also had smaller concerns, with Armstrongs producing quality 
products at their Openshaw plant while Vickers had a strong proxy in 
Beardmore making naval guns for the newest battleships. In addition, 
Coventry Ordnance Works on their own could make all land based 
artillery as well as having the benefit of being able to utilize the skill of their 
three parent companies. Finally, the Royal Gun Factory at Woolwich was 
able to not only produce, but also repair everything in service. British 
capacity for artillery production had never been higher in the history of 
Britain, and British steelmakers were at the front edge of research, being 
able to produce alloys to continuously improve products already in service 
as well as guns yet to be designed.   
                                           







As July 1914 rolled around, nothing seemed out of the ordinary for 
the technical staffs. The second quarter of the 1915 Fiscal Year had just 
started. The second and third quarters were traditionally when most of the 
capital investment contracts had been placed over the last decade, and staff 
work and quote preparation would have dominated most staff members’ 
minds. Little prepared them for the overnight change in tempo that was to 
roll over them like a tsunami. British civil staffs were efficient, although 
they were very limited in numbers. Clerks took years to learn contractual 
and fiscal law. Again, officers in both blue and khaki had developed years 
of experience in all aspects of ordnance, from design to inspection and 
everything in–between. Their experiences were the product of well over a 
decade of professional learning and perseverance. Members of the Trade 
as well represented years of goodwill and working experience with the 
Government. Their capacities were well known and their capabilities well 
tried. The final product was a very well trained and tested system of 
peacetime procurement and management. It was qualitatively strong and 
quantitatively small. The events of August 1914 would test if these staffs 
could be transformed into a quantitatively large administration whilst also 








CHAPTER FOUR: THE CASE STUDY OF THE FIELD 
ARTILLERY RECAPITALIZATION, 1900–1907 
Introduction 
In previous chapters, this thesis has looked as the demand for and 
supply of armaments in Britain between 1900 and 1914. This chapter will 
look at how pre–war procurement was actually conducted. The case study 
for this chapter will be the process and procurement of the largest single 
contract for British artillery before 1914: the Royal Horse and Field 
Artillery recapitalizations.  
The 18–pr in particular was one of the most important artillery 
pieces of Britain in the twentieth century. It was one of the most widely 
produced guns in British history, and served throughout the British 
Empire from 1907 through to the Second World War, when it was 
supplanted by the 25–pr, which itself was an evolution of the older 18–pr.  
Military historians have often seen the process (or lack thereof) of 
design and procurement as something of no importance for later 
operational uses of guns. Almost exclusively, military historians, as well as 
the units they write about, are not interested in where the guns came from 
or how their particular design features were put into the final production 







ignores the fundamental rationale for how they will be used by the service 
and how doctrine and therefore the force structures as a whole are crafted.  
This chapter will demonstrate how exactly the War Office acquired 
the 18–pr by analysing issues relating to the state of technology, the 
experiences and prejudices of the selection committee, the state of British 
industry and considerations in produceability of field guns in Britain, 
developmental and operational testing and how lessons learned from 
testing were inserted back into the program. Finally, we will discuss the 
industrial issues of production through the way in which the Director of 
Army Contracts procured the guns. This chapter will not discuss how the 
service utilized the pieces after they were accepted for service.  
British Army Recapitalization: Background 
By the end of the nineteenth century, British artillery was quickly 
becoming obsolete. The Field artillery had been made obsolescent 
overnight when the French army revealed the Mle 1897 75mm gun, named 
after its year of introduction, 1897 and affectionately known as the Soixante 
Quinze. Britain had to recapitalize although it was soon embroiled in a war 
in South Africa from 1899 through 1902 that drainined the budgets of the 
service. It would have to wait until the end of hostilities to evaluate the 







The table below represents the rapidly changing and relative nature 
of field artillery. The graph lists the old British 15–pr field gun, the new 
18–pr and the contemporary 1897 French 75mm and the 1896 German 
76mm. The particular contemporary example comes from the Hansard of 
the House of Commons in response to a question asked by a Minister of 
Parliament.126 
Table I 
A comparison of contemporary artillery prepared for Parliament 
 15 Pr. Converted British 18 Pr. French 75 German 76 
(1) Effective 
Range (Yards) 




1581 1590 1736 1525 
(3) Extent of 
Recoil on Carriage 
3.4 ft 3.4 ft 3.57 ft 3.66 ft 
(4) Extent of 
Recoil on Ground 
Nil. Nil. Nil. Nil. 
(5) Number of 
Bullets in 
Shrapnel 
230 364 300 300 
(6) Rate of Aimed 
Fire per Minute: 
Trials Not Yet 
Complete 
20 20 20 
From the chart above, the relative merits of the new 18–prs that 
replaced the old 15–pr is substantial and justified the immense cost of 
                                           







outfitting the Royal Artillery and Royal Horse Artillery. Increasing the 
projectile breadth by less than 1 inch gave an increase in shrapnel by 58 
per cent, as well as an increase in range for what was effectively the same 
weight of a weapon for the purposes of mobility. What was also 
demonstrated was the weight of the projectile in comparison to the two 
European rivals, the famous French 75mm and the German 76mm. 
Although the 15–pr was obsolescent for front line service, it was believed to 
be more than adequate as a field piece for the newly formed Territorial 
Force for whom it was updated and converted for.  
The 13 and 18–pr Case Study  
In May 1901 a committee of artillerymen and engineers met to 
discuss the future of field artillery in Britain. This committee would 
eventually decide to recommend into British service the 13–pr gun for the 
horse artillery and the 18–pr for field artillery. These guns would become 
the backbone of not only the largest professional army in Europe by 1914, 
but would also stand as the primary guns of a volunteer British 
Expeditionary Force that made their stand from the Fields of Flanders to 
their twilight in the sands of Operation Torch in 1942, four decades after 







The committee itself was a special committee created from the 
Ordnance Committee, the overarching lead for all warlike stores for all 
services afield and afloat. The special committee was chaired by Major–
General Sir G.H. Marshall, KCB, RA and four regular members: 
Lieutenant–Colonel WE Blewitt, CMG, RA, Lieutenant–Colonel B. 
Burton, CB, RHA, Lieutenant–Colonel WFL Lindsay, DSO, RFA and 
Major S. Belfield, RHA and two consulting members: Major–General TB 
Tyler, RA, representing India, and Bt. Lieutenant–Colonel A Hamilton–
Gordon, RFA, consulting howitzers, and Lieutenant–Colonel ND Findlay, 
RA as secretary.  
The committee recognized at the outset that much was to be learned 
from South Africa, although many of the conditions were one–off and 
should only be followed with analytical care. They ‘look upon the Boer 
War as having afforded much experience and many valuable lessons, but 
some of the conditions are exceptional and unlikely to be met with again.’127 
The committee’s works were designed with the mindset to meet as many 
ordinary needs, and to not meet ‘extraordinary’ needs. They also believed 
that a European war would require ‘well–served guns firing accurate time 
shrapnel’, and not high explosive or ‘ordinary’ rounds.128 Another lesson 
learned were that ‘the utter inefficiency as man–killers of common shell 
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(even at 100 pounds in weight) fired from guns even against defined and 
located targets, and the efficacy of good time shrapnel under similar 
circumstances’129 This came from a ‘lesson learned’ that High Explosive 
rounds were not accurate enough to use for anti–battery purposes, and 
difficulty was had with consistency of high velocity shells keeping intact, 
including the delicate driving bands. Because of these observations, they 
believed that shrapnel was the only means of delivering killing power, with 
the available technology, and in the quantity needed.130 The committee 
defined effectiveness as ‘its capability of pouring the greatest number of 
effective bullets on a given area in the shortest possible time.’131 This again 
favoured shrapnel as imperfect and inconsistent fuzing forced British 
designers away from impact and air burst shells. They also came to the 
conclusion that the Royal Horse Artillery and Royal Field Artillery pieces 
required different methods of evaluation, with the mobility of a horse piece 
being the predominant factor and gun–power being the predominant for 
the Royal Field Artillery. The committee also believed that a six–horse 
team was the most economical use of resources, and therefore drove 
weight to 28–cwt for Horse Artillery, and 38–cwt for field artillery, 
exclusive of men or men’s kits. Thus, the goal was ‘of Horse Artillery 
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obtaining a thoroughly mobile gun of sufficient power, and Field Artillery a 
thoroughly powerful gun of sufficient mobility.’132  
The committee considered that ‘a range of at least 6,000 yards with 
accurate and effective time shrapnel’ was required from a carriage that 
could reach 16 degrees elevation, and a remaining shrapnel velocity of 600 
feet per second. These specifications represented not only the 
contemporary view of the war just fought, but the war to be fought, at some 
unspecified date, and with some unspecified enemy, on some unspecified 
continent.  
The committee took a hands–off approach as the best way to gain 
quality initial designs. This was in large part due to a competent industrial 
base with experience for both domestic and international customers. Items 
such as calibre and length were left to manufacturers. Even seemingly 
important items such as the ability of the gun to be quickfiring were not 
requirements at the early stages of the competition.133 Quickfiring, or QF as 
it is commonly known, meant that the propellant and projectile were in a 
single case, and therefore could be loaded in a single movement, often with 
the powder in a brass casing. The alternative was to load propellant and 
projectile separately. The quickfiring issue was looked at through the 
technical lens of positives and negatives with regard to the weight of the 
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brass casing. This casing weighed between one and three pounds and a full 
load of quickfiring munitions might weigh as much as one cwt or more.134  
Amazingly, by 1902 the committee appears to have not 
wholeheartedly required a hydro–pneumatic recoil system, although the 
specifications laid forth by the committee really left no choice but to accept 
such a system, given the state of technology at the time, and the relative 
power of artillery on the continent, especially France and Germany, and to 
a lesser extent, Russia.  
The committee considered the use of the 5’ howitzer in South 
Africa during the course of specification design. This appears to be due to 
the 5’ not being used at all in lines with its designed parameters of being 
siege artillery, and instead acting as heavy field artillery. Because of the 
inherent weaknesses of the common or high explosive shell, the gun was 
not as effective as it could be. This issue was almost wholly in the design of 
fuzing, which appears to have been in this particular case a contact fuze 
only. The committee did point out that the round was probably too large 
for the range that it could use, and suggested a smaller projectile and a 
longer range. This would of course be used half a decade later when 
Coventry released the 4.5’ howitzer. The committee seemed to suggest that 
a new howitzer was needed, but did not seem interested in procuring it for 
                                           







the purposes at hand. Understanding the relationship between the field gun 
and the field howitzer is integral to understanding how the field gun 
evolved, and what requirements were associated for each to achieve the 
capacity of mission.   
The committee suggested reworking the ammunition columns with a 
two tiered system, totalling 450 rounds per gun in the field.135 This would 
have been a massive increase, as required by quickfiring artillery, but at the 
same time, would have only been enough for about 25 minutes of firing at 
full rate. This amount of munitions provision would have also been a great 
expense, as rounds in the field degrade much faster than in arsenal storage.  
Brackenbury’s Response 
The Director General of the Ordnance, the prececessor position to 
the Master General of Ordnance, Major General H. Brackenbury, 
responded in a memorandum dated 10 May 1901, challenging several 
points of the committee’s requirements paper. He specifically challenged 
the primary qualities of mobility in the horse artillery, arguing that the 
firepower and capacity would not be available with the weight specified, 
based on the current fielded equipment. He also argued that accuracy and 
speed were not available with the recoil mechanisms suggested by the 
                                           







committee. The French and Germans (in the French 75 and Ehrhardt 
systems respectively) had mature recuperator designs, although the 
Director General of the Ordnance rightly pointed out that the Committee 
wanted some sort of magical device that was to contemporary knowledge 
not even invented, let alone engineered, tested, and perfected. The 
Director General of the Ordnance, though, was most pressing over how far 
the committee was willing to lose ammunition capacity for the sake of 
saving weight as a representation of increased capacity in the key 
parameters.136  
Committee Response and Industrial Actions 
The Committee responded ten days later on 20 May, 1901 that they 
truly believed that 28 cwt was achievable because of the inefficiencies of the 
old 12 and 15–pr guns. With this in mind though, it was decided to submit 
a specification package to industry with the 28 cwt and 40 rounds 
specification intact at that early stage. The committee decided that a shell 
under 18 pounds would be unacceptable for field artillery. This was driven 
by the current technology and understanding of the shrapnel round 
                                           







determining the size, without consideration of high explosive shell 
rounds.137  
In an initial conference Vickers was represented by Mr Trevor 
Dawson, a former Royal Navy lieutenant who had risen to prominence 
while working at the Ordnance Factories at Woolwich. Vickers’ initial 
impressions of a gun that could meet the velocity specifications of the 
army, were that either weight must increase or the quality of steel must 
increase to make the 28 cwt goal. It is unknown what internal ballistics 
Dawson was mentioning, but in all likelihood, this was the goal of 6000 
yards range with a shell weight greater than current. Vickers proposed to 
have a hydraulic based recoil mechanism ‘the system of the French.’ This, 
along with a 40-inch recoil, was meant to be a long recoil system. It appears 
on the whole that the Vickers design was a product of close inspection of 
the French 75, and attempted to improve on that style of gun.138 Dawson 
claimed that an incorporation of springs into the recoil saved 1 cwt over the 
entire unit, although admittedly increasing complexity. 
Dawson commented that ‘the more weight you have the better 
means you have of overcoming the energy without movement of the 
carriage.’ Dawson repeatedly suggested that one of the keys to the success 
of achieving the key performance parameters of the gun weight would rely 
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on using better steel, although the committee did not seem interested in 
such a proposal at the early stages of building.139  
Dawson wholeheartedly approved the use of fixed munitions on 
multiple grounds, although mainly the belief that the French utilize it, 
which was the test of quality.140 As a parting question, Dawson was 
questioned on Krupp fuzes, and very insightfully, he commented that the 
fuze and the gun must be a paired object. If two guns are the same except 
for their rifling, the fuzes will not work right. Barrels and munitions would 
have to work in concert to provide effective firepower.141  
Next on the interview process was Mr George Hadcock of 
Armstrongs. Hadcock’s answers to the committee were more grounded in 
reality than Dawson’s, answers based on technical expertise rather than 
trying to sell a product. Hadcock believed that case ammunition was the 
only reasonable answer for quick–firing guns, yet he admitted the weight 
added nothing ballistically. He was also questioned about the effects of 
heat, a question that did not come up with Dawson.142 One effect of 
shrapnel was that the gun could fire at a lower initial velocity, (shorter 
barrel) because the booster in the shell accelerated the rounds by up to 190 
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feet per second, a very large amount. As well, a .5–inch ball would 
penetrate 2 inches of oak at ‘long range’143  
Finally, Col E Bainbridge, CB, the Chief Superintendent of the 
Ordnance Factories (CSOF) was called to speak. He quickly mentioned a 
measure of effectiveness of the gun through the amount of rounds carried, 
which he estimated at 30 and 34 for a horse and field equivalent 
respectively.144 He disputed trade claims about the number of on–target 
shots that could be achieved in one minute. He believed that seven rounds 
was the maximum achievable, but cited that HMS Excellent, the Royal 
Navy’s gunnery school, fired out of the 12–pound, 12 cwt gun five times in 
23.5 seconds, which was then the British record. Bainbridge was adamantly 
against case ammunition for two–fold reasons: first, he believed them to be 
innately less safe than separate munitions, and secondly based upon weight, 
that for every nine rounds, he could have one more if they were not cased. 
He recanted a few questions later and submitted an idea for Royal Horse 
Artillery guns firing case whilst the Royal Field Artillery guns fired separate 
charges, exclusively due to weight.145 The Chief Superintendent of the 
Ordnance Factories based his assumptions of pneumatic springs on a 
workable recoil mechanism based upon the 9.2-inch howitzer. (This would 
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not be completely tested until July 1914 at Shrewsbury with ‘Mother.’)146 
 With these expert testimonies, the government released their 
specifications.  
Key Performance Parameters  
On 8 July 1901 the committee released their key performance 
parameters that had to be met for the Royal Horse Artillery. The gun was 
to be quickfiring, carry 40 rounds, and weigh no more than 28 cwt behind 
the team. Ballistically, it had to deliver accurate shrapnel fire to 6,000 yards 
at 16 degrees and have a remaining velocity of 600 feet per second at that 
range from a 12.5 pound shell.147  
The calibre of the barrel was not stipulated, except that the 
committee did request it should be as short as possible. This would have 
also been in the interests of the manufacturers as it would have saved 
weight, so it is not a surprise. Open sights were a requirement, with 
telescopic sights being optional. Pneumatic recoil mechanisms were 
banned in the initial specification.148  
On the same day, 8 July 1901, the War Office released the 
conditions for the field gun. The gun should be quickfiring, with shield, 
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carriage and limber, and when packed with no less than 15 rounds, should 
not exceed 38 cwt. Ballistically, the gun should accurately fire shrapnel to 
6,000 yards at 16 degrees with 600 feet per second delivery velocity. The 
shell had to weigh at least 18 pounds.149  
The competition was run with the following requirements of 
evaluation in descending order: shell power, ballistics, and weight behind 
team were requirements, while rapidity of aimed fire, provision of shield, 
and number of rounds carried were trade–off factors. Shell power was 
measured by highest ratio of the total weight of bullets to total weight of 
projectile.150 All other particulars, including recoil mechanism, brakes, 
wheel size, etc were identical to the Royal Horse Artillery piece.  
Delivered Test Guns 
The Ordnance Factories, Armstrongs, and Vickers all delivered 
guns for both competitions. All guns failed to pass the tests. Some of these 
failures were minor, although, the failures were still bad enough for the 
committee to tell all manufacturers to redesign.  
For the horse artillery, the Ordnance Factories submitted guns that 
were too heavy, worse, carriages were flimsy, and they were inaccurate. 
                                           








Armstrongs submissions were not accurate, not powerful enough, and too 
heavy. Vickers guns were too heavy, too lively, and had no optics. 
For the field artillery, the Ordnance Factories gun was inaccurate, 
and it was too heavy, the Armstrongs gun was too heavy, and Vickers 
submitted a gun that was too heavy, did not have optics, and had an 
inadequate shield.  
The committee and the competition were conducted in an 
atmosphere of collegiate competition. After the tests at the proving ranges 
and road tests, the makers were also able to inspect not only their own 
submissions, but were able to inspect in detail those of their competitors 
when the systems were taken back to Woolwich. Although this certainly 
would have given the most eyes on the problems at hand, it would also 
have exposed each design and their successes and failures.  
Recommendation 
For the Horse Artillery competition, the committee decided that in 
their opinion the best solution would be to make a Frankenstein gun 
composed of the best bits of each design. The gun was to be based on 
Vickers, but with the Armstrong’s sliding breech block design. They 
suggested that the gun could add up to one cwt, but still be within the 







could be created by slowing down the muzzle velocity of the gun, and thus 
the total energy in firing, and believed this was possible while still getting 
600 feet per second at 6000 yards. Sighting was to come off of the 
Ordnance Factories gun. Much of the carriage was to be from Armstrong’s, 
but it must improve in 16 areas.151  
For the Field Artillery competition the recommendation of the 
committee was that the gun and breech were to be from the Armstrong’s 
gun, but with an improved mechanism. The buffers and running out gear 
were to be from Vickers, and the sighting and elevating were to be from the 
Royal Arsenal, although that of the version for the Royal Horse Artillery 
piece.  
After the gun testing, the panel switched requirements from that of 
the biggest shrapnel delivery device possible to a more refined one that was 
more stable at firing, being willing to give up significant weight of shell to do 
this.152 
Post–test interviews 
On Thursday, 23 October 1902 Sir Andrew Noble of Armstrong’s 
was interviewed by the committee.153 Noble suggested adding weight to the 
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Royal Horse Artillery gun would control recoil, as well as adding four 
calibres to the length to increase end velocity of the projectiles.154 As the 
gun itself was settled on as the Armstrong’s for the 18–pr and the Vickers 
for the 13–pr, each would be more focused on perfecting and tuning.  
Apparently the British shrapnel shells were considered 
comparatively stout in comparison to others, especially the Italians. Noble 
mentioned in the conference that he believed the wall should be thinned as 
the easiest way of increasing performance of the system.155 
Dawson was interviewed representing Vickers on 23 October 1902. 
He thought there was no need to lighten the shell for the Royal Horse 
Artillery project, judging that increasing gun weight and lowering muzzle 
velocity would take care of the issues.156  
(President) ‘Do you wish to make any general remarks upon any 
points which have not been brought forward by the members of the 
Committee? (Dawson) I would like to say that in connexion with this 
question we hope when the time comes for placing orders, it will be borne 
in mind that we have for many months been spending large sums of money 
and experimenting at great expense and that we are prepared to give the 
War Office the use of any design or invention we may make in connexion 
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with these experiments. This would be done of course, after some 
arrangement has been made by which we keep the secrecy of the design 
between Woolwich Arsenal, Messrs. Armstrong, and ourselves. Bearing 
these points in mind, we ask that we should be given a proper and fair 
share of the orders’157 
Dawson’s comment on the field artillery was that of again selling his 
products. He stated he saw no reason why Armstrong’s design should be 
selected over his own and that he thought that the Vickers projectile was 
more effective as it had more bullets. This did not receive a response from 
the committee.158 All of Vickers suggestions were made in such a way as to 
appear to claim patents whenever possible. For instance, both the Vickers 
screw breech and the Grubb sight were recommended strongly by Dawson. 
Both of these were very tightly held patents by Vickers, and stood to make 
large sums of royalties from their use, no matter the manufacturer.159 In 
general, Noble spoke as an engineer, Dawson spoke as a salesman, and 
this certainly would have had effects on how the committee viewed each, 
one as a technical partner, and the latter as a business partner.  
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Col Bainbridge was interviewed as the CSOF. Also interviewed were 
Maj Fisher, Royal Carriage Factory, and Lieutenant–Colonel HCL Holden 
of the Royal Gun Factory. As the designs submitted by the Ordnance 
Factories were not ultimately accepted, the body could be used as an 
unsung integrator and challenger of the trade designs. Bainbridge pointed 
out that ‘the difficulty that comes in here is that Vickers’ have got a light 
gun on a heavy carriage, while the EOC (Elswick Ordnance Company, also 
known as Armstrongs) have a heavy gun and a light carriage. I have worked 
out some figures, and find that the mean pressure of the carriage due to the 
recoil is in the Vickers equipment 4,156 pounds, whereas with the heavy 
gun of the EOC it is 2,464 pounds.’ He did not believe that the light 
carriage could handle such a force caused by so light a gun.  
Vickers could not supply a single forging for the field artillery 
project, and did not bother ‘VM Co (Vickers Maxim) threw up the sponge 
at once, than had never supplied any.’ The gun steel could only be reliably 
be produced by Armstrongs, and therefore the Royal Gun Factory had to 
resort to ordinary steel. 160 
                                           







The Ordnance Factories submitted a completely new design that 
incorporated the Vickers gun, the Armstrongs breech, and a new recoil 
mechanism which was a long recoil with much stiffer springs. OF were 
afraid this design was the best but would weigh too much. In the end, 
Bainbridge was exasperated: ‘I think after talking it over with the 
Committee, and when you make up your mind as to your 
recommendations, we shall be better able to do it.’161 
Major Fisher complained that the Vickers design had too many 
pieces from one casting and that the overall design was not survivable. 
Fisher stated, ‘Because the tubes are very thin, and if a bullet strikes the 
cradle with any velocity it would probably put it out of action altogether.’162 
He also complains that it appears the Vickers design is too expensive in 
construction, especially to be this fragile.  
On 17 April 1903 the committee released their third report.  
After making recommendations, the committee ordered a design in 
October 1902 of each the Field and Horse pieces that represented the 
strengths of each design submitted. Orders of a battery of four of each 
design were ordered from Armstrongs and Vickers for a total of 16 guns. 
These guns would be tested, including on a road trip from London to 
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Aberdeen and eventually some would go through destructive testing for 
survivability under machine gun and shrapnel fire. 
The final report was released on 4 August 1903. By this point 
Lieutenant–Colonel Findley had taken over the majority of the day to day 
activities of the committee. The results of gun shooting were overall 
satisfactory, and ranges of 7,000 yards were achieved.163 The largest 
challenge before ordering came from Blewitt, who did not believe that the 
18–pr design chosen had overachieved enough to justify it being put into 
service, preferring to equip both regiments with the 13–pr, albeit with a 
14.5–pound shell for the Royal Field Artillery. The 14.5–pound shell was 
more accurate than that of the 13 and 18–pr guns, and was less efficient in 
shell capacity, but it would have made up the difference in conserved 
weight. 164 Yet again, in 1907 the request for a 14.5–pound shell for the 13–
pr appeared, this time from camp commandant, Okehampton. He argued 
it shot better, it had a lot more lethality, and it was more effective by weight 
by about 3%.165  
This was backed up by officers who conducted the operational 
testing, who thought that it would be better served to use it for the horse 
artillery, scale it up to a 15 pound shell, and carry the saved weight (8 cwt) 
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in ammunition. Although it seemed a good idea on paper, the idea was 
overruled. It is unknown what difference this would have made not only in 
the howitzer competition, but also in 1914. 
On the second day of testing, nine shots were accurately fired over a 
minute; by day five, it was 15 by one gun.166 The highest rate of fire 
recorded for the Horse Artillery was 50 rounds per six–gun battery 
although it was not able to be sustained.167  
In March 1905, the final contract was signed to produce all the 
artillery for the Royal Horse and Royal Field Artillery. Two–thirds of the 
order went to the trade, split evenly by fiscal amount between Vickers, 
Armstrongs, and Cammell, which was in the process of transitioning the 
ordnance work to Coventry Ordnance Works. The remaining third was 
issued at the Ordnance Factories. Contract #73/4/5103 had 480 18–prs 
from the trade, broken down into 192 from Vickers, 192 from Armstrong 
and 96 from Cammell. This was based upon an agreement with the 
Director of Artillery in 1904 that Vickers and Armstrongs would combined 
receive 8/15 of the orders, and Cammell would get 2/15 of the orders, 
which left the Royal Ordnance Factories with 5/15ths of the order. In 
particular, and most importantly for the sake of policy, the Ordnance 
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Factories and Cammell would not pay any royalties.168 In addition, the same 
contract ordered 90 13–prs from the trade, broken down into 36 from 
Vickers, 36 from Armstrong’s and 18 from Cammell. The even cost for 
each contractor came from other parts of the order, mainly vehicles, which 
Cammell received a much larger share of to make up the difference from 
the gun orders. The overall contract was just at £1 million, which in all 
likelihood was the largest contract, and certainly the largest peacetime 
contract, ever placed for armaments. Little is actually known about the 
third placed at the Royal Arsenal, as the contract was not recoded in the 
annual audits of the Royal Factories.  
The Ordnance Factories ordered all of their steel for the barrels of 
their share from the Trade. Steel was sent to Woolwich for the purpose of 
13 and 18–pr guns with 45 tons from Cammell, which was rejected, 90 tons 
from Cammell which was accepted, 12 tons from Jessop which was also 
accepted, another 10 tons from Jessop which was accepted, and finally 10 
tons from Beardmore which was rejected.169 These were delivered in 18–in 
diameter ingots.  
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In 1905 the 18–prs were starting to bend due to ribs improperly 
designed opposite each other on the barrel. This caused the “A” tube to 
stretch after firing rounds. This occurred at 74 rounds after experiments 
with cordite.170 Four guns from each manufacturer were to be chosen for 
each of the 13 and 18-prs, 30 rounds were to be fired, 2 minutes apart, and 
measured at 15 and 30 rounds in their warm state to check for 
deformation. The resulting design changes might be the basis for the Mark 
II 18–pr guns, although there is nothing in the archives to substantiate or 
refute this.  
Multiple guns from multiple manufacturers showed some bending, 
but it seemed to be usual practice for the manufacturers to straighten 
barrels before proof. The Royal Gun Factory products were the only guns 
that seemed to be immune from bending. This was due to the way they 
were heat treated.171 Eventually, Cammell suggested cutting slots in the 
guides to avoid warping the barrels. This was approved by all and 
Cammell.172 Apparently, the ribs they were talking about were the guide 
rods that the barrel sat on. The cutting experiments did not alleviate the 
issue, and apparently made it worse.  
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The most interesting discovery in the archival material was how 
batteries were initially deployed. Batteries were truly spread across makers, 
and each battery of the three cited in the test results were distributed within 
all four manufacturers. Two of the three batteries had all four makers, and 
included in this were guns made by the Royal Gun Factory. This is also 
conclusive proof of the Factory making guns in the Mark I batch. This 
meant that the guns, including the manufacture of different steels were 
equivalent in performance for the purposes of battery cohesion.  
The mixed battery reports also showed that droop was occurring 
with all manufacturers, so it was a design fault and not a manufacturing 
fault.173 This went against the initial studies. 37 of 38 18–prs tested were 
drooped, and 12 of 12 13–prs tested were drooped.  
Several guns were so warped that they had to be removed from 
service. Gun 114 was test fired in June 1905. 10 rounds were fired in 40 
seconds, 13 rounds in 56 seconds, and 7 in 19 seconds.174 This gun was 
eventually accepted for cordite testing purposes, but was too bent to be 
used for active service.175 The 18–pr gun, number 255 confused much of 
the initial ability to fix the problem. It appears that almost every gun after 
the 1906 trials showed signs of bending. Some, such as gun No 264 were 
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so bent at the rails that they could not be remounted on their carriage after 
measurement.176  
The jams to this particular gun were not caused by bent rods as first 
thought, but by the recoil cylinder head seizing in the inner spring case.177  
After a year’s use, only one gun was beyond the limit in bending, but 
eight were reaching the limit. All other guns that showed signs of bending 
were bent back and had been satisfactory. At the end of the 1907 exercises, 
it was decided to take no further action on the Mk I 18–pr guns.178 The 
redesign of the 18–pr and 13–pr were assigned RGF designs 11,090/35 and 
11,100/41 respectively.179 In the end, it appeared that if an 18–pr was to 
bend, it would happen at proof and in the first few rounds. After that initial 
breaking in, little happened, which was significant for both operational and 
design elements.  
India Experience 
The Indian Army was the first customer to order and receive 18–
prs. In theory, India could produce its own guns, although sometimes this 
was with the help of external suppliers. The Chief Superintendent of 
Ordnance Factories reported on 20 December 1909 that 61 ‘A’ tubes for 
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the 18–pr had been sent to India, presumably for building Indian guns 
there.180 This was probably the basis for much of the force of 18–prs that 
India had in 1914.  
India also gave the British government some insight into the actual 
wear of the gun. The India Office in June 1907 wrote asking what the life 
of an 18–pr was. London replied 6,000 rounds, with the caveat that some 
might do 50% more than that. This would be the basis of many calculations 
that would greatly affect the industrial base in time of war, as Woolwich 
would soon find out. The Committee recommended that six of the new 
18–pr designed guns be sent out to units for practice early in 1907. 
Obviously, the first newly built guns were being built from scratch in 1906 
at Woolwich. This meant that by 1914, the RGF had eight years of 
experience in building and rebuilding the 18–prs.  
Aftermath 
The largest unseen impact of the committee might have been the 
development and professional maturity of its members. Lieutenant–
Colonel WFL Lindsay was the commander of the GHQ artillery in 1914. 
Lieutenant–Colonel ND Findlay, was a Brigadier General and 
                                           







Commander of Artillery, 1st Division, in 1914 and was killed on 10 
September 1914 in the Battle of the Marne.  
The difficulty in understanding the overall strategy for how the Royal 
Artillery would be used, required an understanding of how the new guns 
would be used, although certainly in 1907 and even by 1914 this remained  
vague. This was because of several reasons. First, technology was 
developing quickly, making a situation where a howitzer would have to 
work in tandem with the new guns. Second, as so few 4.5–inch howitzers 
were purchased for the regiment by 1914, time had not passed for new 
doctrine and tactics to be developed and dessiminated. This again resulted 
from the British understanding of fuzing for high explosive ammunition. 
Although the 4.5-inch howitzer and high explosive (HE) shell had proven 
effective at Shoeburyness, the War Office was unwilling to invest heavily in 
a product that the Regiment of Artillery felt uncomfortable with. It would 
not be until a crisis forced the gunners to rethink prejudices built into the 
institutional heritage of their arm that high explosive rounds would return 
to the arsenal.  
Conclusion 
The re-equipment of the two mobile regiments of artillery shows the 







resources to effectively execute a strategy. Industry in cooperation with the 
committee created a gun in essentially two years, with another year for 
testing. Even more, the entire reequipping only took British industry two 
years to complete from a stage of initial prototype production to 
completing all six front line divisions. Although designers would, in 
hindsight, design a gun that was not well equipped for a battlefield that a 
decade later required the use of much more high explosive ordnance than 
was initially perceived, the state of British industry, science, and military 
culture only allowed for the 18–pr to be built in a way that all were 
comfortable with. The guns proved to be reliable, long lasting, and usable 
to those who were not career gunners, all things that would be important. 
The design features and the competition requirements were indeed correct 
for what the British Army needed. The two new guns would prove to be a 
classic of British artillery design due first and foremost to the proper 







CHAPTER FIVE: DESIGN PROBLEMS AND ENGINEERING 
WORKAROUNDS, 1900–1914 
Introduction 
Between 1900 and 1914, how Britain built arms changed 
dramatically. This process was an evolution, as no single event radically 
changed procedures, although advances in metallurgy, propellants, 
chemical science, and manufacturing all affected the end product. Guns, 
even those that were in service, were inherently different systems at the 
beginning and the end of this period. What follows are general themes of 
British ordnance from many different angles. These themes are long term 
observations that drove design, production, and use of British ordnance.  
The following chapter discusses technical issues of ordnance from 
1900–1914 that compliments the supply and demand chapters. This 
chapter discusses the overall evolution over all platforms.  
Health and Safety 
The driving factor of all ordnance design was to make its operation 
safe for its crews. The bureaucrats in Whitehall as well as the officers at 
Woolwich and elsewhere believed that the primary consideration was for 







circumstances. This caused difficulties in both design and use of 
equipment as will be demonstrated in this section.  
Although never overtly stated, the cause for this design restriction 
must have been politicians. As Britain was the only main power in Europe 
that had a volunteer army, the safety of the volunteers and therefore the 
regular supply of volunteers was a cornerstone of British defence strategy. 
If equipment failed, a loss of confidence in the entire system could befall 
the Government. Both the Royal Navy and the British Army needed 
ordnance that was reliable, safe, and further down the line of priorities, as 
powerful as their enemies’ ordnance.  
Wire Wound Guns 
Safety was a primary reason Britain kept wire–wound guns well after 
everybody else had perfected built–up guns. The thinking followed that if 
gun crews felt safe, they would be more effective in combat. This was 
achieved by building up guns through a process first patented in the 1850s 
and extensively used by Sir W.G. Armstrong in his massive guns built just 
after the Crimean War (1854-1856).181  
Armstrong entered the market in an era where large guns made of 
cast or wrought iron had traditionally not been safe. The explosion of 
                                           







‘Peacemaker’ on USS Princeton had occurred just a decade before in 
1844, killing two members of the Taylor Cabinet. A radical new design that 
could ensure safety was a key element of Armstrong’s initial design.  
Diagram 1, Wire construction 
 
Wire wound meant that a set of tubes had wire wrapped around 
their exterior to add compressional strength. The tube was made of several 
pieces, including the ‘Inner ‘A’ Tube’ that included the rifling and its 
corresponding ‘Outer ‘A’ Tube.’ Layers and layers of wire were wound 
around it to add strength. In some guns, some layers were over 100 
thicknesses in depth. The wire kept the ‘A’ tubes from exploding on the 







would theoretically keep the barrel from becoming a deadly weapon to its 
users. The wire was itself covered by a jacket or ‘Outer ‘B’ Tube’ as some 
designs called it, which covered and protected the wire and gave the gun a 
smooth look. It also added rigidity over the length of the barrel. In 1906 
Armstrongs attempted to modify the design, incorporating new 
technologies (including steel advances), to propose a design similar to the 
built-up method of other western countries. It was rejected although the 
single tube was easier to manufacture. The primary reason for not 
accepting the design was that the safety margin was not in line with British 
expectations.182  
Gun wire was not what would initially be considered wire. Gun wire 
came in a form .06 inches thick, and .25 inches in breadth.183 It was more 
like a ribbon than wire, which could cause confusion. For the sake of 
clarity and historical record, this thesis will use the term wire throughout.  
The British wire wound design worked in its stated purpose first and 
foremost, and of all the reports before the war of damage or incidents to 
ordnance reported to the Ordnance Committee, there are no casualties 
due to wire wound gun barrels failing.  
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Cracked guns remaining safe to fire in most cases.184 ‘In other words, 
that it should be safe to continue firing the gun, if circumstances require it, 
after the liner was split, or even cracked circumferentially: all designs 
passed by the Committee are so figured that this is apparent on 
inspection.’185 This became even more important as technology was 
continually pushed on every point to impart more energy to projectiles.  
Accident Reporting  
Any accident was investigated by the central committees as well as 
the Chief Inspector Woolwich, with the results disseminated down, along 
with recommendations on how to prevent the accident from occurring 
again. This was a success, as it does not appear from annual digesting of 
accidents to ordnance in the President’s report that any make and model 
ever had a repeat incident if the advice was followed. The members, who 
had been hand–picked from the most competent officers of the Royal 
Navy and British Army, understood more than anyone that gunners must 
have confidence in their tools, and the best way to build and maintain 
confidence in equipment was to have the best safe designs for manufacture. 
As this was paired with a rigorous inspection process, British gunners felt 
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comfortable with the weapons taken to war. This confidence was invaluable 
when it really mattered: in the middle of battle. This though did enable a 
bit of conservatism in design, especially in breech design, as slower, (but 
stronger) breeches were used, and once mandated in early designs, 
continued through later patterns as they became the ‘standard’ designs.186 
The use of artillery was also constrained for the purposes of health 
and safety. For instance, in October 1908 a test was conducted to ascertain 
if artillery could safely be fired over the heads of friendly troops in combat. 
It was conducted by firing an 18–pr with a fuse set to 0, simulating a 
misfire. Two rounds were fired, landing 1500 yards and 2,800 yards ahead 
of the gun respectively. It was recommended that it was not safe to fire the 
guns within 3,000 yards, or almost two miles, of infantry. This distance 
would be more for heavy artillery. Faults such as defective munitions, 
broken drive bands, etc would unduly risk those being fired over.187  
Gun Pressures 
Importantly, for safety reasons the working pressures for British 
guns were less than the ‘competition.’ Working pressures are defined as 
the pressure, in tons per square inch, which is produced by the propellant 
to push the projectile through the barrel. In general, the higher the 
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pressure, the more energy that can be imparted to a projectile and the 
more speed that it has when it leaves the barrel, also called muzzle velocity. 
The faster the projectile leaves the barrel, in general the longer the 
projectile will fly before landing, based on Newtonian physics and the 
Second Law of Motion. There was a British requirement on almost all 
guns to limit pressures to 18 tons in pounds per square inch at the breech. 
This single requirement drove every other aspect of how British guns were 
designed and used, including gun design, propellants, and projectiles. 
Although experiments were conducted after 1905 to raise it to 20 or even 
more tons per inch, by 1914, the standard remained at 18 tons per square 
inch. Working pressure was a safety measure, but it was also used as a 
primary way to control what might be the biggest worry for British, and 
especially naval, ordnance officers: gun longevity. 
Health and Safety Past Guns 
It is not only in the design of guns themselves that health and safety 
concerns were apparent. In June 1905, Mr Arnulph Mallock 
recommended using ‘artificial ear drums’  to protect ears from the blast, 
replacing the cotton in regular service. (Mr Mallock was a civilian member 







Royal Society.)188 These would be ear muffs made of drums with India 
rubber coating. In the end Mr Mallock’s design was not accepted because 
they were seen as inferior to Elliot’s protectors which had been approved 
just a few years earlier.189 Many modern conceptions of the Edwardian time 
period as being indifferent to personal safety or injury simply do not bear 
close scrutiny at least when the concerns of those employed by the 
Government were concerned.   
Gun Longevity 
Gun longevity increasingly became an important aspect of 
governmental/industrial relations. It also became a driving factor in design 
technical trade–offs. The increasing worry about erosion of the rifling of 
the barrel had a great follow-on effect on the capacity of industry to reline 
guns. A longer life measured in rounds fired before reaching the end of 
being militarily useful meant less need to reline, and more availability of 
both the gun and the ship, in the case of the Royal Navy. A longer life 
would also allow a specialized industrial policy that utilized Woolwich 
alone to remain rebuilding guns, and allow Vickers and Armstrongs as well 
as any other new supplier to build new guns, as noted in the Murray 
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Report in Chapter Two. Guns with better rifling were also more efficient in 
the use of ammunition, as the shots were more consistent and accurate for 
longer periods. Therefore, the gunner should have been able to hit the 
target more often, thus saving ammunition.  
One of the easiest ways to increase gun life turned out to be the 
research and development of better drive bands, or obturator bands as they 
were sometimes called. Driving band design was difficult because it had to 
strike a medium between giving satisfactory shooting in worn barrels and 
not excessive pressures and therefore wear in new barrels. A study in 
1906–1907 had already limited drive bands to copper, cupro–nickel, and 
wrought iron. The latter tore up the lands of the rifling so much it was 
considered unfit for service.190  
The most pressing technical issues of the 1901 report were the need 
to make better obturator bands as the guns were, with advances in 
propellant, creating pressures that were more powerful, and could not be 
supported by current versions.191 Drive bands were thought to be where 
much of the wear of a barrel were created until about 1905. The drive 
bands, served two purposes. First, they were a soft metal that could grip 
rifling and impart spin without damaging the barrel. Second, they acted as a 
gas check that allowed for a more efficient use of energy from the gas of 
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the burning cordite to the projectile. The improvements in shells could, in 
certain guns, exponentially increase the life of the barrel by changing the 
metallurgy of the band between copper, bronze, and other metals as well as 
the shape of the band itself and its position on the shell.  
New High Velocity Guns 
As new high velocity guns became more widespread, especially in 
the Royal Navy, it was discovered by Admirals Chase, Parr, and Foote that 
the middle sections of the length of the barrels were not coming into 
contact with the drive bands on the shell in worn guns. 192 New bands were 
needed to fix this and a drive band was designed, proofed, and accepted to 
fix this issue. The larger problem would not be discovered until several 
years later, as will be discussed later.  
There were other factors that had to be looked at other than friction 
in the wear of barrels. The Ordnance Committee as true bureaucrats were 
worried about many more factors than simply building the best gun that 
money could buy. A 1903 note from the 6–inch Mark VII project lays this 
out. The Committee worried how higher velocities from new propellants 
would affect the increased ballistics, the muzzle velocities, and the life of 
the rifling. An increase in velocity decreased the life of the barrel from 
                                           







2,000 rounds to just 400, with the increased range and power that could be 
associated with such an improvement.193  
Gas factors in high velocity guns 
After about 1903, some British technicians within Government 
started coming to the conclusion that excessive barrel wear might not be 
exclusively a product of driving bands wearing worn barrels through 
friction, but also that the gases produced by the cordite might also have 
something to do with it.  The speed of the gas and flame appeared to be 
scoring barrels in the new high–velocity guns that were becoming the 
current direction of design in British weapons. To work, driving bands had 
to be as thick as the thickness of the rifling, or they would not be a gas 
check, and would lead to inefficiency and inconsistency. Therefore, every 
driving band should grip the entire thickness of rifling for the entire length 
of the barrel. Hot cordite gas was created at speeds of anywhere from 
1,000 to 3,000 meters per second, or roughly 3,000 to 9,000 feet per 
second.194 As well, copper fouling left from the previous projectiles would 
create friction, which converted to heat and caused drag in the barrel as 
well as decreased muzzle velocity.195  
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Mr Arnulph Mallock, as a civilian member of the Ordnance 
Committee, conducted experiments in 1905 and based his theory of 
erosion upon the primary cause being temperature and velocity, and not 
steel composition or driving bands. He based this on maximum velocity, 
which was in excess of projectile velocity, and therefore, the metal could 
not cause erosion, and it must come from somewhere else. In this 
particular case, he surmised that erosion came primarily from escaping 
gases. This was to be proven through a new design for a 7.5–inch gun 
which was to be a test bed for all future guns.196  
Nothing can be found in the secondary sources that mentions this 
issue, and, it appears in not one of the corporate histories. This is for good 
reason, as almost all of the research was conducted at Government–owned 
laboratories and ranges with exclusively governmental funding, and 
technical reports were put in a 50–year classification. This information thus 
was incorporated into the supply chain through design changes and 
specifications given to manufacturers only at the end of the design phase 
for building to the specification.  
                                           







Other barrel wear issues 
Because of all of these reasons, this is the most understudied part of 
the story in barrel wear. When asking for new 9.2–inch guns in 1903, there 
were designs for heavier, 20-ton breech pressure guns, although the Chief 
Inspector Woolwich was having a difficult time with managing ballistics. 
His research indicated the discovery of a previously unknown physical 
barrier at about 3,000 f/s in muzzle velocity. The Chief Inspector 
Woolwich thought this barrier was due either to the driving rings of copper 
not being able to manage both the pressure for a proper gas check as well 
as the increased torque, or the increase in friction being an exponential 
factor that simply had eluded scientists. Nonetheless, Chief Inspector 
Woolwich experimented with a cupro–nickel drive band, but three of the 
four failed by breaking upon firing.197 This increased muzzle velocity would 
take a lot more time to work out, and in the end, the consensus was to 
drop pressures and work on increasing the weight of the projectile in lieu 
of speed.  
 Major Minchin, Royal Artillery, was the British expert on rifling; 
‘working out curves of rotation, pressure for various guns, and suggesting 
modified grooves and various twists’198 Rifling was an ongoing and 
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expensive endeavour, with uniform versus increasing twist being in the 
foreminds of the committee. British officials performed tests through a 
head to head format, ordering one of each at initial trials as well as re–
rifling with new grooves in a wide array of gun sizes and velocities. Rifling 
always entailed a balance between wear, muzzle velocity, range, and 
accuracy.199 More research needs to be done on how the design of rifling 
affected the overall wear and accuracy of guns, but as one of the more 
technical aspects, it must wait for its own study.  
 Poor design on the other hand might be the most well–known cause 
of wear to historians. The 12–inch naval and coast artillery guns were 
notorious for ‘choking.’ This was caused primarily by the inner tube sliding 
slightly forward, and building up a slight amount of metal that could only 
be repaired by boring it away. Behind closed doors, the Government put 
much of the blame squarely on the Vickers design, which none of the 
corporate historians mention, and is not apparent in the corporate financial 
records. The problem was eventually fixed by a two–pronged attack from 
the Ordnance Factories inspecting physical examples of failed barrels and 
Vickers fixing the design once its flaws were discovered by the Royal 
Laboratories and Gun Factory. This process will be discussed in detail 
later.  
                                           








 A final piece was the battle for consistency. This was shown by the 
discovery of how ambient temperature in the new cordite greatly affected 
the internal pressure, accuracy, and range of projectiles. Showing a 
surprisingly modern and scientific approach, the government set a standard 
temperature with which to design barrels to and base range tables on. This 
forced interesting and significant changes, including the more widespread 
use of electricity on board ships so that the magazines could be kept at a 
constant, air conditioned temperature.  
Tests were conducted on a 4–inch Mark VII gun to try to get more 
consistent shooting. What might be most interesting is that stick cordite 
was seen as a much more consistent product than the powdered propellant 
used by all other western countries.200 Also interesting is that British 
designers wanted to design a muzzle break, but could not figure out how to 
do it. This would take until after the First World War to come to fruition. 
The muzzle blast was thought to have disturbed the flight of the projectile. 
It was discovered after inspection of the driving band that the fault lay in 
the inconsistent burning rate of cordite.201 Essentially, it was a point of 
discussion as to where the projectile was in the bore when the cordite was 
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fully burned. As the propellant reached its fully consumed state at different 
places, the speed and pressure at the muzzle was inconsistent. It was most 
desirable to get the powder burned as close to the chamber as possible, but 
the reverse had to apply to get the high muzzle velocities needed in 
modern guns.202  
Longevity of the barrel also depended on proper maintenance of the 
guns. While not being used naval service guns were to have their bores 
lacquered whilst in long–term storage. Guns on board vessels were to be 
coated with a mixture of 95 per cent mineral jelly and 5 per cent beeswax 
in all climes, and land service guns were to continue to be coated in oil. Oil 
was better than lacquer for the purposes of land storage.203 
As can be seen, there were many variables that affected the life of a 
gun. Some of these could be engineered or designed out, while others were 
by–products of other trade–offs.  
Cordite 
Cordite or corded ballistite, was the single largest factor in gun 
longevity. Although specifics of its manufacture and the business 
surrounding it are not within the scope of this thesis, a section has to 
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mention how the propellant affected the calculus of balancing capacity and 
needs within the ordnance industry.  
Cordite was a low explosive invented late in the nineteenth century 
as the leading British variant of the new nitrocellulose and nitro–glycerine 
powders invented by Western powers. It was a successor to black powder 
based propellants that had been used for centuries. Its appearance looked 
not dissimilar from a cord about the shape of round noodle pasta; hence 
the name. As a low explosive, it was designed to burn at a prescribed rate, 
thus having a controllable burn in gun barrels, which would create gas that 
would push the projectile out of the barrel. A high explosive on the other 
hand does not burn, but explodes due to its faster release of energy. The 
understanding that a propellant pushes an object to perform work is one of 
the key visualizations in understanding internal ballistics, or, what happens 
inside a barrel when the propellant is ignited.  
One of the primary issues with cordite was that it burned hotter than 
the melting point of the steel. In the less energetic black powder this was 
not an issue. The heat was not a pressing issue in smaller ordnance. Larger 
guns had inherently more pressing issues, as they required larger masses of 







longer and the initial inertia was greater to overcome on the larger 
projectiles.204  
Nitrocellulose powder as used in other western countries was 
determined unacceptable in naval ordnance by the Explosives Committee 
in tests between 1900 and 1903.205 This determination meant that naval 
guns would be forced to use cordite for all uses, and meant that all powder 
would have to be sourced from the UK, as the only companies using the 
process were domestic.  
The thickness of propellant could also be tuned to best get the 
desired internal ballistics necessary for the particular gun. A longer barrel 
meant that more burning time was available, while thinner strands usually 
meant less burning time as required by smaller guns.  
New Propellants 
The problem with the original Mark I Cordite was that it was not 
friendly to gun barrels. The life expectancy on some designs was barely 100 
rounds. This meant that guns were not able to be used for practice with full 
cartridges, and that guns had to be replaced frequently. Part of the solution 
was to rethink the recipe for cordite so as to increase the longevity of guns. 
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This was achieved with Cordite MD (i.e., Modified Design) a chemically 
improved version, and later, Cordite MDT (i.e., Modified Design Tubular) 
which was a tubular, hollow stick, which allowed for a more controlled 
burn rate. These powders would open up the gun designers to gain 
performance without having to worry about constant relining of barrels.  
In 1901 Cordite MD was authorized for naval service, although it 
would take time for each gun pattern to be approved for the new 
propellant. Not all powders had the same specific gravity, and this new MD 
powder was less dense than the older Cordite Mark I. The scientific 
knowledge of cordite developed rapidly, and by 1902 the designers at 
Woolwich were able to calculate the burn rates of all cordite powders and 
estimate how far from the muzzle each charge would burn. This was a key 
element in designing larger and more powerful guns.  
The new cordite had a great and positive effect on the wear of the 
guns. The chart below demonstrates the difference between the old Mark I 
Cordite and the new Cordite MD on certain guns. By 1905 the superiority 
of MD over Mark I Cordite in regards to erosion was well marked. There 
still is not enough evidence to confirm when Mark I was pulled from 
service.206 In addition to ordinary service, Cordite MD wore guns much less 
                                           







than Cordite Mark I in proofing, when the pressure curves were more 
aggressive207 
The War Office and Admiralty based their assumptions for wear 
rates on the compilation of research and data collected by the 
Superintendent of Research at Shoeburyness as well as calculations by the 
Chief Superintendent of Ordnance Factories and his staff at Woolwich. 
The following table was baselined to 1910 specifications for cordite and 
design, although it can be assumed it is generally acceptable for the entire 
span of study within probable error.  
  
                                           








Barrel life by powder – units are in full charge shells 
Gun model Cordite Mark I Cordite MD 
13.5–inch Mark V  450 
12–inch Mark VIII 220 500 
12–inch Mark IX 130 280 
12–inch Mark X  280 
12–inch Mark XI –XII  160 
9.2–inch Marks IX – X 125 450 
9.2–inch Mark XI  300 
7.5–inch Marks I, II, V  600 
6–inch Mark XI  1000 
6–inch Mark VII (29pound)  1200 
6–inch Mark VII (20–23) 900  
                                           







6–inch QF 1200  
4–inch BL Mark VII  1200 
12–pr QF 18–cwt  1200 
12–pr QF 12–cwt 900  
   
This scientific research also was used to make sure consistency of 
product to operators. Powder had quite a bit of inconsistency between 
batches. An example of this is described in an interesting case. Two 
batches, Batch 69 and Batch 31 were investigated, and although they were 
the same powder type, simply through nascent differences in manufacture, 
created errors. For instance 69 produced 2674 f/s and 17.5 tons, whilst 31 
produced 2705 f/s and 17.8 tons breech pressure in the same proof gun. 
These errors had to be calculated for each batch of powder to tune the 
cartridges they would be used in. Humidity, temperature, and other 
phenomena had a great effect on the velocity, accuracy, and various other 
characteristics of guns, especially long flight naval projectiles. Arguably the 
most understudied of experiments was the experiments in temperature to 
cordite. In tests of the 4–inch QF gun, it was discovered that 10 degrees 







pressure and 18 f/s. In the 4.7-inch gun, this was 22.86 f/s and .19 tons.209 
In naval guns changes were even more pronounced. In addition, a change 
in temperature from 65 degrees to 80 degrees Fahrenheit equated to a 
change in initial velocity from 2547 to 2614 f/s based exclusively on 
temperature.210 Thus, assuming a 20 second flight, with consistent and 
equal reduction due to air resistance, the batch difference would cause an 
over/under shoot of 600 feet, and 15 degrees temperature would cause an 
over/undershoot of 1400 feet. 
MDT Cordite 
1908 saw strip cordite as the primary propellant being replaced by 
tubular cordite, as strip cordite was inconsistent in ignition. ‘Meanwhile our 
knowledge of tubular was in its infancy, and we had to fall back on cords.’211 
This was a significant step, as industrial concerns about being unable to 
make this powder, as well as MDT, forced gun designers to utilize the 
older powders even though designs existed for newer breech designs 
utilizing better powders with better results. In hindsight this point of failure 
was an area that should have received more scrutiny and investment.  
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MDT did continue to have tests conducted upon it, although there 
was not enough to actually bring a gun using the propellant into 
production. A test in 1914 with a 6–inch Mark XII and one with a smaller 
MDT chamber showed that a smaller MDT chamber was not enough of a 
difference to warrant the change. 212 Apparently the wear in the MDT gun 
was much more significant after 239 rounds.213 This discovery required 
massive investment to fire at experimental levels several thousand rounds, 
costing precious powder, projectiles, laboratory space and labour as well as 
range space which was limited even in peacetime, and almost impossible to 
find in wartime with the needs of proofing guns after relining.  
Life of rifling tests were also conducted on 9.2–inch Mark IX and X 
guns. These guns were used for heavy cruisers as well as coastal artillery 
guns for many forts and ports throughout the Empire. Testing wear often 
was conducted to ascertain wear based on the charge size of cordite. In this 
case, size 40 prolonged the life of the barrel by 25 rounds but this was due 
to loss in muzzle velocity caused by smaller sized cordite. In the end, the 
Ordnance Committee rejected size 40 cordite for use.214 This was 
representative of much of the research done at Shoeburyness, finding the 
correct powders to match the characteristics of the guns themselves. It was 
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an expensive process though, as usually the guns would need to be relined 
after the experiments, if they could be used at all, and the shell and powder 
used in larger guns could easily have a total cost in excess of £10,000. It 
was obviously worth it though to contemporaries, who did not seem to 
shrink from costly experiments if the benefits were potentially large.  
Old Guns, New Propellant 
Early guns built in the 1880s and 1890s had high failure rates once 
they were converted to the cordite powder, which they were not designed 
for. For example a 9.2–inch Mark V gun on board Warspite cracked its 
liner to a length of 175 inches. This 1886 Elswick-made gun was one of the 
pre–annealed guns. Annealing was a process introduced into 
commonplace manufacture of British guns between 1898 and 1900 and by 
the accident the specification for manufacture had been changed to allay 
this problem.215 Warspite was sold off in 1904, so these guns were not only 
obsolescent but obsolete by the time of the incident, which might have led 
to the decommissioning. This mass of cracked guns made before annealing 
furnaces were used was probably the underlying cause for many 
obsolescent ships being taken out of commission from 1902–1905. Many 
of these older guns, if actually used in battle with cordite, had a strong 
                                           







chance of cracking or even worse when fired at combat rates and 
temperatures. Tt appears that the Admiralty believed it would be easier to 
decommission vessels instead of redesigning an obsolescent gun to take 
new powder and update the manufacturing techniques. In the middle of 
1902 a call was sent to manufacturers to ascertain what could be done to 
rebuild or alter all guns to get greater power. In every case, the cost of 
rebuilding was too costly, although new powder charges were created, and 
extensive testing was started with composite charges which were made up 
of several different sizes of powders that offered a different pressure at 
different points in the firing cycle.  
For the navy, the increased weight in charge had to also take into 
effect the abilities of the on–board hoists to get particular sizes and weights 
to the guns from the magazines.216 This investment was not a justifiable cost 
to Parliament, reeling from the immense costs of the recently concluded 
Boer War. The introduction of Cordite and Cordite MD allowed 
designers to step back and rethink what the future of warfare was as well as 
making hard decisions on fleet recapitalization.  
                                           








Eventually, guns wear out. When that happens, they need to be 
replaced, and the most efficient way is to keep an amount of guns in 
reserve that can be used to replace them. In the case of the Royal Navy, 
one of the greatest state secrets was the size of the reserve pool of guns. 
This secrecy went even as far as Parliamentary permission being used at 
least as far back as 1888 exempting it from publication in the London 
Gazette, the only such exemption that is known to have been given in this 
period, and tight secrecy was imposed on manufacturers and Parliament as 
to how many guns were purchased in any given year.217 The secret was of 
the utmost importance because of the intelligence that could have been 
garnered about the percentage of guns that could be replaced after a battle, 
the calculated wear life based on the amount of reserves, and weaknesses 
in multiple segments, including industry and metallurgy.  
The Boer War had a significant effect on the designs of ordnance 
that would subsequently be produced. Officers came back with very 
specific lessons learned. Reserve guns became the largest takeaway in naval 
backdoor discussions during and after the war. The Admiralty felt that they 
were being cut out of industrial capacity: whether this was indeed true or 
                                           







not is beside the point. Clive Trebilcock certainly supports this idea in 
multiple sections of his work The Vickers Brothers. The conclusion that 
Admiralty came to was to increase the ratio of reserve guns held. The 
Royal Navy felt that if they had actually to engage, there would have not 
been an opportunity to remanufacture barrels. This forced the Royal Navy 
to seriously analyse the amount of reserve tubes they ordered after the war 
ended. The final number, as decided after the Boer War was one reserve 
gun to every five mounted on warships. This meant that, in the event of 
action, some guns would be replaceable nearly immediately, although the 
reserve gun ratio was only part of the calculation for the navy.  
The policy that was adopted encompassed the needs of the Navy 
irrespective of what the Army was doing. In addition, guns were sent 
abroad to be forward deployed. This meant that the Admiralty was only 
willing to send ships whose gun classes were already forward deployed. In 
places like Australia and the Pacific, it meant that Dreadnoughts with their 
12–inch guns would not be sent, because the largest spare tubes east of 
Malta were 9.2–inch guns.  
In addition, there was a chokepoint in capacity of both 
Shoeburyness and the water transport between Woolwich and 







and it ran on a limited schedule.218 As this was the case with Shoeburyness, 
it can also be assumed that naval guns could only be transported to naval 
bases, including Portsmouth, by barge. By 1902 it does not appear to have 
been possible to move naval guns by rail. In addition, at Shoeburyness, in 
the autumn, winter, and early spring the weather, especially fog and low–
lying mists made firing proof shots difficult for both clear sight and 
recovery. The 13.5–inch Mark V guns were wholly unsuited for over water 
shots as their range exceeded Shoeburyness safety distances. This fog issue 
affected guns of four inches and above, which meant that in peacetime the 
rate of proofing was limited due to safety concerns.219 
Strategy of Reserves 
 
Strategically, the number of reserve guns also had the direct effect of 
allowing the commanding admiral of the battle fleet to engage after a battle 
much sooner by replacing the worn and damaged guns from reserve 
instead of having to wait for industry to build the replacement. To replace 
all guns in this period would very probably have taken even a fully engaged 
British industry 18–24 months to fully reline the necessary articles. This 
would have put the willingness of the commander to engage in a protracted 
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battle in doubt no matter the enemy. The life of a barrel and replacement 
tube numbers therefore together made a much more important calculus of 
how the battle fleets would be used than has ever been put forward.  
As a note, when two guns sit in a naval turret, the breech blocks 
swing out. These are called left and right guns. In almost all cases, left and 
right guns are interchangeable (although sometimes requiring a reproof for 
accuracy) with each other, thus making them much more usable in 
reserves.220 Of course, this is not a problem in field and army guns, as they 
are single mounted.  
When guns were used for experimentation, they often were pulled 
from reserve gun pools. The Ordnance Committee in 1906 requested new 
reserve guns with all the same technical properties as then 12–inch Mark 
VIII and IX guns to replace those being pulled out of stock for 
experiments. The replacement guns would have the same properties, but 
incorporated new cannelured rings on the shoulders of the inner tubes and 
nickel steel construction. This experimentation was part of an indication 
for nickel steel that is talked about in the new materials section below. 
Another example of this occurred in April 1908.  
Two guns of 12–inch Mark VIII were relined with a new liner 
without the steps forward. The two proof shots caused a slight bore post–
                                           







proof that exceeded the specification in a few places, but Chief Inspector 
Woolwich suggested handing these over to plate and cordite testing, 
although importantly, ‘DNO 20.10.08, however stated that they were 
required for issue to the Fleet.’221 The demonstration in 1908 showed that 
the immediate needs of the service always came before long–term 
research.  
The replacement strategy was intended to allow for experimentation 
and improvement as well as for a rapid replacement if necessary for any 
spare guns. One of these older guns was replaced at just 130 shots.222 These 
new reserve guns did not fit the standard specification for the class of boat. 
Although ballistically they might be identical, the manufacturing or buildup 
of reserve guns was sometimes slightly different. In rare cases, this was so 
significant that the tubes could only be used for single identified vessels. 
This inflexibility meant that some reserve guns simply were not as valuable 
as the tubes they were to replace. The trade–off was that the reserve was 
often used for experimental purposes and expanded knowledge while also 
being available if necessary.  
As part of the process to speed up relining, between 1901 and 1904 
Woolwich reworked how it removed liners. Earlier, it bored out the old 
tubes, but sometime in or before 1904 it went to a new system whereby it 
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heated the barrel and ‘tupped it out’, which gave much better results.223 The 
constant maintenance of Woolwich as the centre for wartime repair meant 
that key investment were made that could get guns back in the field much 
quicker and efficiently than by starting from a dead stop with unskilled 
employees. Without Woolwich, the refurbishment of guns for all services 
would have been unavailable.  
Naval Reserve 
Armaments for the Royal Navy were limited to a great extent by a 
limitation of infrastructure, not in the gun–making industry, but in the 
capacity of the public and private shipyards in dry docks and building slips 
required for the new and better classes. In the post–Dreadnought navy, 
capital ships had a limited number of guns. These guns were larger and 
more powerful, and therefore much more complicated to build, than had 
ever been seen before, but the number of primary and spare barrels was 
finite. By 1905 it was the Admiralty’s policy to order one great gun for 
reserve in four being mounted.224 In addition, the navy saw the lessons from 
the war in South Africa as the next war would possibly tax industry more 
heavily than before, and had a larger reserve ordered. They especially 
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feared, as a 1903 report quoting an earlier analysis by Sir Henry 
Brackenbury showed, a war that would require massive expenditure and a 
heavy burden on industry from both services.225 The same report continued 
that Woolwich would be overly taxed from the perspective of 
transportation with raw materials coming in, finished goods leaving, and the 
requirements of inspection. The report continued that this single point of 
failure would certainly in the event of a new war paralyze the services, and 
that a new depot for the storage of warlike goods was necessary to mitigate 
this. Four years later, the Murray Report would by policy limit this stress 
point to just six months when the arsenal would be the primary 
manufacture point, and after this, it would exclusively become a repair and 
inspection point. Finally, Brackenbury’s most far–reaching opinion was to 
learn from the army’s logistics mistakes in war, through standardizing the 
munitions used. This could have been seen as lending an impetus to the 
Dreadnought style of limiting bores of guns carried on ships.  
Some guns were ordered in numbers outside the normal one to four 
ratio. Some models wore much more aggressively, or, the Admiralty at 
least perceived them to, which caused reserve orders well in excess of the 
usual rates. For instance, the 7.5–inch Mark II/V guns made for the 
Warrior Sub–Class and Minotaur Class armoured cruisers had a 
                                           







combined need of 46 guns, four–in–four and three–in–ten respectively. 
The Army Contracts Office purchased 38 Mark IIs and 46 Mark Vs 
spread across Vickers, Armstrong, and the Royal Gun Factory.226 This 
output demonstrates that naval ordnance use was not an exact science, and 
if given the choice, buyers would hedge on the side of caution. As well, if 
the wear rates were indeed as aggressive as it appears from the purchasing 
records, the Admiralty would not stay with underperforming guns. The 
7.5–inch gun was not mounted on any subsequent class as a primary or 
secondary armament, although the gun’s demise probably had as much to 
do with the changing design requirements in the post–Dreadnought navy as 
with any particular failings of the design. 
By 1910 the Admiralty had increased its reserve guns as the larger 
guns were brought to production and mounting, especially the 13.5–inch 
guns.227 This had a great effect due to the increased barrel length of the 12–
inch Mark IX, X, and XI guns, which were 40, 45, and 50 calibres, 
respectively. Over a span of under a decade the same shells increased 
muzzle velocities by over 400 feet per second. The increase extended 
exponentially the range at which the great guns could engage targets, as well 
as the force imparted on targets by the projectiles. A major design feature 
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for the 13.5–in gun designed for the super dreadnoughts of the Orion and 
subsequent classes, was to maximize force by building larger barrels which 
also exponentially increased shell size. An increase in one and a half inches 
at the bore increased the projectile from 850 to 1400 pounds, without loss 
in range. 
It was one thing to manage the reserve component of the fleet at 
home, where the Home Fleet was within a barge delivery of a new gun, but 
the needs of imperial defence were quite another. The Admiralty was 
forced due to its expeditionary nature to pre–position guns at strategic 
points within the empire and around the world. The Admiralty’s strategy 
was to send guns in advance of any deployment, although this was not 
always possible. For instance, when a cruiser was deployed to the Pacific, 
spare tubes were sent as well, usually to either Sydney or Hong Kong, as 
these were the only naval bases that were able to sustain such a large vessel. 
Admiralty policy also tended to send the vessels with the newest guns to the 
furthest places in imperial defence as they would have, in all likelihood, the 
least need for new barrels for the longest time into the future. This strategy 
was a limiting factor in what vessels could be sent where, and essentially 
meant that the Pacific in particular would be left in time of war without a 







at least 1900, and was a well–entrenched policy for how the fleets would be 
used in wartime.228  
In addition, the Admiralty spent large amounts of treasure and 
capacity pre–positioning smaller guns, 6–inch and 4.7–inch guns for use on 
merchant vessels, which could be turned into merchant cruisers in time of 
war. 120 4.7–inch mountings were at Chatham, Devonport, or Portsmouth 
by February 1912, with an additional 48 pre–positioned in Sydney and 
Hong Kong. These were to supplement the 24 reserve 6–inch mountings 
which would be mounted on larger merchant cruisers. 229 These by May 
1914 were destined in particular for the Lusitania and Mauretania.230 These 
vessels appear to have no reserve guns made for them, as, these medium–
calibre guns had average lifespans much longer than the ammunition that 
was carried and the likely limited firing as well as limited campaigning that 
these guns would ever be required to participate in.  
The ability of the Navy to accurately place a shot had always been an 
art, and as ranges increased this became increasingly difficult. As with the 
army, the naval planners also had realized these limitations. For instance, 
in the 1910 naval gunnery book the maximum range of the most modern 
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12–inch gun, the Mark XI, was 20,200 yards in 34.15 seconds. This was an 
increase in just 10 years from the Mark VIII from 14,000 yards with a flight 
of 28 roughly seconds. These were significant challenges and advances in a 
short time, and even more impressive considering that they were firing the 
same shell.231  
In 1908 it became publicly known that the German Navy had started 
placing large orders for vessel armaments with Krupp, the foremost 
German armaments manufacturer. This was taken many ways in London. 
The largest effect was the 1909 Naval Vote that authorized immediately 
four battleships and several battle cruisers with the option of up to eight 
battleships. With each ship carrying new 13.5–inch guns and ten barrels 
each, this was a massive boon for the industry, which had been hurting 
from the lack of orders. The 13.5–inch breach loading guns were 50 
calibres in length, giving a full length of 56 feet excluding the breach and 
mechanism. This massive order was also the first order to apparently be 
placed by the Admiralty contracts office, and not the Army.  
HMS Dreadnought in and of itself did not represent a leap in 
ordnance. The guns used were the 12–inch Mark X, a 45 calibres naval 
gun that had been used in the last run of the King Edward VII class vessels. 
What Dreadnought did represent to armourers was an exponential 
                                           







increase in the numbers of guns needed to commission each vessel. 
Weight in both armaments and broadside would require more big guns of 
the largest sizes from the trade. This increase in demand in quantity 
required larger outlays in Trade plants for both the increase in machinery, 
and for the guns themselves, as they grew in length and weight until the 
pinnacle design of 15–inch guns in 1913. This increased weight required 
larger and larger cranes, lathes, forges, presses, and buildings, causing vast 
and ever increasing outlays in capital investment as well as competent, 
world-class labour to operate and manage it effectively. It would be this 
increased heavy capacity that would become integral to any upsurge if 
conflict arose, especially if it involved a Continental power. 
Capacity 
What might be the most important hidden issue of the period 
between 1900 and 1914 was the increasing use of second tier suppliers. 
This would include manufacturers who could not build completed guns, 
but supplied components, mainly in the form of the finished forgings or 
tubes, to the five primary suppliers. These suppliers would understandably 
be key in any time of crisis. One of the few benefits of the British type wire 
wound gun was that the base materials were theoretically smaller, and did 







just as precise, inner ‘A’ tubes necessary for initial building as well as 
relining. It should not be a surprise that this was most important to 
Woolwich, as the Royal Gun Factory was the main relining facility in 
Britain. Unfortunately, little is known about many of these firms, and the 
Government records are almost wholly lacking in details of these smaller 
suppliers, although, to mention a few, they included Beardmore, Cammell, 
Brown, Spencer, and Firth. The industry in 1910 was considered as 
follows: Beardmore, John Brown, Cammell, Laird &Co, Armstrong, 
Whitworth, Firth, Spencer, Taylor, Vickers, and Darlington.232 
The small firms left even less of a physical paper trail than the large 
firms, and a full study of this sector is unfortunately not within the scope of 
this study, although economic and business historians would gain greatly 
from a full study of the topic.  
Calculating the industrial capacity of Britain’s gunmaking trade is 
difficult even today. Certainly by 1906 at the latest the government was 
taking deliberate steps to ascertain what exactly capacity was. This was led 
by the Admiralty, as the service had been unpleasantly surprised during the 
late war in South Africa. A committee was formed to not only look at the 
                                           







state of their industry, but to look closely at a weak point in the system: 
inspection.233  
Inspection 
Inspection was the Government’s final check on guaranteeing 
consistent quality through the supply base. It was a proven way of 
confirming interchangeability of products not only from gun to gun, but 
also from one manufacturer to another.  
The actual mobilized capacity of Britain was a concept that doesn’t 
survive in records. No records were probably ever created. The concept 
that a supply base (outside Woolwich) be kept ready for the possible use of 
the Government was a concept that was unknown in this period. Even in 
shipbuilding it was not considered important due mainly to a new class 
being built if not every year, certainly every few years. The advances of 
technology did not make having a static industrial line efficient or desirable, 
as obsolescence was a real problem. The period from 1900 to 1914 was 
awash with evolutions in weapon power, size, and construction. Historians 
must take care in understanding the topic without modern influences.  
Therefore, the capacity of Britain’s ordnance industry in 1914 was 
not dissimilar from what it had been a decade before. Certainly the 
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capacity for larger ordnance had been invested in, but the capacity of 
output in quantity was on comparable terms. The Trade had not built a 
field gun since at least 1908, and the naval reserves were being ordered and 
delivered at the same time new ships were initially being fitted out. There 
was no talk of expanding actual production capacity, and if anything, there 
was an overcapacity, especially in smaller ordnance, which had been 
created with the entrance of Coventry Ordnance onto the scene in 1905. 
Certainly naval gun capacity could equal warship building capacity, which 
was the greatest limiter of naval orders, and after 1907 the British 
Expeditionary Force of the Haldane Reforms was not planned to expand 
beyond the moderate reserves already received. Of the five plants engaged, 
Armstrong’s Elswick plant could produce everything in the British arsenal, 
as could Vickers River Don Plant in Sheffield. Beardmore on the Clyde in 
Glasgow was making an order for the new 15–inch guns, although had no 
experience in making guns for the War Office. Coventry had produced 
both field guns and howitzers, but their experience in guns over 6–inches 
was limited, even if their plant could handle much larger weapons.  
Woolwich and the Royal Gun Factory could build up to at least the 
13.5–inch gun which they had received an order for in 1913. The Royal 
Gun Factory could also rebuild everything in the arsenal back to new 







anywhere on the globe. The total output of the industry had probably 
never exceeded 200 to 250 guns a year, of which 75 per cent would have 
been small guns, and only from 1905–1908 at that. The overall tonnage, 
and certainly the average weight per gun had steadily increased, thanks to 
the post–Dreadnought capital ships being ordered by the Admiralty, 
although it was far from certain that this capacity would be able to mobilize. 
Britain did though have a developed stable of mature designs at all ballistic 
levels. The question would be what the industry, if called upon, could dust 
off these plans and fit out a British force in a reasonable time.  
Requirements of Empire 
 Britain’s Empire was by the second decade of the 20th century the 
largest the world had ever seen. Although this required a flexibly armed 
navy, the army was the primary customer when it came to efficient 
ordnance. India was by far the largest customer of the overseas territories, 
although Canada, Australia, and New Zealand also purchased and outfitted 
their forces on the model of British forces. India’s needs however were 
great enough to affect the design of ordnance that would equip the 
European forces. India always had a representative on the Ordnance 
Board, although in reality the representative traditionally reserved 







The driving design factor from the perspective of India was weight. 
The bridges on the subcontinent were not built to the same strengths as 
those in Europe and campaigning with heavy artillery pieces, especially in 
the northern regions of the Raj, was out of the question. The British in 
India did not acquire the 60–pr in 1905 when the British Army did, for 
this very reason, and continued using the older guns because of the weight 
difference. The Government of India wanted to replace their aging 4–inch 
BL Gun, 30–pr BL Gun, and 5–inch BL Gun with a new siege gun. All of 
these, even in India were obsolete. British requirements were for an 
absolute weight that could not exceed 84 cwt under horse traction. The 
desire was to have a range of 10,000 yards, due to many international 
events, mainly the Russo-Japanese war, the retiring of heavy guns by every 
world power save the USA, and, unsaid, the experiences in South Africa. 
Interestingly, India admitted it was difficult with current technology to 
control any round over 8,000 yards.234 This showed a disconnect between 
the requirements and realities. India used Royal Artillery gunners, so 
designers in London would have also been aware of this although it is 
never mentioned for the 60-pr design project, and its 10,000 yard range. 
India’s feelings about range were minimized by the invention of spotter 
                                           







planes in the second decade of the century. Nonetheless, the requirements 
of India did affect what was accepted for the force as a whole.  
On the other hand, Canada and the other colonies utilized standard 
British field artillery, and the defences of the ports were given to the Royal 
Garrison Artillery. The Royal Garrison Artillery operated the same 
specification worldwide and there was little interaction with the local 
authorities. Garrison guns appear infrequently in the Ordnance Board 
meeting notes. This probably had more to do with their longer lives due to 
training requirements as much as anything else.  
Obsession with Shrapnel 
Britain was obsessed with shrapnel. The primary reason was that the 
high explosive shell that was currently in service used Lyddite, an explosive 
made from picric acid. Unfortunately, Lyddite had gained the poor 
reputation in South Africa of detonating prematurely, which put the 
services against it.235  
A top–down review of shrapnel was conducted in 1902 to ascertain 
what increases in efficiency could be gained by introducing higher quality 
shell steel. Better steel allowed for more shrapnel projectiles to be in the 
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casing as the new steel allowed thinner walls. This would have detrimental 
effects in 1914 and was probably a direct cause of the shells crisis, when the 
quality of shell steel would not be available to the country in amounts 
needed.236 This is a topic that, although outside the purview of this study, 
needs to have an analysis conducted in the wider historiography.  
Steel Production in Britain 
It is difficult to state definitively what processes were being used to 
make steel from all suppliers of ordnance in the period in question. The 
primary concern was that the processes were considered trade secrets, and 
furthermore, the Government in general did not care or specify processes. 
This was for several reasons, first being they wanted to keep a wide array of 
suppliers available to keep prices low, and second, to reinforce that as long 
as tests for steel passed inspection both physically and chemically, they 
preferred to not interfere. The President of the Ordnance Committee went 
so far as to write in 1905 that ‘There is, moreover, a general consensus of 
the opinion that for the present it is desirable to leave Manufacturers a 
considerable latitude in this respect, and, as the subject must be regarded 
                                           







as being more or less in an experimental stage, the Committee are of the 
opinion that no hard–and–fast Specification should be laid down.’237  
As new steels came onto the market at the turn of the century, the 
Government also became interested in potential uses. Part of the problem 
with any transition to new steels might have been the process itself for 
making steel. Controlling the chemical composition of steel was much 
more important in ordnance steel than probably any other use by the turn 
of the century. By 1902 many suppliers of castings were providing steel 
made from the Tropena process, which was similar to the Bessemer, and 
had largely replaced the previous method of open hearth steel. The 
Tropena process produced less carbon, although for ordnance use 
manufacturers had a problem with creating blow holes. Even with this, the 
Royal Laboratories started using Tropena process as well, as they were 
achieving better quality in small and large castings of shells with the new 
process compared to open hearth. The process also allowed apparently 
faster production.238 Tropena steel was used by Vickers as well as Edgar 
Allen & Co of Sheffield by June 1902. As it had been used by the Royal 
Arsenal since 1896, it was decided not to ban or change any policies with 
this process.239 
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By 1909, the process of making steel for guns had changed. Most 
steel for gun manufacture came then from open hearth methods, with 
crucible steel still being in use as well. This might have been the direct 
effect of having to make more alloy steel. Electrical furnaces were still not 
in prevalent use, although the Inspector of Steel did believe that the 
electrical furnace was more likely to displace the crucible than the open 
hearth furnace’240 This was the last reference before the war on steel making 
in annual reports.  
The Admiralty went as far as to declare the Bessemer process as 
‘not at present considered being suitable for manufacture of gun steel’, this 
leaving the Siemens Open–Hearth technique as the only viable 
manufacturing technique for gun making by 1914.241   
Experiments 
Experimentation was a mainstay of ordnance manufacture and 
improvement in the period between 1900 and 1914. Experiments took 
many forms, from rifling, to cordite, to metallurgical tests. The overarching 
goals were to make guns safer, last longer, be more powerful, and hit the 
target more often. Many experiments on the surface do not seem to have 
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much relevance, although put together over the long term, the contribution 
of those conducted at Aldershot, Shoeburyness, and Woolwich was 
sizeable.  
 Many experimental reports look just like the one that follows: for 
some reason, lubricated shells were achieving lower velocities and no 
sizeable difference in accuracy from non–lubricated rounds when testing 
7.5–inch rounds. Any increase in accuracy seemed to be from the lube 
creating drag and slowed projectiles down and thus saved the driving 
bands, whereas the unlubed ones had smooth driving bands.242 This 
appeared counterintuitive to the rational thought before experimentation. 
When experiments mention smooth drive bands, this meant the projectile 
had imparted too much energy on the soft bands of the shell. This in turn 
caused the projectile, now without a surface to engage the rifling with, to 
spin in the barrel. In turn the final result was the lands of the rifling 
sheared off all the copper from the driving band. This was usually a tell–
tale sign from the expended shell of inefficient shell ballistics, increased 
barrel wear, and shortened and erratic flight. This experiment showed that 
harder materials for this particular drive band were needed, which helped 
lead to more stable and harder hitting rounds.  
                                           







Powder and propellant were also extensively experimented with. In 
this case, there was a difference in erosion with nitroglycerine powders 
used by ‘foreign’ powers, as they was more corrosive and eroded faster, 
and therefore, cordite was used because it made barrels last longer.243 This 
though was initially more of a thought experiment, as not enough foreign 
powder could be had, although these tests were extensively tried in 1915 
and later through the use of American–made powder as the wartime 
requirement made foreign procurement a necessity.   
Experiments also were conducted to evaluate foreign ideas. For 
instance, Bofors of Sweden in 1907 offered to sell a 9.45–inch gun to the 
Admiralty made of cast steel, instead of forged steel. The Chief 
Superintendent Ordnance Factories questioned the possibility of such a 
gun without imperfections, but also questioned why the price was so high 
as it seemed that the lack of forging should have made it much cheaper. 
Chief Superintendent Ordnance Factories surmised it was either due to 
massive profits, or very expensive heat treatments. What was obvious was 
that Bofors had much greater skill in casting and handling than was 
available in the UK. 244 The Chief Superintendent’s theories were products 
of experience in casting and forging at the Royal Gun Factory and Royal 
Carriage Department. Information also came from internal British supplier 
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sources. Hadfield’s proposed a steel that was similar to the Bofors of 
Sweden product. Hadfield’s first proposed a concept in the UK for cast 
steel guns. The US also used cast steel, but only for guns up to about 6–
inch, apparently with good results. Further requests to Bofors, though, 
showed what was believed to be an inferior gun of 9.2–inch size, and of the 
same cost as current service British guns.245 This knowledge of how to 
evaluate proposals could only come from staff who had extensive 
experience in materials, but also knew how they fail when the right 
conditions do not occur.  
Other Experimental issues 
The experiments staff sometimes came up with curious ways to 
continue experiments in ways that would be considered unsuitable for field 
use. By 1905 the 1880s era 13.5–inch Mk I guns used in proof and 
evaluation were completely worn out, and the Inspector at Woolwich was 
trying to get more life out of them by increasing the driving rings with a 
larger expansion of soft metal 1.5 inches wide and .10 inches thick. This 
was required to keep the projectile from falling out of the barrel during 
                                           







ramming.246 This appears to have given a bit more life to a gun that was 
obsolete, but useful in studying questions pertaining to large projectiles.  
Experiments also helped prove scientific principles. The formula 
used to predict projectile weight was determined by a calculation created in 
1883 as W/d3 of approximately 0.5. As well, projectiles were not to be in 
excess of four calibres in length. With these two calculations, a basic 
maximum weight of projectiles was created. In general, the lighter 
projectile had a flatter trajectory, and a heavier projectile had more striking 
power. As well, ‘assuming the charge to be the same, the heavier projectile 
possesses the following advantages:– 1 Somewhat more energy is obtained 
from the charge, 2 Owing to the lower velocity the resistance of the air is 
considerably reduced, and 3 the heavier shot has greater capacity for 
overcoming the reduced resistance.’247 These principles were used to shape 
the experiments for new guns, especially the 13–pr and 18–pr project.  
What might have been the most probing of experiments was the 
study of rifling. Experiments in 1908–1909  showed the non–driving edge 
received different heat effects, causing possible spot annealing and other 
problems that were believed to cause cracking and other effects.248 In 
addition, experiments proved standard constant pitch rifling seemed to 
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create an oscillation of the projectile in high velocity guns, whilst 
progressive rifling appeared to create exceedingly heavy strain on the 
driving band in the later stage of transit through the barrel.249At the end of 
every year a report on the rifling experiments and the results were 
published in the President of the Ordnance Committee’s report, although, 
with a secret clearance and 25 copies at best, this was to say the least not 
common knowledge.  
Failing Guns  
During the 1904 annual exercises, HMS Majestic, a Pre–
Dreadnought built in 1895, cracked all four of her 12–inch, Mark VIII 
guns. This was the most drastic failure in a string of cases that had been 
occurring since at least 1902. The main gun outfitting British battleships 
was failing. In three years from 1902 through 1904, 20 primary guns had 
failed, mainly due to the carbon inner a tubes failing. Before this, three 
brand new 12–inch Mark IX guns had failed, one from HMS Exmouth in 
July, and at Shoeburyness in September and October, all made by Vickers. 
In addition, a 12–inch Mark V failed in March at Woolwich, a 9.2–inch 
Mark X in January 1903 at Warden Point, Isle of Sheppy, Kent, from 
Vickers, and another 9.2–inch Mark X, at the Woolwich proof butts in 
                                           







May 1904 from Elswick. Finally in May 1904 a 9.2–inch Mark V from the 
Royal Gun Factory burst on HMS Galatea along with one made at Elswick 
which only cracked. Shoeburyness had 6–in Mark VIIs fail in November 
1902, December 1902, three in May 1903, and a 5.8-inch test gun in 
November 1902.250 These failures represented a failure of British guns of 
all types and sizes and for both the Royal Navy and the Royal Garrison 
Artillery.  
The sulphur content seemed to be even more important for large 
guns than other classes. The metal from failed 12–inch VIII, No 66 was 
sent from the National Physical Laboratory to the major gunmakers, as 
well as Firth and Brown. Brown noted that the sulphur content was almost 
50 per cent higher than what they thought acceptable, .05 versus .035, and 
that this would alone have probably caused the failure.251 The seemingly 
small differences in trace materials showed just how fast and far specialty 
ordnance steelmaking was moving.  
Guns Failing Due to Misuse  
Two guns were involved in accidents in 1902. A 12–inch Mark VIII 
gun from HMS Mars and a 6–inch from HMS Royal Sovereign both 
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received failures due to errors by of their gun crews. As well, a failure of a 
15–pr gun had a complete burst in South Africa caused by it being double 
loaded.252 
The Mars incident was caused by the breech not being fully closed, 
so human error. This type of gun was equipped with an electrical firing 
mechanism and although the main electrical circuit normally stopped this 
type of misfiring, it was bypassed to an auxiliary and upon inspection no 
threads of the breech block were engaged, meaning essentially that when 
the charge was ignited, nothing was behind it to stop the breech from 
exploding into the turret.253  
Cast Steel Experiments 
As it would take a considerable time for a new 12–inch gun to wear 
out under service rates, the ordnance committee proposed taking an old 
13.5–inch gun and relining it to the 12–inch specification for the sake of 
firing until worn through proof and evaluation purposes. It would allow for 
a controlled environment that could also allow for testing of material under 
laboratory conditions afterwards. The committee ignored Vickers 
chromium steel and used the Elswick experimental nickel steel.254 
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Hadfields had spent considerable resources on a new steel in 1905 and 
1906 that was to show apparently the properties of Specification #22 steel, 
yet could be cast as well as forged. They had little apparent success in 
delivering a forging large and pure enough to make a 7.5–inch liner at the 
Royal Gun Factory out of it. This might have been the basis for a new type 
of steel Hadfields had been working on called Era steel. Era steel was also 
not accepted for castings, although it does appear to have been used for 
breech mechanisms and other small parts.  
Tests conducted on Hadfield experimental barrels showed that 
slight imperfections in metallurgy were not as important in shortening the 
life of the barrel as were slight imperfections in the casting of the steel 
itself.255  
Conclusion 
Gun design evolved greatly between 1900 and 1914. The underlying 
‘Britishness’ of the designs though played greatly into how guns evolved. 
Failures early in the time period had a significant effect on the experiment 
and design in the last decade leading to 1914. Importantly though failures 
and limitations of British industry led to experiments in steel which will be 
explored in more detail in the next chapter.  
                                           







CHAPTER SIX: EVOLUTIONS IN STEEL AND VICKERS 
FAILURES 
Introduction 
After the failure of the guns from HMS Majestic, The British 
government spent several years improving the steel used for the inner 
jackers of guns. In a short time, British gun metallurgy increased 
exponentially. This chapter discusses how this happened.  
Nickel Steel  
‘Nickel by itself, or when used with Chromium, increases the 
tenacity of the steel without appreciably reducing the ductility.’ And ‘Nickel 
and nickel–chrome steels appear to possess greater resistance to shock 
than carbon steels’256 The first test of this new alloy was conducted with a 
nickel steel inner ‘A’ tube ordered for a scheduled relining on a 6–in Mark 
VII gun as way of testing the erosion and other properties of using such 
metal such as rust and erosion. The gun was then to be sent for test, proof, 
& evaluation work, as many more rounds could be quickly and accurately 
fired in this environment than onboard a working ship.257 Importantly, the 
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head to head test between the service carbon steel and new nickel steel was 
inconclusive.  
Initial Nickel Steel Tests 
The Ordnance Committee though wanted to continue tests, which 
would continue with the Experiments Committee.258 The experiments 
showed that the gun made of nickel steel had actually worn more 
aggressively than the carbon steel bore at 50 shots, and the experiment was 
discontinued.259 This initial test, although superficially inconclusive, was 
important in gathering basic information on how nickel steel reacted 
against the service designs as well as collecting data on the strengths and 
weaknesses of the material in a well–researched and well documented 
platform of the 6–inch Mark VII. In addition, the unexpected results led 
the Ordnance Committee to conduct a conference with steel 
manufacturers as to what their thoughts were on utilizing the material, as 
well as a canvasing of the industry to see who could and would produce the 
new nickel steel if an order was issued.260  
In October 1902 the Committee asked manufacturers what their 
thoughts were for nickels steel and its productivity. 261Although the notes of 
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that October 1902 conference do not survive, the Ordnance Committee 
must have been inspired, as the next new gun to be ordered designed was 
required to be made exclusively out of nickel steel. (The gun wire was 
excepted).262 This new 7.5–inch gun was to incorporate the experiences of 
the 6–inch whilst also furthering the study. It was almost unheard of, 
though, that a new weapon design for an operational need was ordered 
without a steel specification and laid down with unproven technology. No 
mark designation was given in the Committee report, although from the 
time frame, this was likely the 7.5–inch Mark II, which was designed as a 
garrison artillery piece.  
At the same time, more experimental tubes were ordered from 
Sheffield based Thomas Firth & Sons in 1904.263 The contract was for a 6–
inch Mark VII inner ‘A’ tube at a cost of £162/2/0.264 The company had a 
proven record for experimental steels as well as being a primary supplier of 
finished tubes to the Royal Gun Factory and the firm was given a free hand 
to create a nickel steel that they believed would be best for large gun 
construction.  
Cammell Laird appears to have been the first large–scale 
manufacturer to really engage the Committee on the possibilities and 
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constraints of nickel in steel. They wrote to the Ordnance Committee on 
25 February 1904 stating that Britain was well behind the curve and much 
more had to be done quickly to stop a perceived technology gap. They 
stated some basic discoveries in their metallurgical research, but admitted 
that testing was needed as much as anything to ascertain the true effects.265 
In addition, in 1905 reserve guns of the 12–inch Marks VIII and IX type 
had been allowed to be made by Elswick and Vickers to put in nickel 
sleeves of their own designs266 
The second gun that would incorporate nickel would arrive in 1904. 
The 9.2–inch Mark XI gun was to be the last 9.2–inch gun designed and 
accepted for British service. 9.2–inch guns were the main armament for 
many coastal batteries through the Empire as well as being secondary 
armament on pre–Dreadnought battleships and primary armament on 
many smaller vessels. Although drawings were originally created by 
Armstrongs to utilize standard carbon steel in 1903, by the next year the 
physical examples were being built from nickel.267 This was the first time a 
gun had been retrofitted for front–line service to updated steel 
specifications in mid-construction.  
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The First Production Orders 
The largest order though for nickel steel by number of guns was 
almost not to be. On 12 January 1904 the Ordnance Committee formally 
suggested that the ‘A’ tubes of the army’s new 13 and 18–pr field guns 
would be made out of nickel steel, although, with this being such a large 
order, (as discussed in Chapter Four) it was dependent upon the industry 
being able to produce them.268 In the end, the final procurement would be 
split due to that industrial issue. By the 23rd of May 1906, 353 nickel 
variants and 240 carbon variants had been delivered. Not a single nickel 
gun had been delivered by Vickers. Coventry Ordnance Works and 
Elswick had exclusively delivered nickel guns, and the Royal Gun Factory 
had produced 26 nickel and 142 carbon guns.269 The order, which would 
produce well over 500 field guns, did not appear to prejudice one gun over 
another, and the guns of different manufacturers were dispatched to the 
same batteries with no distinction between the barrels.270 It was unlikely that 
the end users even knew the difference between gun steels. Although the 
Ordnance Committee pointed out that a nickel steel barrelled Elswick built 
12.5-pound gun of the Royal Horse Artillery had, after 1,654 rounds, only 
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.032 in rifling wear, and no increasing in scoring.271 This really was an 
incredible feat, for the material that just four years earlier had almost been 
written off by inconclusive results. Vickers’ inability to deliver nickel guns 
that would consistently pass inspection would continue for another six 
years, and it is this point that has been completely void in all secondary 
sources.  
Initial Vickers Issues 
‘At a meeting which was called for the purpose of considering the 
introduction of nickel steel into gun construction, they (Vickers) at that 
time thought that a minimum breaking stress of 45 tons could be obtained, 
but, as they pointed out at the meeting, their experience of nickel steel to 
this analysis in large masses was not very great, and it was not until they got 
into the general manufacture of this steel that they found that a 
modification in the minimum breaking stress would be desirable in order 
that delays should not occur in the manufacture of heavy forgings entailing 
the use of especially big ingots’272 Vickers could only guarantee 30 tons 
elongation, when 45 was the specification that Armstrongs was able to 
produce. In addition Report 1183 from 5 December 1905 stated that the 
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carbon content in nickel steel should not exceed .4 per cent.273 This report, 
combined with the elongation issues, gave Vickers a double difficulty in 
producing on contract, an issue that will be discussed later.  
 
Naval Issues with Nickel Steel 
Starting in late 1904 through 1907 the Director of Naval Ordnance, 
then Capt. (later Admiral of the Fleet) John Jellicoe worked to inject new 
materials into naval gunmaking. This was in direct response to the 12–inch 
Mark VIII gun failures on Majestic and others that put him in a difficult 
position with most of his guns compromised, with old guns that cracked 
and newer guns that wore out faster. Jellicoe saw that nickel steel could be 
the answer to both of these problems. Many new experiments were run, 
primarily by the Chief Superintendent of Ordnance Factories and the 
Chief Inspector, Woolwich, in cooperation with the Inspector of Steel, 
Sheffield. The result was that by 1905 nickel steel had entered in direct 
competition against the old ordinary or carbon steel that had been used for 
the last 20 plus years on naval guns. This transition was so successful that 
by 1908 most guns made for the Admiralty were made of nickel steel, and 
by 1910 all guns were being made to the nickel steel specification.  
                                           







Some clarification should be noted. Only the inner ‘A’ tube was 
made of nickel steel, and the wire specification did not change. The outer 
jacket that covered the wire and added to lateral rigidity as well as 
protection for the lower levels could be made in carbon or nickel steel.  
On 28 September 1905 the Director of Naval Ordnance noted that 
the difference between nickel and carbon inner and outer ‘A’ forgings on 
12–inch Mark X was £14,440 difference over 30 guns ordered. £481 per 
gun was considered worth it to the committee.274 
Industrial Dialogue 
Another meeting with the steel industry met in June 1905. It came 
out in this meeting that manufacturers were still having a difficult time at 
making nickel forgings, but also that there was some inconsistency in 
manipulating the manufacturing process for alloy steel.275 Although it is not 
known which parties overall had what comments, it is doubtful that 
Cammell, Coventry, or Armstrongs were complaining. The overarching 
takeaway from industrial comments for nickel steel specifications was that 
all manufacturers were willing to comply with what the Committee and 
Inspector of Steel decided, but they wanted a return loop to learn from 
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their acceptances and mistakes. Overall, it seems that the steel industry in 
the UK wanted to strive for process improvement.276  
 The nickel transition was probably easiest for Armstrongs who had 
an extensive metallurgical department and a more scientific approach to 
building ordnance. It was essentially Armstrong’s specification that became 
after much trial the government specification, S/22. Armstrongs also had a 
relatively low rejection rate of forgings after the initial learning period. On 
the other hand, the conversion to alloy gun steels almost brought Vickers 
to their knees. It was mentioned earlier that they could not produce a 
single field gun to the nickel specification, and the Government’s 
inspectors believed this was due to Vickers not having clean enough 
crucibles which therefore left trace elements in their batches. These trace 
dissolved oxides, in the form of alumina, then required aluminum to allow 
slagging of the unwanted elements.277 Unfortunately for Vickers, the use of 
aluminum in all stages of manufacture was strictly forbidden within the 
steel specifications for British ordnance.278  
 Four years later, Vickers could still not produce a consistent nickel 
steel tube for large guns. They tried to use instead a nickel–chromium steel 
that was inadequate to compete with nickel in British designs and powder, 
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and they remained with this alloy until it was banned by the Ordnance 
Board for being too flawed too much of the time. Before then though, the 
Superintendent, Royal Gun Factory stated that he did not believe that a 
chromium forging by 1904 could be found that could comply with the 
specification, but nickel steel could comply with new specifications for 
elasticity and other specifications.279  
 It was not until 1912 that Vickers had figured out both the process 
of forging nickel steel and annealing it consistently enough to pass the 
Inspector of Steel inspections on a consistent basis. This lack of 
understanding in the material greatly affected some designs, especially the 
12–inch Mark XI gun that was dropped after just six ships.  
S/22 Emerges  
 The eventual outcome of the large amount of experimentation was 
that the Chief Inspector Woolwich forwarded on 20 December 1905 
Specification S/22 of nickel steel for ordnance to Inspector of Steel. This 
was even after a 5 December 1905 report that showed Vickers had yet to 
successfully cast a single lot of the proposed specification and were still 
obsessed with trying to mimic Krupp chromium steel.280 S/22 was intended 
to replace S/20 which was of nickel steel for field guns and used in the 18–
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pr project. The original S/20 had 3 per cent nickel, although research had 
shown that 6 per cent was much more desirable for larger forgings, which 
the new specification utilized. It was provisionally approved by the 
Committee after provisional acceptance in February 1906 based on 
chemical tests as well as Director of Naval Ordnance suggestions on 
chemical composition.281 The fourth publication of S/22 was released on 10 
May 1907, which removed provisional status, thus bringing Specification 
S/22 into full effect, as well as requiring ‘contractors’ to mark where their 
steel came from, if it was not produced in–house.282 This was to allow more 
oversight from inspectors, as sub–contractors had become more important 
in the supply chain, such as Firth, Cammell, and Darlington.  
The final specification for the S/22 steel was a compromise between 
the elasticities that were capable of being produced by the British 
steelmakers. The committee eventually set down a specification for 
performance, with 30 tons minimum elastic point, not less than 16 per cent 
elongation, and a minimum 45 tons and max 55 tons breaking stress.283  
Even then, the experimental stage was not over. The Inspector of 
Steel noted in a letter dated 28 August 1906 that ‘It is somewhat curious 
that Elswick, presumably to avoid cracks, are beginning to use chrome in 
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12–inch, ‘A’ tubes with less carbon, while Vickers, possibly to avoid chinks, 
are raising carbon and abolishing chrome, and Openshaw go on 
comfortably, hitting off about the middle of the Specification without either 
chrome, chinks, or cracks.284  
 
Later Nickel Steel tests 
The 1907 Hadfield comparison tests were cancelled halfway through 
as being inconclusive to finding the best new steel composition.285 It was not 
apparent that any of these tests were published to steel makers, including 
Hadfield’s. Another test was conducted in 1908 on excess parts of forgings 
that were already worked. The results were sent to the six principal steel 
and gun makers: Messrs. Firth, Coventry Ordnance Works, Armstrongs, 
Hadfield, and another unresponsive source, probably Vickers.286 
Tests continued well after the setting of the S/22 specification, with a 
1908 test with a 6–inch Mark VII gun after 862 rounds demonstrating that 
the nickel steel was ‘distinctly tougher than the carbon steel tubes similarly 
tried’ This was the conclusion of the tests for No 2,002.287 
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In the end though, even after all of the Research and Design that was 
conducted, intelligence reported that American nickel steel seemed to be 
better.288 Nonetheless, it would be the specification set forth in 1906 that 
would be the main steel in British gun barrels by 1914.  
Chromium Steel 
There was another option used internationally that could challenge 
nickel steel: chromium steel. In Britain though chromium was found to be 
exceedingly difficult to work in large forgings, and therefore was considered 
not necessary for large casting orders. The 12–inch gun orders mentioned 
above made with S/22 steel were to be made of 6 per cent nickel, instead 
of the 3 per cent used for field pieces because it yielded better results in 
large guns and was easier to work with.289 Of course, Vickers disagreed and 
thought that they could add chromium into the mix. 
From a report of the Superintendent of Research, it was believed 
that nickel steels took heat treatment differently from chromium steels. 
The difference appeared at the time to be that nickel steel was much more 
elastic, whereas chromium steel acted in a similar way to carbon steel.290   
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Vickers though believed that there was more to chromium steel than 
was apparent to their British competition. It seems that their mind–set was 
based upon the business plan that Krupp steel was chromium steel. It is 
not discussed in the technical reports as to why Vickers thought that this 
was better, although it might have something to do with the export market. 
It could be surmised that Vickers thought that employing a chromium steel 
would give a competitive advantage in winning lucrative foreign contracts in 
places such a Brazil, Argentina, and the Ottoman Empire. This would be 
about the only plausible reason why it was not mentioned in official 
reports, as the Government had a hands off approach to foreign deals as 
long as they did not affect the supremacy of British forces.  
In the end, chromium steel died a relatively quiet death. On 20 
February 1907, the drawings and designs for all liners of modern guns 
officially incorporated nickel steel as the material of choice in relining 
guns.291 
Although chromium was off the table for production guns, 
experiments were still wanted. An order for two 12–inch liners for the old 
13.5–inch guns used for proof and evaluation in June 1907 found that 
nobody was actively producing the material, which gave Armstrongs the 
                                           







opportunity to submit a very large bid, which caused the solicitation to be 
revoked.292  
The records do not say when and why Vickers gave up on their 
precious chromium steel project. It is still not understood why Vickers had 
such trouble and still kept with it. The other manufacturers did not even 
bother except under experimentation purposes. Consistency in the new 
steel could not be produced by Vickers, and their annealing furnace and 
process was not able to rectify many of the problems. After the continued 
rejections of Vickers guns, the Chief Superintendent of Ordnance 
Factories backed by the Director of the National Physical Laboratory 
recommended to the Ordnance Board in 1909, who agreed that the 
specification for nickel chrome steel be suspended. This was only for 
future work, and was grandfathered in for work that was under contract 
currently.293 After 1908 not a single chromium forging was used to build up 
guns in the Royal Gun Factory, and significantly for Vickers market share, 
Vickers had not provided a single forging of any type between 1908 and at 
least through 1910 to the Royal Gun Factory.294 The Inspector of Steel 
never mentioned the inspection of the material again. Vickers had 
transferred to nickel steel, although much capital outlay and work in plant 
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and process were required before their work was consistently passing 
inspection.  
Tungsten Steel 
It must be noted that nickel steel was not universally believed to be a 
proper material for gun making. In the wider commercial steel community 
there was a belief as late as 1903 that nickel steel could ‘convert the fibrous 
structure of the treated tube into a crystalline one, thus also increasing 
erosion’. 295 Therefore, that heat affected the microscopic properties of steel 
was a serious belief. In 1909 tests on tungsten steel showed it to be inferior 
to both nickel and carbon steel in erosion tests.296 It was also proposed in 
1910 to look into nickel–tungsten steel for guns, but the Ordnance Board, 
influenced no doubt by a secret 1909 test, axed this due to the extreme 
rarity of tungsten available. They also stated that for some reason the alloy 
steels were less able to take the heat of cordite, due to their lower melting 
points. The German Erhardt guns made out of the tungsten steel might 
have been, according to intelligence, better suited due to a cooler 
propellant. This was an unverified argument that the Board did not 
consider it worth looking into.297  
                                           
295 SUPP 6/63. Annual reports of the president. 1904. 26. 
296 SUPP 6/164. Annual report of the president. 1909. 45. 








Vickers had a string of failures stretching from 1903 through at least 
1912 that has been completely missed by historians to this date. The sheer 
scale of this failure is arguably the single largest failure of the British 
Ordnance industry since the Crimean War and put great strain on the 
resiliency of the industry. Importantly, this does not appear at all from 
corporate records, which is why it has probably been undiscovered by 
historians.  
Several Vickers guns were failing inspection in 1903 due to poor 
workmanship and careless mistakes in rifling: at least one 9.2–inch gun and 
possibly a 12–inch gun were rejected due to shoddy work.298 A 7.5–inch 
gun cracked so badly that it was written off when the liner was not even 
fitted before submission.299 This was just the first of a long string of issues 
with the firm.  
A 7.5–inch gun made in 1905 by Vickers was produced that 
intentionally hid and deceived the Government about its flaws. The rear of 
the inner ‘A’ was made to 19.1 inches instead of its specification of 19.8 
inches. This was not discovered until the gun went to proof. Vickers was 
allowed to fix the problem somewhat, but it appears that the problem 
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occurred when the Government resident inspector was not on-site when 
the gun was being made, and thus Vickers thought they could get away with 
it.300 This was not an individual incident. Vickers was known by inspectors 
for not always passing off goods as they were promised. This was due to a 
variety of factors that will be discussed in this section.  
It was with this attitude that puts into context when Vickers would 
challenge governmental specifications. In one instance, according to a 20 
April 1905 letter Vickers still believed that a steel of 28 tons elastic limit 
would do fine for 9.2–inch high velocity guns, completely negating both 
Armstrongs and the Royal Gun Factory.301 This might be in some part why 
Vickers-made 12–inch Mark IX guns were plagued by cracking. Four of 
their guns were cracked within the first 50 rounds, and they had great 
problems in getting guns approved. Two of these guns were rejected and 
relined and still cracked, one on round 30.302  
The failure of the Vickers designed 12–inch Mark IX gave the 
Ordnance Committee an opportunity to take a new approach to the next 
big gun for the Royal Navy. The design for the 12–inch Mark X, 45 calibre 
gun came from the lessons of Vickers failing with both the 12–inch Mark 
VIII (designed by Woolwich) and IX (designed by Vickers). The new 
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design was based on strengthened shoulders, the new use of nickel steel, 
the understanding of new pressures with cordite, and the understanding of 
the effects of ballistics on the partial or full wiring of the barrels. It was truly 
the first fully modern gun designed in Britain. It was in reality a Woolwich 
design that was suggested for improvement by Vickers, although the credit 
is often given to Vickers for the design. The 12–inch was also in all 
likelihood the basis for all guns in the next decade, just as the 6–inch Mark 
VII had been the basis for all ballistics for the period before this. This gun 
design also caused the Government to have both the contemporary 9.2–
inch and 7.5–inch gun designs sent back to Vickers to be redone. 303 This 
does not seem at all like a positive experience for Vickers, as they basically 
were told all their earlier designs for big guns over 6 inches were not good 
enough, essentially enforcing a latent defect clause in today’s parlance.  
Governmental Interventions 
To add insult to injury, the Director of Artillery was so impressed 
with Armstrongs guns (or unimpressed with Vickers) by late 1905 that they 
were willing, with Armstrongs permission, to send work done by 
Armstrongs to Vickers to let them see how to build nickel guns. This was 
                                           







not a vote of confidence in Vickers and was also a huge boon for 
Armstrongs steel quality.304  
It is also a fascinating insight into how the British Government 
worked with their industrial partners that could not deliver. The board 
wanted to point out in the annual report of 1908 that Elswick submitted 
nickel forgings of quality well in excess of Vickers. The Inspector of Steel 
on 7 July 1908 was puzzled as to how Vickers was unable to produce 
quality products. Vickers had installed a new annealing furnace in 1907, 
but was astonished when it did not work. The company then rebuilt the 
furnace and installed forging rotators that kept the billet moving while 
annealing, and apparently this produced better results. That being said, it 
was not only with annealing that there were issues. 120 of 640 test pieces 
were streaked green, and 90 percent had laminated fractures. Therefore, 
casting was defective, as the rejections were three times more likely at the 
breech than the muzzle end.305 
At times, chemical differences and inconstancies were noted 
between the inspections from the Chemist War Department, and those by 
the manufacturers. Although this became less common, the science of the 
day did not allow for certainty as to who was more accurate, although the 
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Government plainly stated that the Chemist, War Department had the 
final say in all inspections of irregularities.306  
The tests from Vickers and Armstrongs for nickel versus nickel–
chrome forgings ordered in 1907 were delivered as forgings to Woolwich, 
which turned and rifled them. The Elswick forging was received and 
passed in 1907, but the Vickers forging was low in manganese, and was 
passed only provisionally. The tests were postponed in June 1908. It was 
decided that the test should proceed on the lines of a test on inner liners 
removed from guns. The CSOF had two liners of carbon that could be run 
against, one that was removed due to improper rifling without being fired, 
and another, a 12–inch gun which was removed due to it being worn out. 
These would also be used in the hammer tests that Vickers and 
Armstrongs used to test items.307   
Continued Vickers Problems 
A 1909 report stated that even with the introduction of new 
techniques, Vickers was still having troubles. ‘Although indications of green 
had been found in many of the fractures, they were not nearly as common 
as observed previously, with the proportion having been reduced from 
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about 20 per cent to about 10 per cent. In the same way the number of 
laminated fractures had dropped to about 50 per cent.308 
Even worse for Vickers, ‘At a meeting which was called for the 
purpose of considering the introduction of nickel steel into gun 
construction, they (Vickers) at that time thought that a minimum breaking 
stress of 45 tons could be obtained, but, as they pointed out at the meeting, 
their experience of nickel steel to this analysis in large masses was not very 
great, and it was not until they got into the general manufacture of this steel 
that they found that a modification in the minimum breaking stress would 
be desirable in order that delays should not occur in the manufacture of 
heavy forgings entailing the use of especially big ingots’309 It was eventually 
revealed that Vickers could only guarantee 30 tons elongation, when 45 
tons elongation was the specification that Armstrongs was able to produce. 
This elongation was the second of three failings of Vickers to produce 
acceptable steel, and a primary reason for Vickers guns failing in service 
with high velocity designs. 
Metallurgical Flaws from Vickers 
Vickers-made guns under new steels had been rejected first and 
foremost by the inspectors for streaks, cracks, and flaws. Streaking did not 
                                           
308 SUPP 6/164. Annual report of the president. 1909. 58. 







have depth and therefore was not a failure on its own, but the Inspector of 
Steel considered cracks, flaws, and seams as rejectable defects.310  
Errors in steelmaking appear to have been the result of the different 
type of furnace used. Vickers used the older vertical furnace as well as a 
horizontal furnace, whilst Elswick and Openshaw, both Armstrongs plants, 
used low horizontal furnaces. Openshaw at Manchester ‘might be partly 
accounted for by the forging being revolved while heating.’ Vickers, 
though, were in the process of investing in a new furnace at River Don.311 
The issue, although not explicitly clear, was that heat treatment and 
annealing seemed to be the real problems for Vickers, once the earlier 
issues of contaminated crucibles was overcome.  
Vickers had several failings in building plant. Vickers had an open–
air plant, where guns were susceptible to breezes, whereas the Royal Gun 
Factory was concealed and controlled. Also, Vickers were less accurate 
with their pyrometer, and did not protect it from flames, and therefore it 
was not as accurate as the pyro–coupler pyrometers used by the Royal Gun 
Factory. This could lead to distortion.312 This was brought up, as the air 
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actually made one side cooler, and therefore bent, causing a 6–inch gun to 
be damaged late in 1911.313 
Plant was not only the equipment in Vickers works that failed the 
company’s guns. Vickers Don River had first relined a 12–inch gun in 
1901, and it had all sorts of shoddy workmanship when it was exposed at 
Woolwich for relining in 1905.314 This poor first relining in 1901 was 
hidden by Vickers intentionally from the inspector, and it was believed this 
was why the gun only had 30 shots in its life. The 1905 report was filled 
with 12–inch guns from Vickers failing. Tolerances were noted as a 
primary issue. It must be noted that many of these guns were cracking due 
to manufacturing imperfections of .15 inches and below. The failures of 
these guns showed to many in the Government and industry that the 
British design decisions to maintain tight tolerances were in the long term 
the best route. Poor workmanship was the primary cause of the 
shortcomings, and the lack of governmental inspectors during the building 
process was the primary oversight.315 
Of 110 12–inch Mark IX guns made in total, the only failures were 
of Vickers manufacture: five of 36 they supplied failed. Vickers seems to 
argue in a 7 April 1908 report that this was due to the oil tank for 
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quenching being too cold, although this was not commented on by the 
Board.316 The only eight forgings rejected for chemical reasons by the Chief 
Inspector, Woolwich in 1909 came from Vickers.317  
By 1908 of the 485 guns of 12–inch to 7.5–inch that had been 
made, 15 had split their liners, or 3.1 per cent. Vickers later admitted that 
their treatment was not satisfactory.318 By 1912, the trend had reversed, and 
Vickers along with the rest of the trade were making guns that did not 
crack.  
Bureaucratic Matters with the Use of New Materials  
The Government bought a great amount of steel for the use of 
relining guns that had been worn out. In 1906, ‘The NOO was buying 
nickel steel tubes for future use, and presumably his stock of carbon steel 
tubes would be used up before the nickel steel was taken into use.’ This 
was for the larger (6–inch and above) tubes at Woolwich, for relining, and 
possibly for new build work. It is unknown how large this stockpile was, but 
it could possibly be calculated from the first use of relining large guns with 
nickel at Woolwich.319 Unfortunately, this information does not seem to 
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survive, as the records of the relining inspection appear to have been culled 
before being deposited in the National Archives.  
The design of the 4–inch BL Mark VII was a significant departure in 
many regards from previous smaller guns. The contract solicitation stated 
that this 4–inch, 50 calibre gun was to be made out of nickel steel, in the 
specification S/22, and did not require a fully wired barrel or both inner 
and outer A tubes, although it did require the gun to be easily relined and 
the rebuilding had to be clearly indicated. 320 In addition, ‘the longitudinal 
strength must be such that the gun would be safe with a circumferential 
crack in the chamber’. The 4–inch Mark VII had several entries from 
Elswick, Vickers, Messrs Brown, the Royal Gun Factory, and Coventry, the 
latter being rejected outright.  
The learning curve for producing forgings of quality was very 
different for different manufacturers. Elswick had almost no learning curve 
and had few rejections. Cammell went from 1 in 3 rejections to almost no 
rejections in less than a year. Vickers simply did not bother to make nickel 
steel in this period, as was mentioned in the previous section. Forgings for 
Woolwich provided by Jessop, Cammell and Beardmore had all failures.321  
This period of experimentation from 1903 through early 1907 
showed that if anything, the bureaucracy of arms procurement was flexible 
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and willing to take risk, both financially and technologically. Throughout 
the period, the Ordnance Committee was willing for each company to 
produce their own nickel steel recipes, and moreover, was even willing to 
let them harden or not harden to their own content. These truly was 
experimental procedures with nickel steel, and the Ordnance Committee 
were trying to learn as much as possible, as quickly as possible, while 
relining could always occur later.  
This meant that the 12–inch 40 and 45–calibre guns would all have 
to be relined within a few years to the desired standard steel, but until then, 
a great deal of experimentation would take place. This meant that the 
committee were essentially back loading the supply chain, but also 
recognized nickel was better than ordinary steel.322 Through all of this, the 
Admiralty, and especially the Director of Naval Ordnance and Controller 
of the Navy would have had not only to approve but also actively to pursue 
this approach, as the majority of the experimental material came out of 
their annual Vote 9 for Ordnance.  
There was one instance, though after the acceptance of nickel steel 
when the Vote, due to financial reasons had a veto over design. In 1909, 
the price of new 12–pr 12 cwt guns was proposed at £100 for nickel, versus 
£75 for carbon. The Director of Naval Ordnance sent a letter to the Board 
                                           







asking for guidance. The Board recommended buying carbon in this 
instance.323 This was the only instance ever cited in the President’s digested 
report when such a request was ever made.  
It was not only internal experiments that the Committees had to 
report on. Inventions submitted to the board were all too common. To cite 
what might be the most fanciful, ‘The Director–General of Ordnance of 
the 3rd February forwarded a communication from the Consul–general, 
Christiana, with reference to a gun invented by Professor Birkeland, which 
would discharge projectiles by the force of electro–magnetism. The 
Committee stated that they did not consider anything would be gained by 
an inspection of Professor Birkeland’s invention.’324 It would not be until 
the second decade of the 21st century that Birkeland’s idea would come to 
fruition and the electro-magnetic rail gun would be built. 
Experiments were usually ordered and directed by the 
subcommittees of the Ordnance Committee/Board. Some of these 
committees were not as well represented as the general committee, 
although they could be diverse in their own regard. For instance, the 
temporary Field Artillery Committee of 1901–1905 that the 13–pr and 18–
pr were developed from was brought back as a permanent subcommittee 
under the Ordnance Board in October 1907. The subcommittee was 
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represented equally by the field and garrison regiments, and by two 
members of the Ordnance Board, who were supplemented by one officer 
of the Royal Engineers, one Royal Garrison Artillery representative, and 
(for mountain artillery) one India representative.325 Each of these men in 
the normal service, would have had little to no contact between each other, 
although when in committee together they were able to add to each other’s 
experiences and could help solve problems from different angles. It was 
representative of many of the subcommittee compositions.  
Wire Manufacturers 
It was not only gun steel makers that had to deal with the 
increasingly stringent tests. Gun wire came under heavier scrutiny after 
incidents in 1902 of higher trace elements such as manganese and sulphur. 
The minimum tensile strength was raised from 110 tons to 117 tons, 
without altering the maximum specification.326 In 1903, gun wire 
manufacturers Fox & Co, The Whitecross Co, and Hill & Co all raised 
their prices complaining an overly rigid specification regarding carbon and 
manganese.327 In addition accuracy limits of wire were .002 +/– before 
March 1903. This was replaced with a specification of .001 +/– although it 
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was rescinded after difficulty in producing such accuracy from the trade.328 
There is little known about this tier of suppliers. Even names of companies 
are difficult to come across, and scant receipts were listed in the Woolwich 
annual audits. The science behind all of this was contained in Longridge’s 
theory of wire winding, the basis and theory used by the Chief 
Superintendent of Ordnance Factories for wire winding guns.329  
Wire was tested to 65 tons before being wound, and guns were 
rarely wound over 40 tons.330 Streaking was a problem in some nickel 
forgings in the early days. Cammell had the worst problem, where Elswick 
Manchester had few, and it was not observed in Elswick forgings. The 
larger the forging, the larger the problem. This was caused by a lack of 
homogeny.331  
 According to the specification of 1913, ‘80 per cent of the wire 
supplied is to be in lengths of not less than 1,514 yards, and the remaining 
20 per cent in lengths of not less than 1,000 yards. The wire must be 
regular in section, 0.25 inch wide and with a limit of +/– .001 inch for width 
and thickness.’332  
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This is an area on which much more research needs to be done, 
although it is beyond the focus of this study.  
Joint Design 
 What might be the most novel aspect of British design was the 
nature of inter–service rivalry, or lack thereof. As a quick recap of 
Chapters Two and Three, the Ordnance Committee/Board was made up 
of an equal mix of senior officers from both services. Therefore, ordnance 
designed to mount on battleships in no small measure had input and 
refinement at the specification and inspection levels by army officers. As 
well, all guns until 1911, and effectively again after 1913, were ordered by 
the Director of Army Contracts. The Admiralty had some independence 
of contracts in the interlude. Unified contracting became a huge asset to 
the Government in implementing new materials and specifications across 
all systems. In addition, it meant that Whitehall talked to industrial 
suppliers with one unified voice, which eliminated bidding against each 
other by the services, a requirement of the Treasury. 
At the start of the period under analysis, in 1901 the general process 
of design was that the government, usually the Ordnance Committee, 
asked for a design from the trade based on a certain sized bore and ballistic 







who then accepted, rejected or asked for a rework, and often CSOF picked 
the best of each design as a composite of multiple designs from multiple 
designers to be produced in its entirety by the firm that account for the 
most of the revised design. The designs were then ordered to trial, which 
seemed to be done differently for each new gun, and no generalizations 
can be made about this process. Once it was accepted, all firms could then 
bid on building the gun.  
Very few guns, if any, were the product of perfect designs that the 
government accepted outright. Evidence shows that if anything, more 
technical knowledge of things such as breech chamber design and rifling 
were the near exclusive purview of the government. This changed over 
time, and by 1910, designs were more set in stone and based on solid 
principles. Many guns after about 1908 simply incorporated previous 
designs in a larger size, or with a modified chamber, etc, to meet the need 
of the service.  
According to the Ordnance Committee ‘The conditions required 
having been formulated, designs obtained, carefully considered as to safety 
of construction, &c., and the probable ballistics calculated, it is then 
necessary to have a trial gun or guns manufactured.’333 In addition, as 
technology changed faster, the work also increased. In 1902, the President 
                                           







of the Committee stated that ‘The work of the Committee, and the 
number of subjects referred to them, have increased from year to year, and 
undoubtedly will do so still more, as our armaments must be kept up to the 
rapid advances in war material made by all Great Powers. Application has 
been made for the appointment of an additional Member so that 
increasing amount of Sub–Committee work may be properly coped with’334  
The issue of proper staff office space remained a large issue in 1905. 
The committee believed that they were not able to provide the analysis 
expected of them in the quantity needed with their current resourcing.335 
This demonstrates just how much more advanced and time consuming the 
task of engineering new ordnance utilizing new propellants, steel, and 
design was and the stresses entailed in properly analysing them. In 
addition, it showed that the British Government continued close scrutiny 
over designs as time progressed.  
A Standard Ordnance? 
There was a rapidly advancing opinion by the end of the first decade 
of the century that naval guns were actually quite different from coastal 
defence. Naval guns put a premium on weight, size, etc, and as well, that 
the electronic firing mechanisms were better suited for naval guns where 
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trained engineering officers were available. Coastal batteries might not have 
the engineering support available when a malfunction occurred for the 
more precise electronic mechanisms.336 This was not always apparent in 
gun orders, with frequently the same gun was chosen by both services. It 
appears that a case by case basis for regional needs and availability for 
garrison artillery had a factor in the actual orders, although this was either 
not written down, or has now been destroyed in the records.   
As the coastal artillery had been almost wholly equipped by the time 
the transition to high velocity guns came to naval ships, the cost to benefit 
ratio did not justify replacing all guns on land forts. Also, the particular 
usage of coastal guns meant that they had a different economy. This was 
due to limited rounds in annual shell expenditure. As well, shell ranges 
were limited to the location of the fort. Finally, the coastal mountings were 
not able to take the force of the increased energies created by the increased 
pressures. In the end, the driving requirement of coastal artillery was that 
accuracy was more important than penetrating pressures.337 The end 
analysis appears strong, as many of the guns placed in coastal fortresses in 
the early 1900s were still there 50 years later.  
It was not only the home services that challenged design to standard 
ordnance. Members of the Government, especially the Indian Secretary, in 
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1905 challenged the need for a wire gun, stating that technology had 
sufficiently advanced that single casting could now be done in an efficient 
way. Armstrongs were the only ones that had experience in solid, built up 
manufacture, and argued that although the relining was easier, it was still a 
better gun with wire. The basis for block gun construction as used by every 
other power was that only the breech side of the barrel needed to be 
replaced as it was the only side that usually was affected by erosion.338  
The Ordnance Committee to Ordnance Board 
In a note to the preface of the 1908 edition of the Annual Report of 
the President, it was stated that on 30 October 1907 the Director of 
Artillery decided to amalgamate the Ordnance Committee with the 
Ordnance Research Board, and the new title would be the Ordnance 
Board, effective 1 January 1908. 339 This seemingly trivial change does 
appear to have accompanied some large modifications. The largest 
modification limited the role of civilian advisors. These men had 
previously been part of the committee since at least 1881. This new board 
in reality weakened the Master General of Ordnance in favour of the 
service ordnance chiefs, although it was not explicitly designed to do so.  
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The largest single task of the board was managing and directing 
research and design for all British ordnance. The research and design 
budget was essentially directed by the Board, and almost all of it was spent 
on tests at Shoeburyness and Woolwich, and to a lesser extent Aldershot 
(and Bisley for small arms). The experiments were paid for out of Army 
and Navy Ordnance Votes, Vote 9. This joint experience meant that both 
the Army and Navy could benefit from each other’s experiments, both in 
cost and time. It is really difficult to overstate the benefit this joint 
committee had on designs. It meant that Royal Navy guns were identical to 
their equivalent British Army guns and vice versa.   
Ballistics were considered equal within the realm of coastal artillery 
and naval artillery, and therefore it can be assumed that the contemporary 
reports on naval artillery were covering their army counterparts. This was 
important especially in operations, as naval research could be used in siege 
applications, which utilized weapons of 6–inch and above.340  
Holding Suppliers Accountable  
Inspection and management of supplier deliverables was a key 
element of the Government’s role in verifying that what was delivered and 
paid for was the same as what was ordered. The Government had no 
                                           







problems with holding the suppliers of ordnance accountable for mistakes. 
This seems like an obvious action, although even today inspection rights 
are often not fully exercised, for the sake of keeping contractors content. 
This was important not only to ensure that the product ordered was 
received to plan, but also to eliminate any corruption that might occur 
between supplier and buyer.  
Inspection was especially important in warlike stores. The tolerances 
required as well as the use of materials that were not considered 
commercial made it all the more important. Even more than most, guns 
that failed had a high chance of injuring or killing, which even in 
Edwardian Britain could cause scandal that would undermine the entire 
system. The tolerances for the Mark IX 12–inch gun were seven 
thousandths of an inch. That is under the size of two human hairs (.004). 
And as mentioned earlier, wire had a tolerance of just .001 inch. This 
tolerance was normal throughout the period in question.  
Inspection also included a feedback loop that gave manufacturers 
some way of improving their products. This came through both comments 
on failed guns, but also as part of conferences with gunmakers that 
occasionally occurred. One such event was the third conference with 







important for unwritten communication that was otherwise always written.341 
Unfortunately, because of this medium, no notes appear to survive on what 
was said at any of the pre–war meetings with gunmakers.  
At other times, some firms preferred to self–regulate and self–
inspect. In a rare case, sometime after 23 Jan 1911, Messrs Firth ‘Had 
since declared their inability to produce satisfactory billets for gun forgings, 
and it had been proposed to remove their name temporarily from the list 
of Contractors on this account.’342 It must be stressed, that this case was 
rare, and was also the only uncovered instance of this occurring.  
The Inspector of Steel 
The most important three individuals in the inspection process were 
the Inspector of Steel at Sheffield, the Chief Inspector, Woolwich, and the 
Chief Superintendent of Ordnance Factories. 343 The Inspector of Steel at 
Sheffield had the closest relationship with steel manufactures, not least 
which because he was stationed at the heart of the area where almost all the 
producers were located. The Inspector of Steel regularly visited plants and 
oversaw the inspection staff of the government. He was the first to point 
out oddities that could indicate trends in the industry as a whole. For 
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instance, titanium was found to be a source of rejection due to it showing 
ghost lines in castings, and Cammell Laird was banned from using it by the 
Inspector of Steel in Feb 1912.344 Titanium as a metal was almost unheard 
of by this period in the commercial world, and would certainly have been 
too expensive or use in anything but the most expensive alloy steels.  
Inspection acceptance was set by policy to be on a case by case basis, 
with errors in manufacture being ‘treated on its merits’345 The acceptance of 
guns not meeting specification became a major claim on time and 
resources by 1902. In that year alone the committee looked at 120 guns 
that were improperly manufactured in one form or another, and generally 
accepted the guns at a reduced price based upon the shortened life caused 
by manufacturing defects, assuming that they passed proof. Many of these 
initial rejections were based upon grooves that were too deep, and thus the 
driving bands might cause increased erosion, and other similar issues.346 
Almost all were caused by machinery error and not metallic or casting 
failure in earlier years, but, as the new alloy steels were introduced, the 
errors shifted more to chemical failures in the steels themselves.  
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This chemical inspection was made more difficult by the way that 
particular trace elements were distributed over the pour of the casting. 
Carbon contents and other trace elements appeared in different 
concentration between the part of the ingot at the bottom and the top of 
the pour. For instance, the lower portion of the ingot contained more trace 
amounts than the top of the ingot, causing testing to be conducted at both 
the breech and the muzzle of each forging before and after annealing.347  
Rejections of steel for forgings came under increased scrutiny. A 
seemingly vague area in contract clauses forced the Chief Superintendent 
to purchase forgings that the Chief Inspector Woolwich had subsequently 
rejected after working. The Treasury Solicitor became involved when 
Armstrongs contested the rejection. The difference arose with the rejection 
based upon the lack of passing tests, and not due to flaws, which the 
company stated was not their responsibility. The specifications were 
amended to include more stringent carbon content amounts as well as 
more stringent ductility tests.348  
The seemingly obvious course of comparing the gun under 
inspection to the contracted gun was not even an easy task. The Chief 
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Inspector Woolwich had to set up a contractual policy that the 
Government was to send a set of drawings with every contract, and that 
these drawings were the most up to date and contemporary for every 
contract released.349 In addition, one of the key instruments for inspectors 
was the use of gutta percha. Gutta percha was used as a way of making 
impressions on the internal areas of guns, and was especially useful in 
uncovering imperfections or coppering. Gutta percha came from Malaya 
(now Malaysia) and was a type of latex rubber.  
Many Forms of Informal Inspection 
The board received several forms of official and less than official 
reports on how ordnance was performing in the field. The largest source of 
official information came from casualty reports. There are many incidents 
in the annual reports of the President of the Ordnance Committee/Board 
that highlight issues that obviously were considered important. All failures 
of guns that included damage of equipment or serious injury were reported 
to the Committee, as well as any manufacturing error that did not comply 
with the specification. This latter form of reporting took up by far the most 
time in Committee.   
                                           







Many minor manufacturing mistakes that pertained to rifling went 
subsequently accepted. The Ordnance Committee, not being able to prove 
that a gun would fail, gave the manufacturer the option to have the guns go 
to proof ‘without prejudice to any decision that might come to.’ When 
given the choice, manufacturers almost always chose to have the gun 
proofed, and almost always, the guns were accepted. Artillery tubes were 
simply too expensive, and took too many resources, and a repair was no 
guarantee that the piece would be any better than the first attempt. It made 
more business sense to have the guns proofed and accepted, as a 
destructive proofing was mathematically unlikely with the most up–to date 
gun designs being challenged.  
The inspectors at Sheffield were some of the busiest inspectors in 
the entire Government. The 1904–1905 forging inspections reveal a great 
deal about the size and health of the British steel and ordnance industries. 
Many rejections of carbon forgings occurred, due to the lower limits being 
more heavily investigated and enforced. Elswick had 1.6 per cent rejected 
(13 of 820), Elswick, Manchester, 14 of 242, Vickers, 48 of 744 (6.5 per 
cent), Cammell, 12 of 128 (9.4 per cent), Taylor, one of 21, J Bown, zero 
of 15, Spencer, one of three, Beardmore, zero of four, Ince, zero of two, 
Darlington, zero of one, and Jonas and Colver, zero of two for an overall 







1908 Inspections: a Cross-Section Example 
All forgings sent to the board in 1908 for decision were accepted. 
seven carbon steel and seven nickel steel. What is most significant, is that 
no carbon steel was inspected for the use of ‘A’ tubes in 1908, showing 
that, firstly Vickers submitted no tubes for the Royal Gun Factory; and 
secondly, that the entire industry from the smallest suppliers to the largest 
had transitioned to nickel steel that they were sending to Woolwich for the 
use of the Royal Gun Factory.350  
In addition, 1908 caused a mixup in how forgings were accepted or 
rejected. Instead of the Board deciding on what should be accepted or 
rejected, the Director of Artillery, WE Blewitt, requested that the 
respective service heads have decision, not the board. This gave more 
decentralized power, and did not come with a reason for such a change.351 
Before, the Board had little interfered with and almost never disagreed 
with the service heads. Why Blewitt insisted on this is not articulated in the 
archives.  
New Naval Inspection after 1911 
The devolution of inspection to the services led to a small change 
for naval billets being inspected. Naval service had discs cut off billets 
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starting in 1911 for testing of steel, yet this was rejected by the land service 
for several reasons. First, the billets for Land Service were so much 
smaller, second, land billets were solid 99 per cent of the time, whereas 
naval ones were hollow. Third, the rejection rate for smaller billets was 
much less, and fourth, the delay would not be worth it.352 The 1911 
specification was that all forgings for guns of 8–inch and above had to be 
hollow forged.353 Before being forged, the forgings had been cast using the 
sand method.  
It became a question of who had discretionary powers to accept the 
Vickers forgings with high silicon contents. The Inspector of Steel had 
already accepted forgings that were well in excess of service limits. The 
Chief Inspector, Naval Ordnance, was against this as several forgings that 
had been accepted were later given unsatisfactory results.354 The 
Superintendent of Research was not convinced by the Vickers excuse, and 
believed that the percentage of silicon reacted with the percentage of 
carbon, and that this combination, combined with ‘indifferent heat 
treatment’ was the main problem with the Vickers issues with silicon and 
rejected forgings. The annealing temperature for 0.406 per cent silicon in 
nickel steel was 1,250 degrees (F), which was within 20 degrees of the 
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maximum for the integrity of the steel without degradation. Therefore, 
Vickers’s arguments for raising the silicon content above 0.25 were 
rejected.355 Vickers blamed the excessive amounts of silicon in gun forgings 
on the residual oxygen from the ‘oxygen originally dissolved in the fluid 
steel’ The silicon was added to remove non–metallic substances that 
formed silicates, which then could be slagged off.356  
The Inspector of Steel believed in 1909 that the hands off approach 
that was generally adopted towards manufacturers was not always the best 
because manufacturers heated tubes before shrinking, sometimes heating 
them higher than the annealing stage, which would have altered the 
hardness and other factors. The Board was still unwilling to give much 
more guidance out of a seeming fear of stepping on toes.357  
Paying for Wear and Tear  
Gauges and models were being worn out at Woolwich from 
contractors using them to adjust their guns before formal delivery to the 
Chief Inspector Woolwich. This caused the Chief Inspector Woolwich to 
suggest in particular an increase in tolerance to the breech of several guns 
for the sake of ease of setup as well as the increased life to his gauges, 
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which the Government provided for their use.358 Gauges were not cheap 
and copies were not widely distributed due to this. A new set of gauges for 
the 13.5–inch Mark V would have cost £4,500, £1,500 for the 6–inch Mark 
XII, for the 4–inch, Marks VII and VIII, £1,500, for a total cost of £7,500 
over three guns.359  
The Committee through the Inspector of Steel also saw requests for 
experimental building techniques in guns slated for operational use. One 
of these was listed in a 12 April 1906 note in which the Chief Inspector 
Woolwich informed Elswick that ‘in order to shorten time of manufacture, 
an extra wire may be used with a tension of 20 to 25 tons, to be turned 
down to suit the interior of the ‘B’ tube or jacket, the number of effective 
wires not being altered.’360 
The Last Conference 
The last conference with gun–making firms before the end of peace 
was held on 4 Feb 1913 with Openshaw, Coventry, Brown, Firth, and 
Cammell. The meeting was called to discuss what to do with those forgings 
that did not pass Admiralty specifications as well as the delay in 
manufacture of heavy guns.361 As with all of the conferences called by the 
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Ordnance Board, the results were not kept and the notes do not exist 
today.  
The inspection staffs knew first–hand the pulse of the industry. This 
was primarily due to visits and constant contact. This allowed the inspector 
to notice things. An example of this was through a tour of Vickers by the 
Royal Gun and Carriage Factory metallurgist from August 1912 that 
showed that the private firms of Darlington and Vickers, especially the 
latter, used carbon testing in a way that was more efficient and allowed 
more throughput than the Royal Gun Factory, but was not as accurate as 
that used by the Royal Gun Factory.362  
Donaldson 
Arguably the most important person in all of this was not an officer 
at all, but a civilian engineer, the Chief Superintendent of Ordnance 
Factories at Woolwich, Hay Frederick Donaldson. Donaldson was one of 
the most highly regarded engineers in the country and ran government 
designs for all ordnance from 1899 until his untimely death in the sinking 
of the HMS Hampshire in June 1916. Donaldson and his team at 
Woolwich designed the ballistics, pressures, and specifications for all guns 
before they were sent out to the trade for final manufacturing design. This 
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has been completely forgotten by historians to date as it does not fit in with 
the corporate histories that consider the designs anything but their own.  
Rejected Guns 
Government inspectors of ordnance often did not reject guns 
outright. The proposed rejected guns were sent to the Ordnance Board to 
decide the fate of the individual piece, making judgment on the merits of 
the flaw, as well as the position of the service. Often the gun was accepted, 
although with a substantial fine based upon the shortened life.  
Some fines were quite severe, with an example being a 9.2–inch 
Mark X gun, No 160 that had two widened grooves, and tool marks, which 
warranted a reduction of £350 in the price, a substantial fee that certainly 
would have eliminated any profit.363  
Another Armstrongs gun, No 162, was fined for exceeding the limit 
of bore measurements for 22 inches of the barrel, thus incurring a fine of 
£150. This fine was punitively high because the Ordnance Committee saw 
that this was a recurring theme with Armstrongs and that this might be a 
punitive measure to clean up the quality being submitted to the inspector.364  
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Problems with the same model often could vary widely due to how 
extreme the problems were. Armstrongs guns numbering 176 and 178 
both exceeded bore measurements, and one was fined £250 and another 
£40 for the errors.365  
It was not just Armstrongs that had guns fined for errors. Vickers 
submitted gun number 237, which had a groove .05 inches too deep, which 
caused the committee to reject it and require a new inner ‘A’ tube, a costly 
mistake.366  
The contractors not surprisingly wanted a change to the steel 
specification so that it could be made cheaper. In a meeting, attended by 
the Chief Superintendent, Ordnance Factories, Superintendent, Royal 
Gun Factory, The Chief Inspector, Woolwich, and the Board, they saw 
objections to virtually every point, including that the proposed pieces 
would not ‘materially affect prices’. These objections were concurred with 
by the Director of Naval Ordnance and the Director of Artillery.367  
Corruption 
In that last regard, no case of outright corruption was seen in all the 
records viewed, although some dealings between Archibald Gordon Henry 
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Wilson Moore as Director of Naval Ordnance and the trade, especially 
Vickers, were suspiciously friendly. This is the only case. A.G.H.W. 
Moore seems to have been swayed more by contractors than his 
predecessors. Within a month of his arrival in December 1909 as Director 
of Naval Ordnance, there were requests from Cammell for a new meeting 
of all the steelmakers to change specifications of steels. This was shot down 
by the Board. The Director of Naval Ordnance still held a conference at 
the Admiralty on 27 June 1910.368 He seems to have thrown several 
crackpot ideas out in the first months of 1910. He, at the request of the 
contractors, proposed suspending new regulations for the new steels, on 30 
Nov 1910. This would have been a year into Moore’s term.369 Moore also 
wanted to dispose of the traditional role of Woolwich. Moore was 
addressed in a letter from Donaldson showing his dismay at possibly giving 
the trade the chance to reline guns for the Admiralty. Donaldson stated 
that historically this had come up, and it was decided to stay at the 
Ordnance Factories for this work not only for the consistent quality, but 
also for the research derived from failed and worn guns. He does not seem 
to have been given comment back, and thus policy did not change.370  
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The technical requirements of ordnance drove the decisions of what 
would eventually be produced by industry. Correlli Barnett has argued that 
‘defective technology, reflecting the scientific and technical backwardness 
of British industry, was not the only ingredient in the British failure’ to 
destroy everything in its path militarily.371 This argument that has been put 
forth that Britain was technologically behind, or even backwards could not 
be further from the truth. The British fleets by 1914 mounted the largest 
guns afloat (15-inch), and the British Army had the most powerful field 
guns in the world.372 Only those who truly have misinterpreted the facts 
could see otherwise. British industry, although slow to implement some 
elements, was still able to produce guns of the highest quality. Britain had 
the only growing armaments industry in Europe, with four private 
companies making armaments for the newest British battleships, up from 
two just a decade before.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN: TECHNICAL EVOLUTIONS IN ARMAMENTS, 
1900–1914 
The evolution of ordnance has been shown in the first five chapters 
to be a developmental process. Generational changes occurred in the 
period between 1900 and 1914 exceeding those in any equivalent period in 
British history. This chapter will break individual systems down for further 
development to demonstrate the scientific prowess of the ordnance 
industry as a whole at the time as well as the problems inherent in pushing 
the boundaries of industry and science as it pertains to larger guns used by 
the Royal Navy and the Royal Garrison Artillery. As will be demonstrated, 
most of these problems were easily solved, although some took much 
longer and required cultural, industrial, or management efforts to solve that 
are not obviously compatible with the simple explanations for problems 
given in popular literature such as Ian Hogg’s Allied Artillery of World 
War One. Historiographically, picture books with vital statistics like Hogg’s 
are popular with amateur historians who tend to quote un–validated 
information which is then perpetuated in later texts. The next two chapters 
in particular tackle some of these concepts with contemporary information 
that is directly from previously secret sources which often contradicts the 







The next two chapters look at individual cases. This is important in 
understanding how these particular weapons performed when they were 
used, and problems or successes based upon their design, 
experimentation, and peacetime usage. The following also represents the 
transition from peacetime uses to wartime, and what exactly the British 
Army and Royal Navy went to war with.  
What follows is a breakdown of the inspiration, need, development, 
and operational experiences of the ordnance that represented the British 
arsenal by July 1914. Not all of these guns made it to operational use, 
although those that did not were used to inspire future follow-on systems. 
In general, the chapter progresses from the 6–inch, Mark VII gun which 
was the design inspiration for almost all British guns in the twentieth 
century, to the evolution of naval main armament, followed by the 
secondary and coast artillery and smaller guns. The chapter then 
transitions to land artillery, first discussing field pieces, and ends with the 
siege artillery, including railway guns.  
This chapter as well as the next are products of hundreds of hours 
of archival work that demonstrates the difficulties of summary comments 
to explain complicated technical challenges. This is especially useful to 







been taken for granted how it has evolved and why. Many entries 
demonstrate this is not the case.  
Arguments of ‘Economic Decline’ 
Many historians since the 1970s have argued that Britain had been 
in a decline since the late Victorian period. Some place this as early as the 
1870s. The general arguments follow a line that Britain was in relative 
decline industrially compared to neighbors as well as the new superpowers. 
Many of these arguments run in direct contradiction to the results of the 
analysis presented in this thesis. This does not necessarily mean that either 
case is incorrect. In addition, much of the literature written a generation 
ago has now been challenged by those such as David Edgerton, whose 
1996 book Science, Technology, and the British Industrial ‘Decline,’ 
1870–1970 challenges the works of those such as CP Snow, Martin 
Wiener, and Correlli Barnett, as ‘much technocratic writing is not 
economic or technological history but the cultural history of anti–
technology.’373 Much of the writing of earlier scholars in general such as 
Barnett has not held up to the next generation of study. Edgerton 
especially has challenged the works of these earlier authors. His works 
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such as Britain’s War Machine (Penguin, 2011), Warfare State: Britain, 
1920–1970 (Cambridge, 2006) and Shock of the Old (Profile Boks, 2007) 
have put to bed many of the larger concepts of the field that have 
permeated through myth, lore, and academia for over a century.  
Unfortunately for the topic though, ordnance is difficult to group 
into the wider general histories of economic and technical history as it is 
not a commercial item, and therefore cannot be summarized with the rest 
of the field of general study. The specialized study does not allow it to be 
grouped with almost anything else. The tolerances, high capital outlay, and 
single customer made ordnance and large guns in particular an industry 
that did not and still does not mirror general trends that might represent 
industry as a whole for a country, region, or even general time period.  
The 6–inch Mark VII 
The 6–inch Mark VII was considered the most important gun of 
British ordnance between 1890 and 1914. This was due to it being the first 
large sized gun to be designed for use with cordite. The gun was the testbed 
for over a decade of research. This research spanned every part of 
ordnance from propellants and driving bands on shells, to the proper 
muzzle velocities for barrel life and the basis of all rifling experiments in 







The 6–inch Mark VII was the primary gun for testing new powders, 
especially the differences between the original Mark I Cordite the gun had 
been designed for, and a much improved Cordite MD (Modified Design). 
It was also the basis for the experimental powders that were not accepted 
for general service due to either their failures in testing, or industry not 
being able to produce enough quantities. One of these powders was called 
Cordite MDT, or Modified Design, Tubular. Many of these experiments 
proved how different propellants and muzzle velocities affected the life of 
guns. The 6–inch proved to be a preferred test bed not least because its 
moderate size mimicked large guns, but also because it was much less 
expensive to repair, reline, and replace than its capital armaments 
counterparts.  
In one experiment conducted in 1905 at the very beginning of 
MDT, an attempt was made to see if certain powders gave improved 
ballistics and extended barrel life. It was discovered that Cordite MD gave 
a higher muzzle velocity, a lower rate of erosion, and greater accuracy than 
MDT. ‘In any given gun the amount of erosion at 1 inch from the 
commencement of the rifling is mainly due to the weight of the propellant 
in the charge and is but little, if at all affected by its form (cord or tubular), 
or by the maximum pressure in the bore.’374 The result hampered 
                                           







investment in MDT as well as further research into different sizes and 
chemical compositions. This negative result put back the study of MDT by 
over half a decade.  
The Testbed Workhorse 
The nickel steel issues mentioned in the previous chapter were first 
tested in full on the 6–inch Mark VII gun. Two nickel steel tubed guns 
were sent to the ranges at Shoeburyness on the Essex side of the mouth of 
the Thames to be used for proof and evaluation purposes. Gun 1034 had 
worn down after 803 rounds to a limit almost condemnable, but was still 
good enough to be used for projectile proof, a key role performed at the 
ranges. It was decided to continue firing until the gun was completely 
unserviceable, and then it would be relined after finding out more. Gun 
1034 eventually fired 1127 rounds before being condemned.375 These tests 
performed to condemnation were by far the most valuable tests, as they 
showed not only initial wear, but also how guns, materials, projectiles, and 
other variables affected wear, accuracy, and power over the entire life of 
the gun, not just the initial proof firings. Unfortunately, few guns were 
sentenced to a full life test, as it was not only expensive to fire a thousand 
                                           







rounds, but also took valuable range space for extended periods as well as 
timely paperwork to record and calculate the individual rounds.  
Based upon the results of the 6–inch Mark VII, scientists were able 
to calculate for how guns naturally decreased through wear the speed of 
shot as it left the barrel, also called muzzle velocity. This calculation was 
one of the most important for operational units, as it meant that, if all other 
things were constant, the changing muzzle velocity could be used to 
compute the flight length of the projectile, the distance covered over a 
certain time, and most importantly, at what setting to set time fuzes to 
effectively hit the target as the gun went through its normal usable life. A 
calculation was formed by deducing the decrease in muzzle velocity from 
proof guns. For 29 pounds of size 26 Cordite, decrease of muzzle velocity 
equalled 15+0.175 X number of rounds in feet per second. For 23 pounds 
of size 16 Cordite; the fall of muzzle velocity equalled 10 feet per second 
+50 feet per second for every inch of overram. This translated meant that 
the tests showed in the case of the 6–inch gun that every shot wore down 
the barrel by .175 m/s in muzzle velocity. In distance this converted to 6 
inches per firing less per second.376 In other words, every time the gun was 
fired, the equivalent wear meant that the projectile would go less distance 
with the same kinetic energy (propellant).  
                                           







Tests such as these were extremely valuable for naval guns, where if 
wear rates were known, especially in turrets with multiple ages of guns 
mounted, the crew could calculate the distance and flight time without 
having to fire shots. These were key calculations in rudimentary analog 
computers and range finding equipment. It also meant that gunners 
needed an increasingly sophisticated grasp of high-level mathematics to get 
the most out of their guns, although unfortunately that is beyond the scope 
of this study.  
Later 6–inch Guns 
The 6–inch class of guns were a symbol of the state of naval warfare 
from the 1890s until 1906. Battleships bristled with them to deter the new 
quick moving torpedo boats with the fast evolving self–propelled 
torpedoes. This changed with the introduction of Dreadnought, which 
introduced the all–large gun battle ship, and discarded much of the smaller 
ordnance. At the same time, it was recognized that the Mark VII was 
becoming obsolescent and newer models were needed to outfit torpedo 
destroyers and light cruisers to defend the new Dreadnoughts.  
Part of the obsolescence was shown in the 1906 incident reports, 
which listed all failures for all services. Guns No 1996 and 2126 of 6–inch 







Factory cracked for 33 inches after 249 equivalent full charges. Gun 2126 
was built by Elswick and fired 297 6/16 equivalent full rounds. This was 
composed of 3 proof, 6 full, and 4566 half charges.377  
The incidences of cracking were important as it was often the best 
canary to demonstrate that designs were reaching obsolescence due to their 
inability to fire new rounds and new propellants at increased muzzle 
velocities and to withstand the new kinetic energies caused from increased 
breech and muzzle pressures.  
Life Corollaries through 6-Inch Guns 
As the Mark VII aged, other 6–inch guns took over the research of 
full life charging. A 6–inch Mark XI gun had an estimated life of 1,000 
estimated rounds. The change in muzzle velocity, like the Mark VII, was 
believed to be plotted through its life cycle. Full life firings showed that the 
performance during the first 400 rounds was equivalent to that of a new 
gun, although by shots 400–500 there was a distinct drop off. This 
information allowed designers to try new shells, especially in weight 
difference to ascertain if it made a difference, over the long term wear. The 
practice shells were four pounds lighter, 100 versus 104, and for some 
reason of ballistic coefficient, in worn barrels, they were the same to 100 
                                           







yards, yet at 9,400 yards the practice shell fell 200 yards short in worn 
barrels.378 It is likely that there was a direct link between the research 
conducted on the 6–inch guns and the eventual designs for the 13.5–inch 
gun and its success as a long life main gun. However much of the 
correlatory work that would prove such points is buried in test reports, and 
the designers would probably have simply seen it as an evolution 
themselves, without taking into effect the fusion of the combined 
experiment results.  
6–inch guns were also used as test beds for the viability of certain 
design elements. The 6–inch gun, 50 calibre, Mark XI was designed by the 
Chief Superintendent, Ordnance Factories, HF Donaldson, with build 
ability specifically in mind, this being the key reason the design was 
accepted.379 This was probably the first gun entering British service that 
took British industry specific factors as the primary design factor.  
6-inch Quickfiring Guns 
The Royal Navy had issues with the 6–inch quickfiring gun on HMS 
Porpoise in 1901. The fault was verified by inspection to a cartridge case 
jam. It demonstrated that the supply chain of shell casings in this instance 
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was a weak point.380 The care of casings would become a greater issue, and 
this might have been the impetus for the original desire of the Royal 
Artillery reequipping committee to almost choose a caseless cartridge for 
the field guns. If this had occurred, it would have had a huge effect on the 
rate of fire that would have been available in the field. This is a perfect 
example of how circumstances regarding naval ordnance affected the 
design of army ordnance. 
The rate of fire and pressure as well as the relative cost of 
replacement made 6-inch guns some of the first designs to benefit from the 
introduction of nickel steel into ordnance. In 1908 the drawing was 
changed for 6–inch Mark XI guns to replace carbon tubes with nickel.381 
This was one of the first designs to be converted to the new material with 
an existing pattern gun.  
The Last 6-inch Guns 
In 1911 the Director of Naval Ordnance requested a new 6–inch 45 
calibre gun that was lighter and more manoeuvrable than the present gun 
which was to be used on cruisers and other light vessels. This would 
become the Mark XII.382 The initial design came from the Royal Gun 
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Factory, and not Vickers as also stated by some.383 The design for the Mark 
XII was accepted by the Ordnance Board on 5 September 1911, as Royal 
Gun Factory design No 11,319. The entire process from needs request to 
approval took two months after the original Director of Naval Ordnance 
letter of requirements, dated 8 July 1911.384  
Finally, because the 6–inch gun was one of the most numerous guns 
in the fleet a breakthrough in design could reward great benefits. In 1912 
Beardmore, who to this point had avoided the gun business, submitted a 
5.5–inch gun that they proposed as a replacement for the 6–inch gun. The 
shell weighted the same, being 5–calibres in length. It was rejected on the 
dubious grounds that it might not be as accurate, although it had more 
muzzle velocity than the 6–inch shell at 6,000 yards due to less drag. 385 This 
was a lost opportunity for the Ordnance Board and the navy, and could 
have had ramifications in the design of heavy guns for the army as well, 
such as the 60–pr, which was just being produced at the time. This 
insistence on maintaining 3–calibre shells as a basis of British design meant 
that they possibly had a prejudice that was not good for the long–term 
evolution of ordnance. The inability to consider new ballistic calculations 
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such as shell calibre meant that ordnance could only evolve within certain 
constraints.   
Fuzing 
As long–range guns became more of a possibility, fuzes also had to 
cope with the increased flight ranges and increased forces in firing. 1904 
saw a great deal of research go into fuzing, which the committee saw as 
being the utmost importance, especially in long–range artillery using 
shrapnel shell.386 Although outside this study, it should be noted that as gun 
technology evolved, it brought other technological advances with it, and 
producing fuzes that could fly longer distances and take the new energies of 
firing as well as being accurate was a challenge that had to be conquered 
before the new guns would be effective.  
12–inch Guns 
One of the most important formulas in ordnance is Force equals 
Mass times Acceleration, or F= MA. We have known this since 1687 when 
Isaac Newton published his Second Law of Motion. British naval ordnance 
designers had realized the verge of what was technically possible with the 
                                           







12–inch guns that had been the central armament of British battleships 
since the 1890s.  
On the ocean going side of Whitehall, the Admiralty was dealing 
with technological changes as well, although they were slower moving than 
the Army. French, German, and American gun designers were 
experimenting with a replacement by the traditional, although restrictive, 
carbon steel gun with newer alloys that their armour plate producers had 
been working with, primarily nickel and chromium steel. New alloys, along 
with vigorous amounts of destructive testing, had given way to exponential 
increases in gun size, power, and accuracy. Both of these issues would 
come to dominate the recapitalization and outfitting of equipment.  
The 12–inch Mark VIII was initiated in 1891, with firing trials in 
1894, the IX in 1897 and 1899, and the X in 1903 and 1905.387 In the 12–
inch period, it took about 2–3 years from initiation to firing trials. After 
firing trials were held, gun designs that passed were ordered for production 
runs.  
                                           







12–inch Mark VIII  
The 12–inch Mark VIII was the first battleship gun to be designed 
for the use of new cordite propellant. This made it important in the 
evolution of British arms, although by 1900 it was obsolescent.  
There were 75 Mark VIII 12–in guns in total, assigned gun numbers 
48–122 inclusive. These were broken down as: 49 Royal Gun Factory, 10 
Elswick, 10 Whitworth, and 6 Vickers.388 
The guns did not wear well. This was partly due to a feature of the 
state of manufacturing when they were designed and built. It became 
known with these tests that the 12–inch Mark VIII were often faulty 
because they were not properly hardened, with the water bath turning to 
steam before proper annealing occurred. These guns had the physical 
attributes of not being hardened at all.389  
As the guns became obsolescent, several were rebuilt for 
experimentation. One of the Elswick made inner ‘A ‘tubes for a 12–inch 
Mark VIII made in early 1906 was made to a previous RGF design, No 
9988, instead of the then current 9988A. This gun was produced 
apparently at Elswick, but it was specifically slated for a spare tube for 
Vengeance. The change was in the design of the breech chamber, and 
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allowed for newer powder. 12 Mark VIII guns received the modified 
chamber, of which there were 3, numbers 50, 51, and 77, which were used 
for proofing size 45 MD after its introduction. Normal pattern Mark VIII 
guns could not be used for this purpose.390  
One of the problems with the gun was that due to the barrel not 
being annealed, along with its use of Mark I Cordite, it wore excessively. 
One gun had been relined less than a year after mounting, from Jupiter. 64 
rounds had been fired, and for some unascertainable reason the liner 
cracked. The investigation showed no cause.391  
The Mark VIII was also the first British gun to show signs of 
choking. The guns elongated due to the friction of the shell pulling the 
barrel to a longer shape. The 12–inch Mark VIII, No 50 had fired 132 
6/16 equivalent full rounds (178 total) and was still not in need of rifling, 
yet, it did have copper deposits as well as an apparent cannelured ring 
issue, but more was to be learned from this gun after it was rerifled. It was, 
along with No 54, a P&E (proof and evaluation) gun. The choking 
experiments seems to not have affected these particular guns as much as 
some examples in the field.392On the other hand, No 54, 12–inch Mark 
VIII was transferred to Proof work, and within 9 full rounds, had choked 
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so badly it had to have the choke removed. This problem would continue 
in several classes of 12–inch gun as will be seen.    
An interesting experiment showing the technology of the time was 
conducted on a gun in 1908. The firing time, or the time it took from the 
pushing of the trigger to the time the projectile left the bore, was not 
normally measured, but it was in the 12–inch Mark VIII, and it was 
roughly .1 seconds, of which .025 was the time it took for the shell to 
transit the bore, therefore ignition and burning took on average .075 
seconds.393 
12–inch Mark IX  
The Mark IX was the follow–on for the successful but obsolescent 
Mark VIII. The gun was 40 calibres long, which in this case meant 40 feet 
of rifling. 110 in total were built. 44 were made by the Royal Gun Factory, 
36 by Vickers, and 30 by Elswick.  
The gun proved to be an accurate gun at the time. A Director of 
Naval Ordnance minute of 19 October 1900 stated that guns had an 
acceptable error of 5 feet at 2000 yards for all guns. The committee came 
to the conclusion that there would be a difference in vertical and horizontal 
                                           







errors due to manufacturing technique as part of the industrial policy set 
forth.394  
The Cracking Problem 
The gun was prone to cracking, although little was known why for 
the early part of the gun’s life. Vickers-made guns were the only ones to 
crack or fail, five of their 36 being removed from service due to 
shortcomings in manufacturing.395 All the Vickers cracked guns failed at the 
point of 72 to 84 inches from the muzzle, where the second wire cannelure 
was found.396 An example was a Vickers manufactured Mark IX that split 
from 69 inches to 94 inches after 36 rounds had been fired. The gun was 
made in January 1901, although it was blamed in this case as a blatant 
manufacturing error 397 
Vickers gun No 130 in 1900 failed first inspection, and Vickers 
relined it. Vickers complained of difficulty of relining accurately such a 
large gun. This reinforced the need for Woolwich to undertake all relining. 
The gun was eventually tested at Shoeburyness, but Vickers was charged 
for ‘reduction of life of rifling on account of rounds fired’398  
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A product of the cracking of the Mark IX 12–inch guns was that the 
CSOF, Donaldson, believed that without a redesign, these would crack 
again after they were relined. The Director of Naval Ordnance also 
thought along these lines, and suggested putting tapered liners into guns 
that were slated for relining. As a note, those which had already received 
strengthened reliners could not be relined with a tapered tube. Therefore, 
all relined guns before 30 January 1912 were still stuck with outdated 
technology. The new tapered liner was to a Royal Gun Factory design.399 
Only three classes of pre–dreadnought ships received the Mark IX, and 
due to this, the gun saw little action.  
The possible reason for later guns such as the Mark X and XI and 
the 13.5-inch guns being built without experimental models being 
constructed first experience with the 12–inch Mark IX. The experimental 
gun was delivered late, which caused delays in designing the breech, and 
led to delays in building guns for the new classes of vessels that they were to 
be mounted on, which would have been the Formidable class of 
battleships.400 Indeed, ‘No trial gun has been ordered, as the OC 
considered such procedure unnecessary, owing to general similarity of 
design to that of the 12–inch Mark IX’.401 This policy was instituted in 1903 
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by the Ordnance Committee and was seen as a ‘great advance’ by the 
DNO, Rear Admiral Angus Macleod, as it created the possibility of 
installing guns of the newest type when commissioning vessels.402  
It also meant that designs simply copied previous design elements. It 
stopped major innovations or engineering changes in how the guns were 
made. At any other time in history this would have been acceptable, but 
the advances in propellant technology in the first decade of the century 
made for much more energetic propellants without updated guns that 
could fully utilize this advance.  
In 1906, Gun 172 of the 12–inch Mark IX cracked its inner ‘A’ liner 
after only 36 5/16 equivalent charges. It was relined and repaired by the 
Royal Gun Factory.403 This was an indication weaknesses that emerged 
later. By 1913, so many Mark IX 12–inch guns were being relined that it 
was not possible to get Duncan and Albemarle a combined five new guns, 
and it was suggested they be lapped out instead of being replaced for the 
time being, as they were being used for gunnery tenders.404 Obviously 
Woolwich was working at capacity, or the secondary suppliers were at 
capacity.  
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The Scale of Problems 
Of the 110 Mark IX guns built, 20 had cracked, 14 
circumferentially, and six longitudinally. The average equivalent full rounds 
were 102 for a circumferential crack and 50 for a longitudinal crack. 
(There was a need for 76 mounted guns.)405 The average life of these guns 
before achieving worn out status was 92 rounds with Mark I Cordite. With 
mixed charge Mark I and MD, it was 104.  
Due to the amount the gun was studied, a drop in pressure from the 
12–inch Mark IX guns of Hindustan, was revealed as ‘A 12–inch Mark IX 
gun, using MD cordite charges, would lose about 10 feet per second for 
every 14 rounds. That would be 40 yards at 6,000 yards.406  
The accountants calculated that each shot cost the Admiralty 
roughly £13.33. A gun was re–relined at Armstrongs due to faults in 
manufacture, the life of the rifling was shortened by 3 shots, which the 
Chief Inspector Woolwich believed was worth £40 over the life of the 
gun.407  
In another case, an accepted gun, number 162 from Armstrongs, 
failed due to the breech bush split on first round, the gun then being 
                                           
405 Ibid. 112. 








repaired by Armstrongs and accepted after being within 2.5 feet at 2000 
yards, although the firm was fined £ 250 as a consequence.408 
12–inch Mark X  
The 12–inch Mark X gun was a 45–calibre gun designed for vessels 
at the heart of a historic change in shipbuilding. Although not specifically 
designed for her, the Mark X would be received by HMS Dreadnought. 
The gun had fewer years as the premier gun of the Royal Navy, but was 
mounted primarily on the first British Dreadnoughts as well as the world’s 
first two classes of battlecruisers. It was at the experimental stage in 1903 as 
a 12–inch 45 calibre gun. The gun was designed specifically for Cordite 
MD, and the powder required a special chamber shape. The gun was 
designed by the Royal Gun Factory, under the watch of the Chief 
Inspector, Woolwich and Explosives Officer. Given that 18 tons was the 
maximum breech pressure, with eight tons maximum muzzle pressure. It 
was also explicitly stated that the design should have much in common with 
the Mark IX, to facilitate production.409 The eventual design was for a gun 
‘designed’ by Armstrongs and based upon the build parameters of the 
Mark X. The gun because of this did not have to incorporate a complete 
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trial gun, as there was little to trial. The order seems to have been placed 
for rifling and ballistics test guns alone.  
The DNO stated in testing of new bands for the 12–inch Mark X 
gun that he would accept new bands of ‘good accuracy with it could be 
relied upon for the first 60 rounds fired from a gun’410 The testing at 
Shoeburyness showed that in test conditions, guns were still showing at 
7,300 yards an error of 32 yards over seven rounds. This mainly came 
through a lateral deviation of 15.4 yards. This meant that the targets were 
on average missing their aiming points by 15 yards left or right. This was 
actually pretty accurate at a distance of over five miles.411 The error was 
largely due to the service band 11606, which was chosen and cleared for 
12–inch guns with Marks VIII, IX and X.  
Although the gun had a higher velocity than the older Mark IX, the 
Mark X was a strategic failure. The full life of the 12–inch, Mark X was 
150 rounds, according to the Ordnance Committee in September 1907412 It 
was strategically important that HMS Dreadnought had 80 rounds per gun 
in its magazines, and hence could not have fired two full loads without 
being relined. The gun life was proven by Elswick gun number 292 which 
was rejected for active service but used to experiment. What mattered was 
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the finding that the 12–inch Mark X guns were to have a lifespan of 175 
rounds, with this gun showing that it would last 75% of its life, or 130 
rounds.413  
Of the 12–inch Mark X guns built in 1907–1908, nine had severe 
problems that were reported to the Ordnance Board. Of them, three each 
were from Armstrongs, Vickers, and the Royal Gun Factory. The 
Woolwich had one inner ‘A’ tube from Elswick, and two from Openshaw. 
Openshaw, an Armstrongs plant, also made the damaged tubes for the two 
Vickers models in 1908. Due to Vickers need to subcontract manufacture 
of components it demonstrates Vickers even by 1908 was unable to 
manufacture nickel steel to a quality necessary to put in their big guns.414  
Mark X Testing Numbers 
Testing of the 12–inch Mark X guns had given some interesting 
figures. A proof round equalled two full service rounds. Also, the gun no 
288 made by Elswick had fired 150 equivalent rounds, 3 proof, 144 full. It 
was stated that muzzle velocity had fallen from 2,762 to 2,679 f/s. The 
condemning feature for this gun was a measurement of wear 1 inch from 
commencement of rifling. In this case, the limit was 12.76 inches in total 
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diameter, yet, this gun was still at 12.5 inches, or about 90 rounds short of 
condemnation.  
With this calculation, and knowing in hindsight the opening salvo at 
Jutland in May 1916 was 14 kilometers, or 15,310 yards or 45,930 feet, 
total flight would have changed from 16.62 seconds in the new barrel, to 
17.14 for the older barrels. Therefore, the worn barrels, would have 
missed the target by .52 seconds or 1,393 feet, almost a quarter mile. Of 
course, these are vacuum calculations and do not take into effect angle of 
fire, drag, or other calculations that would slow down the projectile as it 
travelled including shape or any other ballistic coefficient.415 This gun was 
also from one of the first batches to use nickel steel.  
What is very interesting is that ‘a 12–inch Mark X. projectile, fired at 
8 degrees elevation, with a muzzle velocity of 2,710 feet per second, 
retaining that angle to the trajectory throughout its flight, would strike base 
first, at some 13,200 yards’. ‘In recent practice with this projectile, an 
officer posted at a range of about 14,400 yards was able to see the shell 
directly after first graze, and to follow it to its second graze at 16,500 yards. 
In most instances it was tangential to its trajectory.’416 If this was indeed the 
case that projectiles were coming out of rifling was significant for many 
reasons, not least fuzing. Secondly, if a shell bounced between 3,300 and 
                                           








2,100 yards there was also a significant amount of energy still in the 
projectile to create such a flight.  
Increased 12-inch Life through Munitions Improvements 
In 1908, it was estimated that 12–inch guns, with new driving bands 
as introduced in 1900, had the life expectancy of 220 and 130 rounds with 
Mark I Cordite in Marks VIII and IX respectively. With MD, that was 
increased to 400 for the VIII, 240 with the IX, 200 for the X, and for the 
XI the data was inconclusive.417  
There were issues of 12–inch Mark X guns expanding, with three 
used in Cordite tests expanding after just four shots. (1 E Co and 2 VSM). 
This caused all of Dreadnought’s guns to be checked, and none of the ten 
were shown to have signs of expansion. The guns by this time, February 
1909, had fired between 41 and 50 shots respectively. The Chief Inspector, 
Woolwich thought that this expansion might be caused by instability of the 
projectile when firing. The shells showed heavy grooving. This appeared to 
be proved in several cases. That being said, No 288 had fired 193 
equivalent rounds.418  
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12–inch Mark XI  
On 21 June 1906 the Director of Naval Ordnance stated that a 
replacement more powerful than the 12–inch Mark X was likely needed 
soon. He wanted a muzzle velocity of 2,850 f/s and 50 calibres from a 12–
inch gun.419 It was to not exceed 18.5 tons chamber pressure, and 8 tons 
pressure at the muzzle. It was also to be nickel steel.420 The requirements 
were difficult to comply with, as the energy required to achieve the desired 
velocity pushed the abilities of both 1906 physics and industrial capacity.  
In the design phase, using guns 401 and 403, both Elswick and 
Vickers were having difficulties getting the nickel steel to be both elastic 
and hard enough to avoid expansion or cracking respectively. Pressures 
should have been lower than designed, and the metal itself was to blame.It 
appeared that the reason for the abandonment of the 12–inch class was not 
the end of the use of length: it was due to the inability of the manufacturers 
to produce a 12–inch gun in nickel steel that could comply with the design 
specifications. The elasticity simply was not there without either 
rebounding or cracking with the frightening new muzzle velocity energy on 
the limited diameter of the barrel.421   
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There was much discussion as to whether the new 12–inch gun was 
to be wired to the muzzle, or if it was to be made solid. This came out of 
the contemporary conviction that guns that were fully wired might be less 
accurate than those that were solid built. The belief was that the gun might 
be slightly bending during firing. This was tested in a 7.5–inch gun with 
inconclusive results, and no proof was shown either domestically or 
internationally that using wire would entail less accuracy. In addition, with 
the cracked tube of the first Vickers gun, it was decided to go back to a 
fully wired gun on the Mark XI gun.422  
The majority of the design internally for the 12–inch Mark XI came 
from the lessons learned from the rebuilding of the Mark VIII. This would 
have meant that the CSOF (Donaldson) was essentially the inventor of the 
Mark XI 12–inch gun and Mark XI 6–inch gun. The Mark XI 12–inch 
guns appears to have been a creation that was produced quickly, and 
without a need for much research and development, and even rifling was 
accepted from the Mark X. It was an evolution in design, adding 5 feet of 
barrel.423  
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Early Mark XI Orders 
The gun was ordered by the DNO (Reginald Bacon) on 28 
November 1908, apparently as a sole contract to Vickers with the 
requirement of having the same remaining velocity as the 12–inch Mark X 
at 8,000 yards. The very first 50–calibre 12–inch gun, No 401, 12–inch 
Mark XI was made by Vickers. After 38 equivalent rounds, it was found to 
be cracked for 157 inches from the muzzle. It was decided to continue 
using the gun in testing to gather data on what had happened with cracked 
barrels.424  
The gun according to Dawson and others was cracked because the 
shell had been improperly handled, so they implied no responsibility 
whatsoever for the cracked barrel. They argued that the shell had gyrated 
in the barrel when fired. This suggestion was countered by the Ordnance 
Board on the grounds that the type of scoring used in the proof was not 
confirmation, as it had been evident many times before in other high 
velocity guns, and this result had never occurred before.425 The Board 
concluded that Vickers had no justified reason for why their gun had failed. 
The Ordnance Board seems to have little time or patience for Dawson’s 
excuses.  
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A Vickers order for 12–inch Mark XI guns was suspended in order 
to put a thicker inner ‘A’ tube into the gun so that the choking issue would 
be negated.426 It appeared to be a velocity issue, and not an energy issue, as 
the difference between energies was great: 280,000 ft pounds of energy vs 
2,380,000 ft pounds of force. By the first year (1909), 18 of the Mark XI, 
and one Mark XII (RGF) had defects that were cited, yet all were 
eventually accepted. It appears that the main reason the Mark XI was 
rejected as a design was not the lack power, but that the gun was too 
difficult to manufacture with the current powder technology. With later 
research this could be different, but the powder to gunmaking technology 
was simply not there to make the 12–inch gun a viable service piece.427  
Due to higher muzzle velocity the XI also was wearing out much 
quicker. The wear rate of a Mark XI would, with the new powder and shell 
designs last about 160 rounds.428 On the 43– 12–inch Mark XI or XII guns 
proofed up to the end of Jan 1910, 22 had exceeded high limits by the end 
of 1910. This extreme wear in such a new gun was only occurring with 
these 50 calibre, 12-inch guns.429 
As it became quickly obvious that there were critical failures in the 
12–inch Mark XI, a new competition was hastily instituted. Coventry 
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submitted a design in the competition for a new 50–calibre 12–inch gun 
competition, although it appears to have been submitted after Vickers had 
already submitted plan 15,830, or service Mark XI. In the end, the 
requirements put on the Coventry design were so significant that it 
essentially made it a Mark XI. The Board went so far as to say ‘The Board 
noted that the CO Works design No 1,015 F was practically the 12–inch 
Mark XI design.’430  
Final 12-inch Gun Reworks 
The first modification to the design, was to rework the wiring, with 
the hope of making the gun more rigid. ‘The original 12–inch Mark XI 
was not wire wound at the muzzle, and had to be strengthened when 
converted into Mark XII by wire winding, but this had to be done without 
altering the balance or the contour of the gun to any material extent. It was 
impossible to do this without resorting to unusually high wire tensions.’431  
Coventry pointed out when building their first 12–inch Mark XI gun 
that Vickers had calculated incorrectly the shrinkage between the ‘A’ and 
‘B’ tubes. When asked by CSOF, Vickers gave an answer of calculations 
that completely perplexed the CSOF. This caused delays until Vickers 
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could undo their mistake. No charge seems to have been incurred for this 
work.432  
The Director of Naval Ordnance requested a new competition after 
the failure of the XI and the XII guns. This had all the players submit, 
Woolwich, Beardmore, Elswick, Vickers, and Coventry. All had slight 
differences in the size and shape of chambers. The test trials of one per 
manufacturer of 12–inch 50 calibre guns proceeded to commence, with 
each manufacturer picking their own bands and powder. Beardmore 
picked MDT, Vickers wanted 55 MD, then Chilworth, or MDT, settling 
finally on MDT, and Elswick chose size 45 MD after their request to use 
Chilworth Special was declined.433 All seem to have been unable to really 
get anything more out of a 12–inch 50 calibre gun. Beardmore seems to 
have really come up with an independent breech. The 12–inch 50 calibre 
experimental tests were formally cancelled on 30 May 1911, with the 
exception of the MDT tests that were being conducted on the Coventry 
gun.434 
The failures of both the Mark XI and the Mark XII forced 
designers to conclude that the era of British 12–inch guns was at an end. 
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The effectively build guns, the size of the shell would have to increase, and 
therefore the size of ships as a whole.  
12–inch Mark XIII 
The very last 12–inch guns designed and accepted were not destined 
to ever grace a British warship. Agincourt was outfitted with 12–inch Mark 
XIII, which were 12–inch 45 calibre guns designed for export by 
Armstrongs. Originally ordered for the Brazilian Armada, the vessel was 
sold to the Ottoman Empire in 1913, and seized at the outbreak of the war 
by the British government. The guns were apparently made of nickel–
chrome steel, which Elswick thought led to one cracking at proof.435 
Agincourt’s guns could not be traded for those of any other British ship, 
making it a difficult vessel to use, as it would be almost impossible in 
wartime to replace the barrels.  
Cannelured Rings / Choking 
The 12–inch guns dominated British battleships from the 1890s 
until the commissioning of the Orion Class in 1912. In under a generation, 
British industry produced four separate gun designs of 12–inch bore, each 
increasing in length or calibre.  
                                           







Mark I Cordite had a property of compression within the barrel. 
The compression created an elongation of the barrel, paired with the 
construction technique of having mounting points on the inner ‘A’ tube 
that caused the material to only travel so far before bunching up. This had 
two negative effects. First, it meant that some areas were increasing in bore 
size and therefore the gas check was being lost. Second, the material had to 
go somewhere, and it tended to catch where the shoulder rings were 
located. This meant that guns were choking at areas near the shoulders of 
tubes when wearing, and these chokes were possibly caused by the tubes 
moving. Especially the liners or ‘A’ rings and the outer jackets were moving 
as the gun wore.436 This was made even worse by coppering deposits on the 
copper obturator bands. With the introduction of Cordite MD, this 
phenomenon had ‘ceased to be important’437  
The problem was apparent on the Mark IX and Mark X 12–inch 
guns as well as the Mark X 9.2–inch guns. In 1905, all new Mark X 9.2–
inch guns were to be relined with a new design from the Royal Gun 
Factory for liners, with Vickers designed cannelured rings.438  
In 1906 the Committee recommended, ‘That as the elucidation of 
the question of splitting of inner A tubes and similar problems requires a 
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research department, with the services of an expert trained in a physical 
laboratory, and familiar with the mathematical investigation of elastic 
problems, such a department should be formed without delay. If such a 
department had existed in the past the tendency of certain guns to stretch 
and choke would probably have been detected as an early stage, and much 
subsequent annoyance have been obviated.’439  
After 1907 and into 1908, the use of cannelured rings to strengthen 
the transition between Inner and ‘A’ tubes started to transition to tapered 
tubes, which were harder to make and reline, but seemed to not cause the 
problems that had been the weakness of the Vickers design. This new 
design was created by CSOF (Hay Frederick Donaldson) and was 
approved by the Board in December 1908 for use on the 6–inch Mark 
XI.440 As part of this, Donaldson created a machine that could be carried 
onboard to rerifle the guns in situ. One problem though, was as guns were 
fired, the barrel cycled through hot and cold sessions, and essentially 
annealed the barrel to a much harder steel, which might make the new 
machine unable to cut into a much harder steel.441 
The choking of barrels was discovered in tests in April 1908 to have 
been caused by displacing the shoulder of the ‘A’ tube. The two shoulders 
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became disconnected and then the inner tube apparently stretched. 
Donaldson also stated that the new cannelured rings were not a cure, but a 
‘temporary palliative for the defect.’ The Superintendent, Royal Gun 
Factory, commented that at the choke the molecular structure had not 
changed, and therefore it had occurred down the length of the barrel. He 
believed the steps were ‘a defect in design and the gun would be better 
without them’.442 
In 1909 the theory was put to the full test. Gun No 50, a Firth built 
carbon inner ‘A’ tube 12–inch Mark VIII that had been used in projectile 
proof, was sent back for relining. It had fired an equivalent of 268 13/16 
rounds with only slight indication of choking.443 This was the first gun to fire 
a great deal of rounds after the introduction of cannelured rings. It was 
commented that this particular tube was much harder than its 
predecessors. This was not recommended for further use.444  
The 13.5–inch Mark V Gun 
The 13.5–inch BL Mark V gun that took the Royal Navy into the 
super dreadnought age was one of the most secretive projects conducted in 
the Dreadnought era. The gun was designed with the hope that the 
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Germans would not figure out that the new ships would be carrying 13.5–
inch guns instead of 12–inch guns. The new Orion Class was to begin a 
new era of British naval superiority, and make older Dreadnoughts 
obsolescent. The gun was requested in October 1908 as a 12–inch Design 
A*, and approved in December 1908, with the gun design being given to 
Vickers in February 1909, a full three years before the ships were to be 
launched.445 The gun came about from a meeting between the Director of 
Naval Ordnance and Lt Dawson of Vickers on 20 October 1908, when 
Dawson proposed the idea of a new gun that could be 13, 13.5, or 14–
inches in calibre. Vickers submitted a design on 3 December 1908, of a 
13.5–inch 45 calibre. The real benefit of this new gun, though was that the 
wear rate was much less than that of any of the previous 12–inch guns. The 
secrecy was to be taken so far as to even send all correspondence in double 
enveloped letters marked secret.446  
From the perspective of manufacturing, this was the first capital gun 
could be manufactured by any firm that was willing and able, instead of just 
Vickers and Armstrongs.447 This was due to the way in which patents were 
controlled, and that essentially all of the design came from the Royal Gun 
Factory. The great expansion of technology as well as the political 
                                           









requirements of a larger fleet after 1908 called for a gun larger than the 12–
inch naval guns. 13.5 and 15–inch guns would take on this role in time.  
The navy had essentially already exceeded with its current gun the 
capacities of the calibre. As the 12–inch Mark XII was 50 calibres already, 
any added weight through lengthening the barrel would have been 
extremely problematic for turret and gun balance. Only a few people, 
primarily the President of the Ordnance Board and Reginald Bacon as 
DNO, were to know that the new classes of vessels were to carry the larger 
guns. Importantly, Bacon requested up front designs that would be 
available for general production, and not exclusive to Vickers. The first 
physical evidence of the 13.5-inch is mentioned in an Admiralty file from 
the DNO to Vickers on 22 February 1909 requesting a new drawing.448 
Vickers received an order for an experimental tube to be produced on 25 
February 1909 to design #19788G at a cost of £11,400 and delivered to 
Woolwich, and with a mechanism for £1,250. Delivery was to be nine 
months after the order, or roughly 25 November 1909. It was important to 
proof and test the gun before 31 March so that funds for that fiscal year 
could be used for the new guns, instead of having to wait another year for 
funding. The Admiralty specifically requested the gun’s forgings be made 
of nickel steel, a realization that carbon steel had no purpose on the most 








modern designs. It is unknown if Vickers actually created the nickel steel 
for the prototype, or if it was subcontracted. Vickers subsequently 
submitted a drawing dated June 17, 1909, a full three years before it was 
finally mounted on a ship, and a full year before a vessel that it was 
supposed to arm was laid down.449 In regards to the 15–inch gun the dates 
of the 13.5 are important in understanding the relationship between ship 
and armament design as well as ship and armament building schedules.  
It can be surmised from the experience of the 13.5–inch gun that it 
took industry roughly one year from the release of a requirement to the 
delivery of the first experimental model. It would have then taken at least 
six months for tests to be undertaken at Woolwich and Shoeburyness to 
ascertain the ballistic data needed to make a decision for orders, and 
another nine months for a gun to be delivered to Woolwich from the time 
of the order, and another month of proofing and inspection before it could 
be issued to a vessel.  
It was calculated that the 4–calibre radius could penetrate 12–inches 
of KC armour at 9,300 yards, whereas the 6–calibre could penetrate the 
same at 11,500 yards, but the 4–calibre proved much more accurate at 
12,000 yards. In addition, the gun appeared to wear less than every 
                                           








modern 12–inch gun save the old Mark VIII. The life expectancy of these 
guns was estimated at 450 rounds.450 That in one swift design proved the 
theory of gas speed is a major factor in the wear of a gun. The longer barrel 
wear was directly attributed to the heavier but slower projectile that had the 
same force at distance, although had a much lower muzzle velocity.  
The procurement of Reginald Bacon as director of Coventry 
Ordnance Works certainly seemed a suspicious situation in light of the 
orders for the 13.5–inch guns. Coventry asked for the drawings for the 13.5 
in July 1910, as a likely preclude to bidding on the contract.451 The firm was 
desperate to get a large gun contract, and Bacon was the most well 
informed individual in the Government. This ‘revolving door’ of officers to 
the trade was actually very rare. The only previous experience of such a 
transition was when Trevor Dawson was poached by Vickers in the 
1890s.452  
 The first delivery was made by Vickers in November 1909. Range 
and accuracy tests were carried out on 16 April 1910.453 This meant that 
from concept to proof, the gun took just over 18 months.  
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Previous 13.5-inch Guns 
The Mark V was not the first Royal Navy gun to utilize the 13.5–
inch size. It had been the mainstay in the 1880s and 1890s battleships 
before the introduction of Cordite and the 12–inch Mark VIII. The 
original 13.5–inch Mark I–IV gun fired a 1,250 pound shell, although the 
Mark V used a 1,400 pound shell. The initial design also called for this 
lighter shell, although it was changed in the design process to a heavier 
shell, which gave lower initial muzzle velocity, but more power at a distance 
as well as lower barrel wear.454 After initial tests proved very satisfactory, the 
well wearing Mark V allowed the Director of Naval Ordnance to try to get 
the gun to fire at a higher velocity, and higher accuracy, although the tests 
were not completely successful, leading to the introduction of the 15–inch 
Mark I.455  
The first guns were noted for a problem of bend or droop in them. 
Both Elswick and Vickers were criticized for this.456 Although this problem 
did not last, it was never truly known what caused it, although it did cause 
guns to be assigned as a left or right breech at proof and they remained that 
way throughout their lives, unless they were proofed again.  
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Rifling Tests With 13.5-inch guns 
The Director of Naval Ordnance was the pushing factor in a set of 
experiments in uniform twist versus increased twist, and in a letter to the 
board on 13 October 1910 he stated that this was an urgent decision as it 
might delay the delivery of 13.5–inch guns on order 457 As technology 
matured, there was less flexibility in experiments over the entire fleet, and 
rifling was one of the topics that less work was done on. Experiments were 
conducted for rifling on the new guns with the 9.2–inch Mark X. The gun 
pattern was resealed with a uniform twist instead of the then present service 
increasing twist. This was due to accuracy issues. It was discovered that 
increasing twist in high velocity guns was not as accurate as uniform twist.458 
This discovery led to all British heavy guns to be designed with constant 
twist rifling by 1914.  
Producers of the 13.5s 
For the first time, Beardmore was allotted a gun order with the 
13.5–inch guns. Beardmore suggested a new system of manufacture due to 
their perceived difficulties in building up a 13.5–inch gun with its heavy 
and extensive forgings. They wanted to reproduce the traditional ‘A’ tube 
system with one that was more based on hoops. This new design did not 
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appear to be a full wire wound gun.459 The Ordnance Board interestingly 
did not reject this design outright, and let Beardmore experiment with the 
new technique in their production guns.  
The Ordnance Factories also produced the new guns. Darlington 
Forge produced the inner ‘A’ tube forgings for the Royal Gun Factory to 
build up the 13.5–inch gun, and Brown and Cammell produced the ‘A’ 
tubes. Elswick was also producing inner ‘A’ tubes, along with Vickers.460  
Armstrongs also utilized their Openshaw facilities which produced 
the 13.5–inch gun in 1913. It is not apparent if the tubes were also 
produced at Openshaw, or if they were simply building up the gun with 
tubes manufactured at Elswick and transferred.461 
15–inch Mark I Gun 
Just as the 13.5–inch guns were designed to outclass older 12–inch 
guns, the 15–inch guns were meant to mount on the largest warships afloat, 
the Queen Elizabeth Class. The 15–inch gun appeared to have come out 
of nowhere in 1913. Elswick was tasked to build up a gun, which fired test 
shells by 5 September 1913. Vickers had also submitted a gun. The 
Vickers gun had irregular rifling and it was thought it would wear unevenly. 
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462 This would have been well after the Queen Elizabeth Class were laid 
down, 21 October 1912, and about the time they were launched, 16 
October 1913, for the Queen Elizabeth herself.  
Although the gun was essentially an oversized version of the 13.5–
inch Mark Vs it superseded, it was not without problems. A meeting on 31 
July 1914 showed that the most pressing matter at the Ordnance Board was 
a Vickers built 15–inch gun that had been made larger in the barrel due to 
a tool breaking. This gun would not be proofed until 9 November 1914.463 
It is significant that, as the world was about to be engulfed in war, the 
technical heads at Whitehall were worried about toolmarks. It showed that 
the failure of manufacturing had the ability to greatly affect the readiness of 
the Royal Navy. It also showed that seemingly small errors could have 
delayed, and possibly robbed Britain of its newest warship in the decisive 
battle.  
As was normal with all new guns, experiments on the pressures 
involved in a 15–inch gun were conducted in January 1914. It should be 
noted that the results not forwarded to the Ordnance Board until July 31 
1914. The experiment used a 1,920 pound projectile in a 15–inch Mark I. 
The temperature of the powder was 80 degrees Fahrenheit, with MD size 
45. Round 1 used 390 pounds of powder with a velocity of 2,405 feet per 
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second at 19.3 tons, whereas round 3 used 448 pounds of powder, with a 
muzzle velocity of 2,621, at 25 tons pressure.464 This is significant as it 
showed that by 1914 the testing of overproof was well in force. 25 tons was 
well in excess of 18 tons working pressure, and even in excess of the 
experimental work done almost a decade before. In comparison, the 13.5–
inch Mark Vs were to be proofed at 20 tons.465 The decision to lower 
working pressure seemed to have been proven as a wise decision by 
looking at the results of the test. The increased pressure, which would have 
probably shortened the life of the gun by half, only increased the velocity 
of the gun by roughly 200 feet per second in a new gun. This difference 
would have diminished as the gun wore.    
9.2–inch guns 
The 9.2–inch guns were the mainstay of British naval ships below 
battleship grade as well as being the primary armament of coastal defences. 
These guns evolved within this context. They were not nearly as powerful 
as heavy main guns, but they did not have to be, and being much lighter 
overall, were able to be used on a wide variety of platforms. The evolutions 
of the 9.2–inch guns were the evolution of guns in microcosm.  
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The Director of Naval Ordnance asked on 21 October 1902 for two 
new designs, a 50 calibre version of both the 7.5–inch and a 9.2–inch gun. 
Requests were sent out to the trade to make the most powerful 50–calibre 
guns without exceeding 50 calibres, and not exceeding 20 tons pressure 
with Cordite MD.466 As the smallest ‘main gun’ issued to large navy ships, 
the 9.2 was often considered an experimental platform with large returns, 
without large costs. This experiments was part of that case. The submitted 
9.2–inch guns were marginal at best. Vickers submitted a design that did 
not meet the specification for travel of the projectile length.467 Eventually, 
the Elswick design was chosen as the best for purpose, and they were asked 
to make the final proof gun.468  
The design boffins at the Royal Gun Factory had taken the old 
designs for 50 calibre 9.2–inch guns and tweaked them so that they were 
either massively strengthened and stiffened, or easier to build. The latter 
was done through Royal Gun Factory design No 11,220 according to which 
the wire was wound on a tapered ‘A’ tube which made the need for 
complicated fastening wire rings unnecessary. 469  
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Cordite also shortened these guns to a very short life. The life of a 
Mark X 9.2–inch gun was 125 rounds.470 Manufacturing defects that caused 
cracking could shorten that to 74, as with gun 275. In addition, 9.2–inch 
Mark X guns had a problem of drooping, and a 13 August 1906 report 
from GOC Portsmouth showed that every gun under his command in the 
Portsmouth defences had had a droop appear, all 20 guns. Also as with the 
larger guns, 9.2–inch guns also had problems with artificially excessive 
wear. Two Portsmouth coastal defence based 9.2–inch Mark X guns had 
been found to be choked after 30 rounds. The Chief Superintendent, 
Ordnance Factories offered three solutions: One, borrow the lapping 
machine from the Navy, which would require finding 65 volts in a land 
establishment (a difficulty); two, make a land service machine; or three, 
dismount and send the guns to Woolwich.471  
1908 Tests 
All 9.2–inch Mark X guns were inspected in 1908, with a report 
being made to the Ordnance Board on 28 April 1908. Of 233 guns 
inspected, eight had been relined, four due to wear, two in flaws, and two 
in cracks. The guns varied in life from nine rounds to 213, but most had 
fired less than 40. ‘The wire tensions were extremely ambiguous; no 
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drawing appeared to have existed to govern this operation. Each maker 
had worked on individual theories which were unrecorded.472 
The guns that had choked failed at the second ring, although rarely 
at the first or third, unless the second had already failed. Elswick after 
reading the report commented that they believed a thicker inner ‘A’ tube 
was required to fix the situation.473  
Even when guns did fire in their prime, a 9.2–inch Mark X gun had 
a mean error of 60.5 yards at 8,200 yards.474 Although much better than the 
12–inch guns, any cruiser engaged at what was seemingly full range could 
easily overshoot the target. This demonstrated that even the most 
controlled experiments contained a large amount of error that could affect 
the effectiveness of a fleet simply by chance.  
 
Experimental 10s  
The 10–inch guns were seen as the natural follow–on to the 9.2–
inch guns that had reached the end of their development life by 1905. On 
13 November 1901 the Director of Naval Ordnance asked for a new 
design for 10–inch guns to be authorized, ‘and asked for suggestions as to 
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the details that should be laid down to govern construction.’ The gun was 
designed to compete with the new American designs and mounted twin 
turrets on armoured cruisers. The Director of Naval Ordnance believed 
that the 10–inch guns could, if it be made light enough, replace the 9.2–
inch as the general purpose weapon. The goal was to achieve 3000 feet per 
second in muzzle velocity. The gun was also to be designed to take the 
follow–on propellant to cordite, which had yet to be created. The 
committee believed that to satisfy the Key Performance Parameters the gun 
would either have to have an increase in muzzle and breech pressure, or an 
increase in calibre to achieve the stated goals with the current Cordite 
charge.475 
The Chief Superintendent, Ordnance Factories, submitted a plan 
for a new and more powerful 10–inch gun, stating that it was currently 
impossible to produce to the original specification of 3,000 feet per second 
muzzle velocity as well as moderate weight and 500–pound projectile. He 
stated that he could get the gun up to 2,800 feet per second with the use of 
18 tons per square inch. This could be achieved with 145 pound of 
Cordite. The Ordnance Factories proof officer calculated that to achieve 
the desired velocity, the gun would have to weigh 47 tons, 15 cwt, 1 qrs. 
and use 238 pounds of Cordite, compared to 31 tons and 2,800 feet per 
                                           







second with 142 pounds Cordite as proposed. Armstrongs was requested 
to build a gun to a medium specification between the two extremes of 
weight and pressure476  
As part of the research and design phase, the obsolete battleship 
Revenge was given 10–inch sleeves for her 13.5–inch Mark III guns. These 
were for range table practice. This would make a 30 calibre gun into a 40.5 
calibre gun theoretically.477 
A ‘New and More Powerful 10–inch BL Gun’ was designed as a 
replacement to the venerable 9.2–inch guns of cruisers. This increase in 
size would allow a 500–pound projectile, replacing the 380 pound 
projectile of the 9.2. The gun, proposed by Elswick, would be able to more 
efficiently deliver projectiles than the previous gun, without having the 
weight of the 12–inch battleship guns. The gun itself was too heavy as a 
true replacement, and as the Chief Inspector Woolwich did not see 
enough of an improvement over current guns, he decided to retire the 
design without a physical copy being made. This caused a redesign to the 
older 9.2–inch guns to create the 9.2–inch 50 calibre gun.478  
In an unusual case, in December 1906 the sealed drawings for the 
Elswick designed 10–inch Mark V 50 calibre gun were unsealed as the gun 
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had never been ordered since being sealed in 1903, and that it did not 
incorporate the new technology. This is interesting because it shows that in 
just three years guns became obsolescent, a huge demonstration of how fast 
technology moved. This gun had been intended to be first used for a refit 
of HMS Renown, which was built in 1895. The ever–increasing speeds of 
fleets meant that this ship was simply too obsolete to economically rebuild, 
as the Admiralty had moved away from the concepts of rebuilding ships, 
and started building ships new. This cost this particular design its only 
known possible mounting.479 The concept of the armoured cruiser, along 
with the 10–inch gun had died with the invention of the battlecruiser.  
The 7.5–inch guns 
The 7.5–inch gun was the primary secondary armament on British 
capital ships in the period under study. They were much more powerful 
than the 6–inch guns that were discussed earlier, and were used primarily 
in cases where the increased weight over the 6–inch guns was not a priority.  
The very first 7.5–inch gun came with the 1901 approval of Vickers 
design number 1,388 G, accepted as the 7.5–inch Mark I gun. The 
Director of Naval Ordnance requested no delay in producing the gun by 
waiting for proof and trials. It was approved of the Vickers plan with 
                                           







approved modifications. The rifling plan was delayed until after trials, but 
everything else was drawn up. It would take another seven months for the 
gun to be trialled and the final specification to be produced for rifling. In 
the end, it took almost 12 months from the time the gun had been first 
delivered in a drawing sufficient for tooling until the gun was proofed. 480  
The 7.5–inch Mark I had poor accuracy. It was discovered that the 
cause of this was the driving bands on shells. The copper band was 
removed and a cupronickel band replaced it. This made the gun much 
more accurate.481 
Vickers and Armstrongs were asked to make a 50-calibre version 
based upon the design of the 45–calibre accepted design. This design was, 
like most 50-calibre wire wound designs, not acceptable operationally. The 
50 calibre gun outperformed the 45–calibre gun with muzzle velocities of 
3,090 feet per second versus 2,902. The increase in velocity for the weight 
penalty of another 5 calibres in length was not seen as worth the trade–off. 
The final program cancellation came when the gun was declared 
unserviceable due to ‘serious cracks’482 
The 7.5–inch Mark I was weak at the muzzle, so it was given a 
stronger jacket at the breech to remedy this. This was also incorporated 
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into the Mark II, a 50 calibre version that improved upon the previous 
attempt483  
The 7.5–inch Mark II gun demonstrated an inherent weakness that 
many in the industry did not want to discuss. ‘While all English guns, 
whether made in the OF, Elswick, or by the VM Co, are constructed on 
precisely the same principles, the EO Co prefer, when left free to do so, to 
shrink the outer over the inner ‘A’ tube, at the same time using much 
thicker outer tubes, especially at the breech end, than are the tubes used in 
the Government design’.484 This had a direct effect on accuracy, which 
appears to be a reason why Elswick guns seem, inherently, to have been 
more accurate than the others, as the shell had less chance of movement 
within the barrel at unsupported parts. This principle was also put to the 
test with the army’s long range heavy field piece, the 60–pr.  
The 7.5–inch gun became the centre of a challenge to the traditional 
wire wound British design by the middle of the first decade of the century. 
There was a belief within industry and the services that high velocity guns 
that were fully wired to the end were less accurate. This was believed to be 
due to the rigidity of the wire to the barrel. The tests for new wiring designs 
for heavy guns requested in 1904 came back in March 1906. The results of 
tests conducted on the 7.5–inch gun that was not fully wired were not 
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conclusive enough to justify redesigning the 9.2–inch and 12–inch guns.485 
Oddly, the argument for full, wire wound guns occurred when a 7.5–inch 
gun that had developed a twist in 1905 had fired subsequently two proof, 
148 full, 59 three–quarter, and 26 half charges, without developing any 
more twist, and without impairing the accuracy of the barrel.486 This meant 
that the problem with the Vickers step issues at least in the 7.5–inch guns 
was not greatly affecting the overall life of the tube, which did not require 
immediate relining. It also in some regards proved the purpose of wire 
wound guns.  
Nonetheless, problems with the new 7.5–inch guns were appearing 
in service. HMS Carnarvon had been completed in 1905, yet by 1906 her 
7.5–inch guns had started to droop. CNC Malta stated the gun was bent 
2.5 minutes down and 2.5 minutes right in 41 ¾ shots.487 This excessive 
distortion was part of a trend in the new high velocity guns, which after 
firing just a few shots started to droop. The remedy was never stated, 
although a similar issue with the 18–prs was fixed by redesigning the guide 
rods in the carriage to increase the support.  
Swiftsure, commissioned in 1903, had two nickel steel made 7.5–
inch Mark I guns on board when commissioned. These were probably the 
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experimental nickel steel guns ordered as the first British order of nickel 
guns. The guns by August 1908 had fired 58 and 63 rounds respectively. 
The guns showed good wear, and ‘the wear was certainly not greater that 
‘that which would be expected with carbon steel’. The guns were made of 3 
per cent nickel, or the old S/20 specification also used on the original Mark 
I 18–prs.488  
The 7.5–inch guns were, due to their high muzzle velocity, regularly 
tested. 67 7.5–inch Marks I and II, were examined after one split its inner 
‘A’ tube. Two had fired 280 rounds, but most had fired under 40. Of the 
guns made to May 1908, Vickers was the only company that had problems 
with cracked guns under their manufacture.489 In this time period this 
probably had more to do with their insistence on not using nickel steel 
whilst all other manufacturers had transferred to the new material as 
discussed in chapter five 
14–inch Mark I  
HMS Canada was the only ship in the British battlefleet that had 14–
inch guns. This was due to the vessel being built by Armstrongs for the 
Chilean Navy as Almirante Latorre. The 14–inch gun was designed to fire 
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a 1,586 pound projectile. The vessel was purchased after the outbreak of 
hostilities, although before the war, several comments were passed to the 
Ordnance Board on her construction. Canada and her 14–inch guns were 
to have an experiment conducted as called for on 17 November 1914, 
although Canada had still not completed outfit. Her guns were not proofed 
until 16 December 1914, showing the lack of knowledge with this calibre.490  
Conclusion 
The evolution and development of individual gun Marks for heavy 
artillery demonstrate why certain paths were chosen. The ability of 
seemingly small problems forced designs through the entire period. Also, 
this chapter demonstrates the quick evolution, especially for main 
armament of the Royal Navy battle fleet. Issues with cordite, barrel life, 
manufacturing, and the simple nature of the environment in which they 
would be used drove design in a way that is often difficult to understand. 
The next chapter will follow on with this theme but with smaller field based 
artillery.   
  
                                           







CHAPTER EIGHT: THE ARMY SUPPLY CHAIN 
Introduction 
The Army had very different issues with the supply chain. In general 
the Army bought more numerous and smaller pieces compared to its naval 
counterpart. This characteristic, along with the army’s possible need in war, 
for much greater mobilization, had the effect of commanding industrial 
policy through their orders for an extent that some might consider 
disproportionate to their vote power.  
The army entered the 20th century with the quickfiring 15–pr Mark I 
as the primary field gun of the Royal Artillery. A great number of 
experiments were conducted on it before deciding in 1902 for a new 
competition.491 This competition eventually arrived at the 13–pr and the 
18–pr for the Royal Horse and Field Artillery respectively as discussed in 
detail in Chapter Four. Many experiments were conducted before then, 
however. In 1901 the committee worked with new 4–inch breechloading 
guns, to test cased shot or separate shot. This experiment created the 
mindset that the uncased shell, i.e., powder not encased in a brass, was 
always the best. In this competition, the Vickers design failed, and 
Armstrong’s was accepted, with a redesigned ‘A’ tube.492  
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Many of the post–award problems that caused the introduction of 
the 18–pr Mark II occurred from 1906 onwards. The measurement of all 
13 and 18–pr guns after the 1907 summer exercises showed all guns within 
the range of acceptability. This was after a summer of gun failures as 
mentioned in Chapter Three. A redesign of the 18–pr was called for soon 
after deliveries of the Mark I occurred. This new Mark II 18–pr gun was a 
direct product of tubes bending in the first year of use. The first order for 
the new guns occurred in November1909 with the Canadian order for 18–
prs to outfit the Canadian forces.493  
The 4.5–inch Howitzer 
The new Experimental Field Howitzer project was commissioned in 
1901. The howitzer was defined originally to be used up to 7,000 yards. 
British engineers were fascinated with the 4.7–inch (120–mm) Boer 
howitzer with its 34–pound shell that was captured in South Africa. It was 
made by Krupp and outclassed much of what the Britain could field, and 
with a 34–pound shell only.494 It was with this motivation that the temporary 
Howitzer Committee took up their work.  
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In general, the committee studied increases in range more than 
increases in power. The 5–inch howitzer was worked on from 1900 to 
1902 to increase its range. This was done by lowering the weight of 
projectile from 50 to 40 pounds, which gave an increase in range of 1,200 
yards. This increase still only gave accurate delivery to 6,000 yards. With 
the failure to meet the technical parameters, the program was cancelled.  
The project was dropped when it was apparent that the new Royal 
Horse and Field Artillery would take up the majority of any budget, as well 
as manufacturer designs not meeting the Government’s accuracy 
requirements.495 It was it until 1907 that interest again appeared for a field 
howitzer. There was not a qualitative enough jump yet in technology to 
allow for such public expenditure in re–outfitting. The range of the 5–inch 
howitzer meant that, to hit a trench, it would have to be within the range of 
every field gun in Europe, and thus it has to be assumed that this weapon 
would only be for use outside Europe, against non–modern equipped 
forces.496  
Initially, the War Office saw the project as being able to increase the 
supply base, after Coventry was successful in winning 18–pr orders. In this 
procurement, Coventry submitted the 4.5–inch howitzer, Vickers 
submitted a 4.33–inch howitzer and Elswick submitted a 4.7–inch 
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howitzer, and the Royal Gun Factory submitted a 5–inch howitzer.497 The 
Howitzer Committee preferred designs from the Royal Gun Factory, 
Elswick, and Vickers for a new field howitzer, and rejected proposals from 
Cammell and Beardmore, and only liked the breech from Brown’s. Oddly, 
a later submitted modified design from Coventry was accepted. This seems 
in violation of normal procurement rules. In the 1907 testing phase, the 
4.5–inch howitzer programme the Coventry designed howitzer won. The 
design, though after being submitted to the Royal Gun Factory, was 
recommended to be modified for manufacture due to the extreme 
difficulty of producing the piece to the tolerances as designed by Coventry. 
The attachment of the jacket was the primary culprit.498 This howitzer, and 
its difficult design was a perpetual difficulty through 1917.  
The operational testing of the 4.5–inch howitzer was uniquely 
striking in the damage that could be achieved by a Lyddite shell on 
hardened targets. The howitzer in testing in November, 1908 was able to 
destroy bombproofs at 6,000 yards. This capacity showed first the 
development of high explosive since 1902, and second, the quick 
development of fuzing for the said shells that made the battlefield much 
more dangerous.499  
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Evolution from 4.7–inch guns 
The 4.7–inch gun had been the mainstay of British long range field 
artillery in the Boer War. The gun gained a reputation in the popular press 
as being a lifesaver for British forces, although the technical staffs knew it as 
an obsolescent liability that needed to be replaced. The project that 
replaced it was the 60–pr gun.  
A new 4.7–inch gun had been testing for many years and was being 
developed in 1904. This was to replace the 4.7 Marks I–IV of 2,175 feet 
per second muzzle velocity by one of 2,744 with MD Cordite and 45 
calibres. This project became the basis of the procurement of the 60–pr. 
The problem in this particular gun was that the driving band could not be 
made strong enough to keep the projectile accurate without exceeding 
working pressure.500 A 4.7–inch gun in 45 calibres, especially when being 
designed for India, would have been an exceedingly heavy gun. The 40–
calibre variants were used by the Royal Navy in South Africa, and coastal 
batteries. Trials of new rifling of the 4.7–inch gun were based upon 
experiences gained with the 6–inch Mark VII.501 
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The 60–pr gun 
Lord Roberts, the Commanding General in South Africa, submitted 
a request in September 1900 for heavy batteries for use in South Africa. 
The ensuing request for 5–inch guns in lieu of the standard 4.7s was 
probably the genesis for the 60–pr programme. His request was for a range 
of 10,000 yards, with a weight no more than 80 cwt for the entire gun, 
carriage, and limber, and as large a shell as possible. This was believed to 
be a difficult task of accuracy at long distance with shrapnel as well as short 
range targeting. All three manufacturers were asked to submit plans, with 
Chief Superintendent, Ordnance Factories and Elswick submitting the 
heaviest guns at 39.5 cwt and Vickers with 36 cwt. The Vickers gun was the 
smallest in weight and length.502  
Essentially, the 60–pr was a long range version of the 18–pr. It was 
to deliver shrapnel to 10,000 yards, 4,000 yards further than the 18–pr. was 
designed to do.503 The 60–pr gun program was a disappointment for 
Vickers, who failed to impress. Elswick produced a good product which 
was accepted. The munitions were also selected from the Elswick 
submission. Vickers produced a 5–inch BL gun that did not meet the 
company’s promises, as well as not meeting specification. It was 
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constructed with ‘curious’ functions, which appeared to not be a positive 
feature, and failed the tests at Salisbury.504  
Two days after Christmas in 1906, the Chief Superintendent, 
Ordnance Factories remarked that the German designed Erhardt Howitzer 
of 12 cm was very competitive against the 60–pr when it came to weight. 
The howitzer weighed 24 cwt. in the field, whereas the 60–pr weighted 91 
cwt, and only gained a 15 pound projectile weight and less than 3,000 yards 
in range. He believed both were necessary, and that South Africa proved 
the viability of two separate weapons, but he did start obviously thinking 
about the possibilities.505  
As part of the success of the 60–pr for field use, on 15 January 1914 
the Director of Naval Ordnance asked for a new naval service 5–inch (60–
pr) with quickfiring ammunition and a sliding block mechanism. The 
Royal Gun Factory, Vickers, Beardmore, Elswick, and Coventry all 
submitted designs.506 The Royal Gun Factory, Beardmore, and one of the 
Vickers designs were selected for trials.507 The war would put this 
procurement on hold, and it appears to have been dropped by the time it 
could be implemented.   
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The heavy howitzers and guns made up the siege train of the army. 
This was designed to crush fortifications, but it took time, often days or 
weeks, to bring up. As it was a specialist artillery, little time or money was 
actually spent on it, although the experiments that were conducted were 
some of the most important in the pre–war period. By 1914 Britain went 
to war with a haphazard array of weapons listed below in a diverse state of 
readiness and obsolescence.  
9.2–inch Siege Gun 
The first requirements for a long range piece in the field came from 
the Director General of Ordnance (the predecessor position of the Master 
General of Ordnance) on 20 February 1901. He requested a new 
requirement coming directly from gunners in South Africa for high angle 
guns with a range of about 15,000 yards. He requested the Ordnance 
Committee should look at any current guns to fit this requirement although 
it was desirable to have these made out of 9.2–inch guns. The Ordnance 
Committee responded that the 9.2 Marks III to VII would comply with the 
requirement. The selected guns had three ways to get the key parameter 







muzzle velocity (and therefore range) needed. First, they should have a full 
charge and an angle of descent of 39.5 and elevation of 26 degrees. 
Second, they could also achieve an angle of elevation theoretically of 60 
degrees and 80 degrees descent, essentially plunging fire, although such a 
carriage would be an engineering marvel if even possible. Thirdly, the 
committee stated that a ¾ charge could theoretically give a muzzle velocity 
of 1,660 feet per second, and an angle of 45 degrees, with descent being 56 
degrees. The committee asked what the final use was for this system, to 
which the Director General of Ordnance responded that ‘These guns were 
specifically required for use against batteries placed behind hills or 
concealed in folds of ground. They would not be required for ranges of 
less than 6000 yards.’ 508 
In the research phase, designs for a 9.2 inch arcing shot gun, which 
took an old gun and remounted it to 45 degrees, (which gave between 
9,000 and 15000 yards calculated range), dropped it at 56 degrees, as the 
requirement called for low velocity, high angle.509 
Major Minchin, the Army’s rifling and mathematics expert, 
conducted rifling experiments on these new high–velocity guns in 1902 and 
concluded that the uniform rifling was just as accurate, if not more, than 
                                           
508 SUPP 6/60. Annual reports of the president. 1901. 41–42. 







experimental and new increasing rifling.510 This sort of rifling did not have a 
uniform pitch, although it increased in angle as the rifling approached the 
muzzle. The guns achieved thorough results at 5,695 yard range with 8 ¾ 
pounds powder at 35 degrees, and 5,942 at 45 degrees, and 14,489 yards 
with 37 pounds powder at 35 degrees and 14,950 at 45 degrees. The guns 
were wildly inaccurate at full charge, with an error of 274 yards in range, 
but only a 9.6 yard error in direction. The gun was deemed too inaccurate 
in its current rifling pattern, and was rebored and rifled with a design 
designed for high angle fire. This new bore found much better results, 
achieving a 5,949 yard range with 8 ¾ pounds powder at 40 degrees and 
6,022 at 45 degrees, and 15,226 yards with 37 pounds powder at 35 
degrees and 16,140 at 45 degrees. The guns were wildly inaccurate at full 
charge, with an error of 72 yards in range, but a 28.22 yard error in 
direction. In addition to tweaking the rifling, a new shell was also tried. The 
3.8 calibre service shell was part of the cause of the inaccuracy. It was tried 
again with a shorter 3.1 calibre shell with more success.511 
Although artillery, especially siege and naval artillery, involved 
cutting edge engineering, users were not afraid of using simple techniques 
that worked, and the 9.2–inch gun demonstrated this brilliantly in a 
dialogue with the Ordnance Committee. The testers at Shoeburyness 
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discovered that the shell was sliding out of the gun at high angles, so the 
shell had to be held in the barrel with a stick. ‘It was found at 
Shoeburyness that when loading at high angles of elevation the projectile 
slipped back into the chamber when the rammer was withdrawn, and to 
prevent this a stick was employed’, and ‘They asked the Superintendent of 
Experiments, Shoeburyness, whether he saw any objection to the use of the 
stick, especially in view of the fact that the cartridge would have to be made 
up of several portions’, to which the reply ‘The Superintendent of 
Experiments saw no objection’512 was given.  
The high velocity 9.2–inch gun was finally deployed in 1903. It was 
sent to Gibraltar for deployment. The gun worked best with a 35 degree 
firing solution and a 288–pound shell of Lyddite.513 
The eventual successor would take over a decade to emerge, and 
would not even take the form of a gun, but that of a howitzer. The results 
of a solicitation for the new 9.2–inch howitzer were sent to the Ordnance 
Factories, Elswick, Vickers, Coventry, and Beardmore on 31 October 
1910, resulting in the Board accepting the OF as the most likely solution. 
The requirements were: 10,000 yard range, 3.5 calibre length shell, burster 
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of 55 pounds, 11 ounces, and Cordite MD.514 The final result, started a 
decade earlier would be the go–to Army level gun on the Western Front.  
9.45–inch Skoda Howitzer 
The Czech arms firm Skoda sold the British Government at least 
four 24 cm Mörser M 98 howitzers, which were subsequently renamed 
9.45–inch Howitzers in British service. Unlike almost all other ordnance 
buys near the Boer War, the wealth of evidence was that Vickers bought 
the forgings directly from Skoda, and then sold them on to the British 
government. There was a problem though in this arrangement. The 
forgings did not contain the requisite chemical composition and it appears 
that Vickers were not completely trustworthy in their fronting of the 
requisite clauses to make sure that the foreign made forgings were in 
compliance with British inspection regulations. The forgings were rejected 
and all other work suspended. All guns already built were to be chemically 
tested. This experience, along with others that are not mentioned in the 
detailed report might have led to the limiting of metals and forgings from 
outside the UK, one of the key testing points in British forgings between 
                                           







1900 and 1914.515 Skoda forgings brought about the double testing of steel, 
both mechanically and chemically.516  
The 9.45–inch howitzer had development problems due primarily 
to it having a working pressure of 13 tons, which gave 928 feet per second 
in muzzle velocity, about half the speed of a contemporary British gun. 
Shells were filled with ‘dynamo’, which was more stable than Lyddite, and 
the shells as such could be treated as filled with powder.517 This would have 
also limited the effectiveness of the howitzer.  
After the defects of the Skoda built 9.45–inch howitzers were made 
known, a new 8.5–inch howitzer project was started. The specification was 
to have a muzzle velocity of 1,150–1,200 feet per second, a range of up to 
10,000 yards, and a 300 pound projectile. The requirement was taken up 
by the Royal Gun Factory and was in the works at the end of 1902. 518 
A 9.45–inch howitzer was being built, weighed 5 ½ tons for gun and 
gun limber, and by the summer of 1908 was doing road tests with a traction 
engine to North Wales from Dover.519 Tests at Lydd were conducted to 
determine what happened to fortifications when a high explosive shell was 
fired at them, mainly the effects of splintering and the goal of bettering gun 
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emplacements, but also much was learned on how to conduct 
bombardments. Tests used 6 and 9.2–inch shell.520 These tests conducted 
on the 9.45–inch affected both the 9.5–inch and the 9.2–inch howitzer 
projects. 
Although not operationally a success, the 9.45–inch howitzer was a success 
in tightening bureaucracy and contract clauses. Due to its failure, the 
introduction of chemical tests on forgings helped bring about a revolution 
in steel that ended with the introduction of the nickel steel specification. It 
also laid the ground work for the heavy howitzers that would be needed in 
the next war.  
8.5–inch Howitzer 
The Ordnance Committee wanted a heavy howitzer that had both 
the range and firepower to attack fortified targets. This was very much to 
be taken from the experiences of South Africa. One model was an 8.5–
inch Howitzer, of which one was created. The results of the 8.5–inch 
howitzer road tests demonstrated that it was too heavy for all but the most 
‘sound’ roads, and even then it was difficult. The design was all but thrown 
out after the test as a completely new carriage would be required. The 
Skoda howitzer weighed almost half as much, and the new howitzer was 
                                           







even more awkward than the 8–inch already in service. It is very likely that 
the failure of this 8.5–inch howitzer, started the basis of development for 
the 9.2–inch howitzer.521 
9.2–inch Howitzer 
The 9.2–inch howitzer was started through the merging of several 
needs for which several weapons had been experimented with though none 
had been adopted for production. One of these was a new 9.75–inch heavy 
howitzer being proposed in 1906. On 13 January 1906 Vickers submitted a 
design for the heavy howitzer competition, but it was rejected, with 
Coventry, Beardmore, and Brown being selected for trials of design.522 
Although the 9.75 had been authorized, it did not appear to have a single 
copy made, although it was important as the winning design was the first 
heavy howitzer to have the Royal Gun Factory design being made out of 
nickel steel.523  
The next step was on 30 March 1910 when the Director of Artillery 
sent out letters to Elswick, Coventry, Beardmore, Vickers, and the 
Ordnance Factory for a proposed design and specification for a new heavy 
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siege howitzer.524 A design committee was formed to work on a new heavy 
howitzer. This would be a 9.2–inch howitzer, with ranges from 2,500 to not 
less than 10,000 yards. It was to have a 290 pound shell minimum, 60 
degree traverse, and a simple design that could withstand rugged terrain.525 
Elswick, Brown, Coventry, Beardmore, Vickers, and Royal Gun Factory all 
submitted designs for the heavy howitzer.526 The winner of these 
experiments was still in the testing phase in 1914 when war broke out. The 
prototype, ‘Mother’, was sent to France, and now resides in the Imperial 
War Museum. 
6–inch Howitzers 
In 1901 tests of the 6–inch 30 cwt howitzer were conducted to 
lighten the shell from 122.5 to 100 pounds. It was found that the lightening 
of the shell afforded a range increase from 5,000 yards to 7,310. It was also 
found that the error in range was 168.8 yards, at 45 degrees, making it not 
a terribly accurate weapon. The 100 pound shell was not as accurate as the 
standard shell, but at 28 and 36 degrees, the accuracies were within a 
satisfactory range. The tests results were found to be acceptable, and the 
service charge of 100 pounds was accepted by the Director General of 
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Ordnance.527 No orders are listed in the contract books from 1900–1914 
for this howitzer either with the Trade or at Woolwich. The accuracy 
issues were probably a primary reason why it did not receive investment 
and by 1914 was obsolescent compared to other siege armaments.  
Railway Guns 
Railway guns were considered one aspect of the heavy siege train. 
The Ordnance Committee tried to mount a 6–inch howitzer in 1902 to a 
railway carriage, although this effort was abandoned. The 6–inch railway 
trials were reopened although they were going slowly, mainly because it was 
believed that a 6–inch gun was too energetic for the tracks, and 4.7 and 60–
pr guns were suggested instead. Logistically, it was thought undesirable to 
shut down rail lines to fire guns, and that they would have to have their own 
sidings. There are reports in the next chapter that this was due to railway 
guns using a track 1–inch wider than the normal Western European 
standard gauge.  
The development of the 6–inch guns was interesting as these were 
not for home defence and the customer was different from in most other 
operations. The General Staff did not comment on the project, which in 
                                           







itself is a comment on how effective those outside the technical field saw 
railway guns.528  
In the end, the 6–inch railway gun tests were a failure as the 60–pr 
made it obsolescent, but the Committee suggested continuing work for 
mountings of 7.5 and 9.2–inch railway guns.529 Elswick designed railway 
mountings for 9.2–inch guns that were submitted to the Director of 
Artillery who forwarded them on 27 August 1914. These apparently were 
to mount spare proof and evaluation guns.530 In addition, the 12–inch 
howitzers to be mounted on railway carriages were to use a 750–pound 
high explosive (TNT) shell versus the service 850 shell.531 The heyday of 
railway artillery would have to wait for more funding that was a direct result 
of warfare.  
Conclusion 
The experimentation and development of ordnance in the period 
from 1900 to 1914 demonstrated a constant cycle of improvement based 
upon scientific principles and a willingness to adapt new materials and 
processes. Naval guns almost doubled in size over the period, while the 
army’s guns increased in range and power. The service which was pinned 
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down by Boer artillery at the start of the period had substantially increased 
its holdings of long range artillery, even going as far as to take guns that had 
once been reserved for siege trains and adapting them for new uses. The 
period also demonstrated several great examples of how interservice 
synergy was used to create guns that incorporated lessons learned from the 
other service. All of the experimentation and redesign built up an 
infrastructure that ensured that British ordnance was well designed, safe, 
and was effective on the whole. It also produced a vast amount of 
knowledge for both industry and the services about how guns could be 
modified for the best manufacturing techniques. The guns that equipped 
the British armed forces in 1914 were the product of experience, 
experiments, and evolution. They shaped the services, and drove how the 










CHAPTER NINE: INITIAL MOBILIZATION: THE OUTBREAK 
OF WAR THROUGH THE END OF 1914 
Introduction  
War arrived in Europe on 28 July 1914. The United Kingdom did 
not declare war until 4 August 1914. The British, like all entering the war, 
did not know the scope or duration of the conflict. This point must be 
constantly reinforced if we are going to analyse the decisions made and 
when they were made. This is especially important in contracts, as they are 
a product of a particular time, need, and availability, or perceived 
availability.  
This chapter will discuss the events from the declaration of war for 
the British government through the end of 1914. It will focus on the 
immediate response to a system shocked by not only war, but also the new 
issues of industrial conflict including a degraded workforce depleted by 
military recruitment, increased industrial demand, and the opening of 
governmental funding. It will work through the first months of uncertainty, 
and the contracts that were placed by the end of the year for the initial 







The Government Staff  
Contracts, procurement, and acquisitions were and are inherently 
based upon human interactions. Without staffs, contracts are not written, 
and such was the case for the British Government in August 1914. The 
civil financial staffs, the uniformed officers in technical roles, and their 
suppliers were leaders of mobilisation on the outbreak of war.  
The business of finding the armaments to take the country to war 
did not lie in the hands of the Generals and Admirals. In many ways, they 
also did not lie with the politicians who declared war to begin with. The 
single group that was issued the task were a select few individuals in 
Whitehall. The civil staffs had always dominated procurement, in 
peacetime and wartime. Partly due to their permanent assignments, they 
were ideally suited to take jobs where consistency and experience were 
paramount.  
The War Office 
The organization of those who dealt with the issues of payment and 
contracts were all focused under the Financial Secretary of the War Office. 
The position had existed in its current guise since the creation of the Army 







Parliament (MP), the day to day work of the office was run by his assistant, 
Sir Charles Harris.  
Sir Charles Harris, as the Assistant Financial Secretary to the War 
Office was the professional civil servant who was the institutional memory 
of the department. Since 1908 Harris had led the War Office’s financial 
affairs, through three political Financial Secretaries.532 Harris was charged 
with managing the civil staffs of the office that built and executed the 
estimates and votes of the War Office. His primary qualification before 
entering the position was that of the chief financial auditor of War Office 
votes, and yearly he led the audit of the Royal Factories. He knew the 
business of finance, but also the business of ordnance, as he had worked 
closely with the Chief Superintendent of Ordnance Factories, Hay 
Frederick Donaldson regularly.  
Harris had three primary staffs under him that executed the business 
of the Financial Secretary, the Director of Army Accounts, the Director of 
Contracts, and the Director of Financial Services. Each of these positions 
was a long–standing bureau within the War Office, and without them, 
nothing happened. That set these three particular positions apart from 
much of the bureaucracy surrounding ordnance. These men had long 
service contracts and had grown up in the system of clerks, most likely 
                                           







requiring a tour as a second–class clerk, before becoming a first class clerk, 
and eventually being a Principal before taking leadership.  
JA Flynn, Esq CB, occupied the office of Director of Army 
Accounts since January 1905, when the position was created along with the 
Army Council.533 Unfortunately, there is little known about Mr Flynn, as he 
did not leave papers, and he did not receive an obituary that survives today.  
HD De la Bere, Esq CB, was the director of Contracts for the War 
Office. Like JA Flynn, De la Bere had held the position since 1905 as the 
only Director of Army contracts in the Army Council period. As part of 
the agreements with the Treasury in the 1880s, De la Bere was given the 
task of procuring guns for both the army and navy until 1909 when his 
office reverted the execution of the Vote to the newly formed Navy 
Contracts Office. De La Bere was replaced in the fall of 1914, and took up 
a job as a Commissioner of Inland Revenue which was effective by at latest 
1 December 1914.534  
De La Bere was replaced by UF Wintour as Director of Army 
Contracts. He had come over from a position at the Board of Trade. 
Wintour would stay in the position until the spring of 1917, when he was 
superseded by WA Bland, a long serving Principal of the finance bureau.535  
                                           
533 Army List. January 1905. 
534 The London Gazette. Issue 28992. 1 December 1914, 10201. 







Finally, WP Perry was the director of Financial Services. Bland was 
elevated from Principal for Accounts in 1908 to take over for De La Bere, 
as the latter had both positions from 1905–1908.  
The most important work of the Finance Department was 
undertaken by the Principals. These clerks were the most senior civil 
servants that handled between them all financial matters at the War Office. 
Before the war, this position had been rearranged several times, with the 
1905 iteration being one Principal for Contracts, five Principals for 
Finance, and four Principals for Accounts.536 In 1909, the Principals for 
Finance and Accounts were combined to make a general pool of seven 
Principals for the department, although the Director of Contracts kept his 
single Principal for Contracts.  
Of the three financial offices of the War Office, by far the most 
important of the three to the study of ordnance in wartime was that of the 
Director of Army Contracts. It is his work that will be cited in this thesis.  
Unfortunately for historians, little is known about anybody other 
than Sir Charles Harris in the War Office financial bureaucracy. Part of 
this was because they, in the tradition of the Civil Service, did not leave 
papers. This cog–in–the–machine mentality meant that they have been 
understudied for their role in the war. Many of them were decorated with 
                                           







CBEs or CBs after the war, although to First World War historians their 
work has become background and taken for granted, since there was not a 
failure in the office during the war.  
The Admiralty 
At the Admiralty, Rear Admiral Frederick Tutor was just completing 
his tour as the Director of Naval Ordnance (DNO). He had impressed the 
King, and was to be assigned the First Battle Squadron, although this was 
speeded up. His replacement was Rear Admiral Morgan Singer. Singer 
had already had one tour as a member of the Ordnance Committee, as 
well as being the Commanding Officer of HMS Excellent, the Royal Navy 
gunnery school, and had just come off a year as Aide De Camp to the 
King.  
Little is known about the contracting side of the Admiralty after 
1909. The papers do not survive at Kew outlining the contracts or 
personnel, and due to the way in which civil staffs were recorded in the 
Navy Lists, there is not the level of detail about the financial staffs as there 
is for the War Office. The only clues left remain in the audits and order 
books of the Royal Gun Factory, which only give a partial view of the 







The State of the Trade 
The Trade in July 1914 was working on a plethora of complex 
contracts, although mainly for foreign customers. Since the introduction in 
1905 of the 13 and 18–prs into the Royal Horse and Field Artillery 
respectively, no major home orders for field artillery had been placed, with 
the exception of a few 4.5–inch howitzers. Any orders received for the 
trade therefore came from Admiralty Votes.  
Vickers largest project was the newly laid down HMS Revenge, a 
massive 25,750 ton Superdreadnought that was designed to be the biggest 
British battleship ever.537 The company had recently launched the HMS 
Emperor of India, one of four in the Iron Duke class. The only major 
project Vickers was working on for the army at this time was an 
experimental replacement to the Short Magazine Lee Enfield, or SMLE, 
the main rifle of all British and Commonwealth servicemen. The new rifle 
would have replace the venerable .303 British cartridge with a smaller, 
more modern .276 cartridge.538  
Armstrong meanwhile was finishing the Almirante Latorre, a 28,000 
ton battleship mounting 14–inch guns for Chile. In addition, Armstrong 
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was finishing the HMS Malaya, one of five Queen Elizabeth Class 
Superdreadnoughts, the first British ships outfitted with 15–inch guns and 
oil–fired furnaces, making them less likely to be seen than older coal–fired 
dreadnoughts.539   
Beardmore, as a shipbuilder first and foremost, was the most reliant 
on Admiralty orders of any of the big private firms. The company had just 
received its first large gun contract for the 15–inch battleship guns of the 
Queen Elizabeth class in Fiscal Year 1913. July 1914 saw two capital ships 
building in the works, HMS Benbow was being outfitted, as HMS 
Ramillies was being laid down. The company was also building three 
Arethusa–class light cruisers, giving a sense of the scale of operations on 
the Clyde in the summer of 1914. By July 1914, there is no record of 
Beardmore ever contracting directly with the army for anything other than 
‘A’ tubes for building up guns at Woolwich.540  
Coventry Ordnance had last produced a gun for the army in FY 
1910 with the 4.5–inch howitzer that they had designed in–house.541 They 
had received an order from the Admiralty for 26 4–inch Mark VII breech 
loading guns in FY 1914, an order that would have been well towards 
completion by July 1914. The company’s last major gun contract was for 
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four of the 13.5–inch guns in FY 1913, at £11,300 each. The company 
received no orders for 15–inch Mark I guns for the initial order for the 
Queen Elizabeths.  
The Ordnance Factories 
In July 1914, Major General Sir Stanley von Donop, KCB, RA, had 
been the Master General of Ordnance for just over a year. The 54–year 
old had been appointed on 11 Feb. 1913 to the position, which also 
allowed him to sit as the fourth member of the Army Council.542 Von 
Donop was arguably the most experienced manager of technical 
requirements in Britain at the time, previously serving as the Professor of 
Artillery at Woolwich in 1900 as a major, and serving as Secretary of the 
Ordnance Committee from 1905–1907. Von Donop had also served in 
the last war on the artillery staff in South Africa.  
The Chief Superintendent of the Ordnance Factories oversaw the 
execution of one of the largest budgets of the government, as well as several 
thousand civilian and military staff spread through factories across the 
country. Sir Henry F. Donaldson had maintained the position (as well as 
the position of Chief Mechanical Engineer) since 1903, and had overseen 
the execution of the Murray Committee’s reforms and strategy as well as 
                                           







having been an active onlooker to the complexities of the world’s arms 
advances.543 As one of the highest civilians in the Ministry of War, 
Donaldson oversaw that the Royal Navy and British Army were issued with 
quality arms that only his inspectors could sign off on. His mind in July 
1914 would have been focusing on not only the execution of budget, but 
also managing the new 15–inch Mark I naval guns for the Queen Elizabeth 
class battleships and on whether Woolwich would be expanding to make 
the 60–foot behemoths.  
Overall, in July 1914, the vast majority of the work that was being 
done on Government contracts by British industry took the form of naval 
contracts. Not a single large project was being procured by the army in this 
time. It is no surprise that when war broke out the army would have to 
either displace naval orders or build or hire new capacity to cope with its 
needs. This balance would challenge all pre–war work, from policy all the 
way to design and training, and everything in between. The success of 
delivering weapons to the end user community would determine in large 
part the success or failure of the British and Allied campaigns in the Great 
War.  
                                           







Government Position with Suppliers 
Most critiques of the Army’s procurement system, especially after 
the ‘shells crisis’, were that the Government were too comfortable with the 
Trade, especially Vickers and Armstrong. Records indicate that this was all 
but a barefaced lie for political ends. As early as 1902, the Director of 
Naval Ordnance had specifically pointed out that he would rather order at 
Woolwich than go out to the trade, as the Trade was more costly and in 
many cases more expensive than what he could get at the supposedly 
inherently inefficient Royal Factories. This had changed somewhat by 1909 
when Reginald Bacon took over as DNO, although it was due primarily to 
accounting changes since the Murray Report that increased the percentage 
paid by votes and not by the quality of the guns being made.544  
The key basis of an industrialized war was that the leaders of such a 
war saw industrial capacity, production, and results as a center of gravity to 
the conduct of operations and final victory. With this as a major aspect of 
the first weeks of the Great War, one must argue that indeed the conflict 
against Germany was the first industrial war Britain had fought. The shift 
from personnel to material priorities would become the greatest difficulty 
on the bureaucratic front.  
                                           







Naval Requirements at Outbreak 
Naval requirements came in two distinct forms. First, guns were 
needed to outfit new vessels that were being built in yards. Second, guns 
were required to replace those damaged or worn out. The latter need was 
much smaller than the first. As the Royal Navy went on a wartime footing, 
little actually changed in the needs of ordnance for the fleet. Ships that 
would be commissioned in the next several years already had their guns 
ordered, as the lead times could be several years to complete a full set of 
armaments. As the Royal Navy could not quickly increase its vessel count, 
its need for new armaments was much less than that of the British Army. 
In addition, the war reserve built after the Boer War allowed more 
flexibility in naval contracts and capacity. The new vessels that were armed 
were primarily merchant vessels. These armaments had been pooled for 
over a decade, with some vessels even carrying their armaments in 
peacetime in the hold so that they could be armed without having to travel 
back to Britain.  
As to the second need, the Royal Navy actually fired very few shells 
during the war, especially in comparison to its land based counterparts. 
There was only one pitched battle involving the entire fleet, although there 







such as HMS Invincible at the Battle of the Falklands on 8 December 
1914. The largest campaign in regard to expenditure was in support of the 
amphibious assault in the Dardanelles, although most shells fired were not 
full charges, and therefore barrel wear was much less than it would have 
been against naval targets. Additionally, the vessels assigned to the 
bombardments were older pre–dreadnoughts that had already been 
removed from the battle fleets, and were considered obsolete for front–line 
naval use.  
During the war, the Director of Naval Ordnance assumed the duties 
of design and inspection of naval ordnance from the Chief Inspector at 
Woolwich.545 This ended a dominance of design for naval ordnance dating 
back to the 1880s, and required time to ease into the new position. Slowly 
the roles of inspection, design, and contracts were assumed by the 
Admiralty staffs as more capabilities were acquired. Arguably, this was a 
task that although maturing, was not fully integrated by the end of the 
war.546 The DNO staff only amounted to 16 officers and petty officers at the 
outbreak of the war, and thus to find the time to complete orders for 
current guns, fix problems in the fleet, and design new guns required skill 
and attention, and lots of long hours. This would wear this small cadre of 
officers down, prompting a wartime reorganization, which, four years later, 
                                           








was still in transition. Even including the administration staff of clerks, 
writers, and typists, the staff only comprised 50 souls all in.547 
Even the size of the naval ordnance inspection department was 
small. Only nine officers were employed to inspect all naval ordnance over 
the entire country.  
In a somewhat cryptic request, the DNO on 20 August 1914 
requested relining designs for 12–inch Marks XI, X, and XII, 13.5–inch 
Mark V, and 9.2–inch Mark XI and 7.5–inch Marks II–V.548 This should 
have been well known to the DNO, unless he was thinking of diversifying 
into other manufacturers. In addition, this signalled that the battle fleet 
would lose the QE class and newer boats as well as the pre–dreadnoughts 
that carried the Mark IX. The Master General of Ordnance stated in a 
memo dated 15 October 1914 that it was the Admiralty that had ordered 
9.2–inch guns mounted on railway carriages, and suggested that the most 
that could be ordered due to capacity of the manufacturer was six. He 
proposed using some of these mounts to also put in the field a 12–inch 
howitzer. The benefits of the heavy howitzers were that they fired almost 
twice the weight (410 versus 750) and were just as mobile, but also stated 
that it would be five months for a howitzer to be delivered.549  
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Although the naval requirements in August 1914 were not great, the 
sister service would see an exponential spike in its needs.  
 
Army Requirements at Outbreak 
On 1 August 1914, the British Army had in its possession: 126 13–
prs, 624 18–prs, 128 4.5–inch howitzers, 28 60–prs, 81 6–inch 30 cwt 
howitzers, one 9.2–inch howitzer, 164 4.7–inch guns, 150 5–inch 
howitzers, 623 converted BL 15–pr guns, 85 15–pr QF guns, and 10 2.75–
inch guns. 550 This was the basis for arming the six regular divisions, the 
Territorial Army, and any siege units of the Royal Garrison Artillery that 
had been attached to the force.  
The needs of the armies though were somewhat driven by the size 
and style of divisions in the army. The army needed 24 13–prs per cavalry 
division, 54 18–prs and 18 4.5–inch howitzers and four 60–prs per infantry 
line division.551 The recruitment of new units forced this to be rethought. 
The K Armies of the ‘Kitchener Army’ had four battalions in lieu of three 
for the old divisions, but with only 48 18–prs, every brigade now only had 
12 guns instead of 18 in the original British Expeditionary Force. This gave 
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each division much less artillery support as compared to that of the original 
British Expeditionary Force. This also meant that as there were many 
fewer guns in the ratio of men to guns, the K divisions were considerably 
less capable when it came to artillery support. With that being noted, it also 
meant that the supply of guns was much relieved. A K division could be 
sent to France with 24 fewer guns as compared to that of the old divisions, 
and for every two new divisions, a third one could be created from the 
amount that would have been required. The issuance of four guns per 
battery is not mentioned by the Master General of Ordnance as being 
either a temporary industrial fix, or a permanent solution, but by the end of 
1914 the ratios had been set out, and the orders had been placed.552 The 
howitzers per division would revert to two batteries of four each for a total 
of eight initially.553 The other weapons classes would remain to be seen, but 
artillery above division was to be dealt with later. It was not a worry in 1914 
to any level of the field guns.  
The British Army ordered 480 18–pr guns in March 1905. To 
completely outfit the British Expeditionary Force, 324 guns would be 
needed. In addition, the ‘Mowatt Reserve,’ a strategic reserve that had 
existed since the new guns had been delivered, included 90 18–pr guns 









held as strategic reserve at Woolwich, along with their reserve munitions.554 
It is not currently known where the remaining guns were held, which on a 
conservative estimate would have numbered at least 76.  
Siege Guns 
The introduction of medium howitzers was the subject of the 7 
November 1914 meeting of the Siege Committee. What came out of this 
committee was the acceptance of the 8–inch howitzer converted from the 
6–inch guns. They calculated that although the howitzer was relatively light 
in projectile weight, heavier artillery might not be necessary in breaking 
through the Rhine defences. The defences were the primary reason for 
initially choosing the heavy 10–inch howitzers that nobody seemed to like 
(and were never built) due to both their excessive weight and clunky 
carriages.555 The Committee though still in 1914 had the mentality of a 
short war that required the use of a Victorian era siege train for the 
purposes of mopping up the defences of the Rhine. This was what drove 
the orders for ordnance in 1914, with the request being submitted for 32 
heavy (over 750 pound shell, or 12–inch), 48 medium (300–400 pound), 
and 60 light (6–inch) howitzers to total the siege train.  
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The siege committee on 14 Oct proposed converting the old 6–inch 
Breech Loading Converted (BLC) guns into 8–inch (200–pr) howitzers. 
This was proposed apparently due to need for medium howitzers in the 
field as well as the lack of 10–inch/9–inch Rifled Muzzle Loading (RML) 
guns, of which there were four and not the 18 promised.556  
These are the only guns mentioned by the siege artillery in 1914, the 
12–inch howitzer, the 9.2–inch gun, and the converted 6–inch BLC guns 
In October, both Vickers and Armstrongs submitted designs for 12–
inch howitzers. Both appear to have been given the production go–ahead 
very quickly, and were to build separate designs of their choosing as long as 
both fired a standard cartridge.  
Contracts 
The war forced the Government to expand the size of the forces. 
This affected the British Army most. The requirement of outfitting the new 
divisions was approached through the traditional view that the easiest way 
to procure equipment was to go directly to the proven firms that could 
provide artillery for the needs of the newly expanding army. Therefore, all 
the contracts for artillery in 1914 went to firms that had a proven track 
record.  
                                           







Major General Stanley von Donop, the Master General of 
Ordnance, described the process of the War Office work in the first few 
months as follows: 
‘On August 10th Orders were issued for the necessity equipment and 
ammunition for the 1st New Army.  
In September then further New Armies were ordered to be raised 
and equipped further orders for both Guns and Ammunition and for the 
necessary ammunition were placed. By this time the policy of employing 
the resources of Canada had already been taken up and order given.  
In October it was recognized that not only was a much larger 
number of guns required but that the number of rounds per gun found to 
be necessarily exceed by a large amount that previously thought to be 
adequate. Orders were at once placed for the guns and the questions of 
how the large amount of ammunitions required could be obtained, was 
closely considered’557  
The three time periods of von Donop’s letter above show that the 
Master General of Ordnance and the Army Contracts Department saw the 
mobilization in three distinct periods. Indeed, the contracts as listed below 
also demonstrate and verify the orders. The first contracts for the August 
mobilization were placed with the Ordnance Factories. The September 
                                           








requirements for the New Armies was placed in the first weeks of October, 
with a final set of contracts being placed in late October. Like the armies 
being raised, this last tranche of contracts was also the largest.  
The role of the Master General of Ordnance is key to understanding 
the decisions made in mobilization. The Master General of Ordnance at 
the outbreak had the final say in what ordnance stores were purchased for 
the armies. In an undated letter to George Gibb early in 1915, von Donop 
laid down his requirements for more equipment, although all new orders 
were not to interfere with those orders already placed.558  
Contracts Placed in Opening Months of War 
In this next section all of the contracts placed in the first year of the 
war will be discussed. They are broken down by the item being produced. 
These numbers are based upon the Army Contracts Department’s records 
book, and cross referenced by the Ministry of Munitions classified 
contracts book created in 1915 and 1916. There is no evidence to suggest 
that it is incomplete, although some contracts for artillery not placed by the 
Director of Army Contracts might be missing, such as those ordered by the 
Royal Navy, or orders in North America placed by firms such as J.P. 
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Morgan, although the only known North American orders are included in 
the notebooks.  
It should be noted that the dates listed below for each order are 
based upon the date that the final contract, including the negotiated price, 
was executed. Many of these contracts were given preliminary approval to 
await price negotiation later. For instance, Contract #G 1624 for 16 9.2–
inch howitzers from Vickers was signed on 7 October 1914, although the 
order and permission to start manufacture was given on 4 September, a full 
month before.559  
18–pr 
The 18–pr made up the majority of orders placed with the firms. All 
contracts placed for 18–prs placed in 1914 were for Mark II variants. The 
initial contract was placed for 168 guns with the Ordnance Factories under 
contracts 57/3/4247 and 57/3/4435. This contract was let on 22 August 
1914, less than 3 weeks after the declaration of war. The placement of 
orders with the Ordnance Factories showed that indeed the policy set forth 
in the Murray Report back in 1907 was being executed. The purpose of 
the contracts was twofold, first they allowed for an extra three divisions 
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worth of artillery to be produced in the only factory that had produced any 
18–prs in any size of production run since at least 1907. Second, they 
warmed up the supply base and trained workers on the platform. This 
would be, with one exception of an order for 30 guns on 18 January 1915, 
the only recorded order to the Royal Gun Factory for new 18–prs for the 
duration of the war. The orders therefore were designed to prepare the 
workforce for the coming deluge of repair work that the Ordnance 
Factories would conduct.  
The second half of the execution of the Murray Report was to then 
fully mobilize the private factories belonging to the mature and proven 
Trade. Vickers and Armstrongs both received orders for 1,000 18–prs 
each in the opening months of the war. Vickers contract G 1691 was issued 
on 16 October 1914, whilst Elswick received their contract, G 1724 on 27 
October 1914. These were massive contracts and would have required 
extensive outlay in plant to comply in time. Each of these contracts was 
almost twice the size of the previous largest contract ever signed in 
peacetime, the initial order for the 18–prs back in March 1905, and that 
contract was split over three different manufacturers. In regards to that 
previous contract, the third firm in 1905, Coventry Ordnance Works, did 
not receive a single order for 18–prs throughout the period of War Office 







Armstrongs on 11 January 1915. This order, G 1993, would see an 
additional 450 guns per company. Finally, Vickers received an order from 
the Canadian Government for 150 guns sometime in the first months of 
1915.560  
As part of the widening supply base, Beardmore received their first 
contract for field pieces on 5 January 1915. This order, S 7083, was for 
200 guns, and was increased by another 70 under G1993 on 11 January 
1915.561 Beardmore had already built 15–inch superdreadnought guns, but 
this was the first known field piece contract. In addition, Beardmore was 
50% owned by Vickers, and so they were able to access assistance ‘in–
house’ which allowed them to enter the field much faster than other would 
be entrants.  
Only one other contract for 18–prs was executed in 1914. The 
Bethlehem Steel company of Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, USA, under the 
control of businessman Charles Schwab received an order for 100 guns. 
This order, placed on 19 November 1914 directly to the War Office 
Director of Army Contracts was the first order for field pieces made 
outside Britain in the war. In addition, under the same contract, but stated 
after the initial contract, the order was raised to 200 guns. It was stated that 
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this increase of 100 was for the Royal Navy. It is not recorded if the Royal 
Navy took delivery of these guns, or if they were immediately transferred to 
the Royal Artillery. In the campaigns which the Royal Navy could have 
used such pieces, such as the campaigns in eastern Africa or at Gallipoli, 
there are no records of naval crews utilizing the new pieces. It is also the 
only known artillery contract recorded in the entire war or which the Royal 
Navy used an existing army contract to increase for its own use.562  
In total, at least 3,718 18–pounders were ordered between August 
1914 and the end of January 1915.563 This represented a massive 
mobilization of extreme proportions. To compare, Wellington’s allied 
command at Waterloo a century earlier had a combined total of 156 
guns.564 The total number has historically been under represented in 
secondary works. For instance, Hew Strachan’s The First World War 
states the number of guns ordered by 21 October 1914 at 878 although the 
actual numbers to that point were at least 2,168.565 This 
underrepresentation is due directly to the source: the Official History of 
the Ministry of Munitions, which had a vendetta against properly 
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representing the effectiveness of the contracts placed by the War Office 
before May 1915, as justification for its existence and effectiveness.  
13–pr  
The other field gun, the 13–pr, did not receive nearly as many 
orders as its bigger brother. As with the 18–pr all ordered variants were for 
the Mark II pattern guns. Vickers was given an order for just 18 guns on 5 
December 1914. This order, G 1855, would be the only apparent order to 
the trade for the entire war, although Canada ordered 24 guns, also to 
Vickers, sometime before 15 May 1915.  
The Ordnance Factories also received an order for 100 13–prs, 
under contract 73/4/6561, although this order was only placed in May 
1915, which might hint that these were intended for replacements as much 
as new units, and might hint at the difficulties of relining the original guns 
made in 1905 as much as anything else. 566 Although not clear, these last 
13–prs ordered from the Ordnance Factories could also have been the 
basis for work to create the high angle anti–aircraft (AA) model 13–pr that 
was being stood up about this time. If this is the case, this order would fall 
out of the purview of the study of this thesis.  
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The 4.5–inch howitzer was to be the second most issued gun to 
British divisions. To fully outfit units, one howitzer was required for every 
three field guns. As the howitzer was originally designed by Coventry 
Ordnance Works, they received all orders placed in the trade. The first 
order was placed on 13 October 1914 under two separate contracts, G 
1653 for 200 howitzers, and G 1718 for 100 howitzers. In addition, by the 
end of the month, another 150 howitzers would be ordered under contract 
G 1748. By the end of January 1915, another 200 howitzers had been 
ordered from Coventry, with contract G 1993 executed on 11 January 
1915. This contract seems to have been converted for some reason on 24 
April 1915 to 94 G 32, which does not appear to be anything more than a 
conversion of nomenclature rather than a new contract. These 650 
howitzers were the only orders for the field howitzers before the end of 
1915 to the trade.567  
In addition to the Trade, less than ten days after the declaration of 
war, the Ordnance Factories were given orders for 112 4.5–inch howitzers. 
These three contracts, 57/3/4259 for 30, 57/3/4435 for 50, and 78/4/6500 
for 32 were all placed on 13 August 1914. It is unknown why the three 








contracts were placed separately, but by looking at the delivery dates, it 
might have been a way to have a tiered system of delivery, with some of the 
contracts having definite delivery dates, whilst others did not. This meant, if 
war concluded quickly, that the War Office could cancel whole contracts, 
whilst also having full delivery of others, instead of managing one large 
contract, and only executing portions of it. This is only speculation though, 
as no records of the thought process of contract strategy survive. It can only 
be surmised from the existing contract summaries as well as the delivery 
schedules by contract.  
Canada also ordered 4.5–inch howitzers in FY 1913, although on its 
own terms. It requested that they be made by Coventry Ordnance Works, 
and that it should be able to purchase the said howitzers under last year’s 
pricing. This was initially denied by the Director of Army Contracts, H. De 
La Bere. When Canada insisted on its demands being met, they also 
issued an ultimatum that if this was not possible, it would cancel the order 
entirely. De La Bere still insisted upon the procurement under the proper 
competition rules, and Canada cancelled the order request in March 
1913.568  
The underestimation in the Official Records mentioned earlier for 
the 18–pr also occurred with the 4.5–inch Howitzer. Quoted as 150 orders 
                                           







before 21 October 1914, the actual number was almost treble that at 421.569 
The constant underestimation of War Office orders is disturbing to this 
study for two reasons. One, it has skewed the narrative since 1921 for all 
historians since that point to perpetuate. Secondly, if the Ministry actually 
believed its own numbers, it could have been a primary reason why Lloyd 
George and his followers so blatantly misunderstood the scope of what had 
been done and the state of industry in the country. This latter view could 
have been true in 1915, although there was almost no possibility of this by 
1921 when the Official Records were published, and therefore the 
Ministry’s historians deliberately underrepresented their predecessors 
work. These points are more than enough to take the entire Official 
History of the Ministry of Munitions with suspicion at best and as a work of 
historical fiction at worst.  
60–pr Guns 
The Corps level artillery was to be dominated by the 60–pr guns. 
Contractually, the 60–pr was acquired in a different format from the 
Division level artillery. A 5 October 1914 contract, G 1779, ordered 36 
guns each from Elswick and Vickers. The element that made this 
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procurement different was that it appears the Government tried using a 
contract format similar to a Blanket Purchase Agreement (BPA) or an 
Indefinite Delivery Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) type contract. This was due 
to both companies receiving the same contract number for the 60–prs. 
This might have actually been a carry on from the contract placed for the 
18–pr recapitalization contract of 1905, which used a similar contract 
method.  
In addition, the Ordnance Factories were given two orders, one for 
36, under 73/3/7993 dated 11 October 1914, and seemingly updated on 5 
November 1914 as 57/3/4435, and an additional one for 40 sometime in 
the spring of 1915 listed as 73/3/8081.  
The remaining contract listed in the contract books for 60–prs was 
issued to Vickers on 19 February 1915 for 12 guns for Canada, to follow 
the end of the initial contract production. There is also one contract to 
Elswick issued sometime before 12 June 1915, although it only appears in 
Ministry of Munitions papers, and does not give a production amount.570  
The problem with the contract production schedule listed above was 
that it was woefully small in comparison to the needs. There was either a 
serious void between production and need, or several contracts were 
missing from the files. Either could be true, but it is much more likely that 
                                           







records do not survive for the additional guns needed and ordered before 
June 1915.  
6–inch, 26–Cwt Howitzer 
The larger 6–inch howitzers were latecomers for contracts. It was 
not until 5 February 1915 that the first contract was issued for these 
howitzers, and even then, only four were ordered from Vickers. Another 
16 were ordered on 19 February 1915.571 These are the only known orders 
for these howitzers in the pre Ministry of Munitions era.  
8–inch Howitzer 
The 8–inch howitzers were not new build howitzers, but a 
conversion from the old 6–inch BLC guns bored out to take the larger 
shell. These would prove to be effective both in regards to resource 
allocation of industry as well as making it possible to use otherwise obsolete 
equipment for new purposes that could help the war effort. They would 
eventually be replaced by the 9.2–inch howitzers as they became available. 
The conversions were completed by four factories under the same contract 
number, 73/3/8037. Elswick, Beardmore, and Vickers each received 
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orders for four, three, and four respectively, on 31 December 1914. A few 
days later, the Ordnance Factories were contracted to convert 12 effective 
14 January 1915.  
9.2–inch Howitzer 
The 9.2s were still in experimental stage when war broke out. The 
first, ‘Mother’, was shipped to France for several months in late 1914 for 
quite literally operational testing. Vickers were awarded the only known 
War Office contracts, for 16 on 7 October 1914 (G 1624), and another 16 
on 31 October 1914 (G 1746).  
Short War?  
One of the most contested topics of the First World War among 
historians is that of whether those in charge planned for a short war or a 
long war. Contracts are one of the few places where an insight into that 
decision making can be analysed. By looking at the contracts placed by the 
War Office, we can conclude it was highly unlikely that those writing 
contracts for delivery dates over a year after thought that the war would be 
over by Christmas. What goes even more against such an assumption in 
that due to a decade old contract, British planners were able to have at 







budgeted. The orders for new artillery would not arrive until December at 
the earliest delivery date, and most of the initial contracts did not have 
primary partial deliveries until April 1915.572  
 
Comparisons to Policy 
There are no other contracts that are known to have been executed 
in the period between August 1914 through May 1915 for service with the 
British Expeditionary Force. The contracts for armaments for naval service 
do not appear to survive at all. Contracts for guns placed after May 1915 
are limited, but the procurement of guns under the Ministry of Munitions 
will be discussed in the following chapter.  
In final comparison, the contracts placed by the War Office were 
actually quite bold in their scale, and fitted well into the pre–war policy. 
The working thought in almost all western nations was that it would take 18 
months for a country’s industrial base to go from cold to full capacity. The 
British assumption that the Royal Gun Factory at the Ordnance Factories 
would produce the majority of guns in the first six months before 
conversion to repair work was completely compatible with the size and 
scope of the contract placed in the first few weeks of the war. The question 








after the mobilization though would be whether 1915 would show 
consistent production in a timely manner, and if the assumptions that 
British industry could fight an industrial war were right assumptions. It 
would not be known until the summer of 1915 if Britain had a fighting 
chance of winning the war from the factories.  
Effects of Woolwich 
Woolwich traditionally had an audit every year which was published 
for the use of the House of Commons. This had been suspended in the 
Boer War, although an audit of contracts was indeed executed in 1902 that 
complied with the spirit of the annual audits.573 This policy was again 
followed, and only a very limited report was produced, of a handful of 
pages, whereas the peacetime reports were often over 400 pages long. In 
the end, no audit report for the wartime years was ever completed, which 
adds a complexity to understanding the actual output of Woolwich during 
the war. We cannot follow the especially important work of relining and 
repair which contracts were not formally written for, and no financial data 
survive for this work. As stocks varied through peace and war, it is not even 
possible to calculate the quantity of work based on the purchase of 
individual tubes. Unfortunately as well, the records of secondary suppliers 
                                           







seem to have not survived, and even records of completed new-build 
artillery are spotty at best.  
The establishment at Woolwich was the lynchpin of mobilization, 
yet some tasks were woefully understaffed. For instance, the Inspection 
Department maintained all sealed drawings for government–accepted 
designs. In 1906 the Department had just one army captain on this 
requirement, and it was only one of many assigned duties. As the 
department was not reorganized between then and 1914, when the war 
broke out, only one person would have still been given that assignment. 
Without drawings, no guns could be built, and no contracts could be 
written.574  
Unusually, a 12–inch Mark IX was sent to Beardmore’s to be 
relined. The Inspector of Steel reported a fracture in the tube on 12 Nov 
1914. This must have been a wartime expedient. It does seem to prove 
though that the Royal Gun Factory was the primary centre, as Beardmore 
cracked the tube when trying to get it out. This proves that it was a 
specialized task that is not related to manufacture.575  
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In the opening months of the war, most research was usually 
commissioned and completed by the Ordnance Board. Due to the 
requirements of the services to have guns proofed and accepted quickly, 
staff who would normally have worked on research were given the task of 
inspecting and accepting new guns. The ranges at Shoeburyness were at full 
capacity with work on production guns, and therefore little research and 
design occurred during the war. British designers took the point of view 
that it was better to have a clean production of identical pieces instead of 
inserting improvements into the contract, which would slow down 
production. This was in hindsight a clever decision, as it allowed for a 
streamlined production which could integrate suppliers without having to 
alter tooling or train staff on new tasks.  
End users  
As a note to readers, the design and purchasing was done as 
mentioned before primarily by the Ordnance Board, on the orders of the 
Master General of Ordnance, and executed by the civil staffs of the Army 
Contracts Division. The Army Ordnance Corps were not involved at all in 







between the Royal Artillery and Woolwich Arsenal. The force was 
commanded by a Captain or Major, and was primarily composed of senior 
enlisted engineers who were trained to fix things that could be fixed in the 
field, as well as for preventative maintenance and checking on barrel life. 
They were not by our definition strategic forces, and did not normally 
operate in wartime in Britain, and therefore will not be mentioned again.  
Activity in the United States 
 In the first few months of the war, the United States maintained its 
role as a neutral, although neutrality almost always favors one side over 
another. Because of unrestricted access to the sea, Britain had the upper 
hand in ordinary US exports. The British Ambassador to Washington, Sir 
Cecil Spring Rice, theoretically ran all communication in and out of the 
country. In reality, the war progressed with such vitesse that it would be 
impossible for a diplomatic office to control all business deals between the 
two states. By looking at the accounts books of the Embassy, it appears that 
most of the efforts of Sir Cecil’s staff concerned ascertaining information 
about German shipping out of Philadelphia and other ports. His staff was 
too small to directly send operatives, so the embassy contracted out to the 
Pinkerton Detective Agency to watch over all major ports on both the east 







$5,202, or roughly £1,200, every three weeks on this contract alone. These 
activities were paid out under Secret Service funds made available under 
the Foreign Office. Certainly the human intelligence collected by the 
embassy would have had some effect on calculations of the industrial 
capacity of Germany’s supply chain outside of Europe, as well as providing 




The first months of the war were critical to the successful outcome 
of the war. The Murray Report from 1907 outlined the strategic industrial 
policy of the War Office in times of war and peace, and from all 
indications the War Office executed it to plan at the outbreak of war. The 
Ordnance Factories took large orders in the initial weeks of conflict that 
allowed industry time to mobilize, expand, and produce the equipment 
needed for a European war. The initial contracts placed with the trade 
were executed in a timely manner and the actual ledgers of the War Office 
show that indeed the contracts were placed with firms that were likely to 
comply with the quality, quantity, and time of the critical contracts. The 
                                           







only failure of the Murray Report, and therefore War Office policy was 
that it could not have predicted in 1907 that the British Army would swell 
from six divisions to seventy–five.  
The Royal Navy was better positioned for the oncoming war. As a 
service that relied on long term investment and the consideration that ships 
unlike men, cannot be recruited quickly, the Royal Navy was unable to 
expand in the way that the army did. The policies put in place after the 
conclusion of the Boer War gave the fleet a substantial pool of reserve 
guns. As the fleet developed technological advances to lengthen the lives of 
its main guns, the need for replacement became less acute. The fleet by the 
end of 1914 had yet to engage the enemy’s main fleet, and therefore had 
not placed industrial pressure on the Trade or Woolwich. Naval orders for 
new ships required their ordnance to be ordered years in advance, and 









CHAPTER TEN: LABOUR ISSUES, POLITICAL SOLUTIONS, 
AND THE TEST OF 1916 
Introduction 
As the new year came and went, the guns on the front continued to 
blaze. 1915 would be the first year of a material war, as all sides had now 
started to see the benefits of months of industrial mobilization. 1915 would 
also see a number of crises that would shake the way industry related to the 
government. This chapter follows the problems and successes from the 
beginning of the year until the creation of the Ministry of Munitions at the 
end of May, 1915. It then assesses the war under the Ministry of Munitions 
until the summer of 1916. This chapter discusses how the war for 
mobilization and sustainment evolved. This chapter will also cover the last 
of the great arms contracts, which coincided with the entrance of the 
Americans and the exit of Imperial Russia from the Great War.  
The most challenging of these was that of labour, which took up the 
most time of the governmental and trade staffs, with increasing contracts, 
although the continuing war on land as well as the relative quiet of the war 
at sea led to challenges that were not planned at Whitehall. This was 
followed by a period of intense need for ordnance, with the summer 1916 







Finally, this chapter will discuss the end of the war for ordnance 
procurement for all intents and purposes by the spring of 1917.  
Naval Needs 
The needs of the Admiralty into 1915 had somewhat changed from 
what they were in August 1914. The threat of commerce raiding on the 
extensive British Merchant Marine diminished day by day as lone German 
cruisers were swept from the seas. The destruction of the German East 
Asian Squadron under Admiral Maximilian von Spee off the eastern coast 
of South America in December 1914 removed the final major enemy 
combatant force afloat outside of home waters. This victory had eliminated 
or at least lowered the need for smaller guns to arm merchant vessels 
against other surface threats. These had been a large portion of the pre–
war requirements of the Royal Navy, and the needs consisted mainly of 
4.7–inch guns and 6–inch guns for the larger vessels like Cunard Line’s 
RMS Mauretania. The Royal Navy therefore had the primary threat shifted 
to a consolidated force in the form of the German High Seas Fleet waiting 
in harbour. Meeting this required big guns, guns with the ability to hit and 
damage capital ships. At this point, this meant only guns of 13.5–inches 
and above. The shift allowed some capacity to be freed for medium guns 








The largest need in the first months of 1915 was not the 18–pr, but 
the 4.5–inch howitzer. The field howitzer had been designed to plunge 
high explosive shell upon bunkers and other obstructions, although the 
production of the gun was proving difficult. By May 1915, only 16 divisions 
worth of howitzers could be accounted for, while at the same time, 25 
divisions worth of 18–prs were available. Even more worrying, only 5 
divisions’ worth of ammunition was available for the howitzers. The May 
estimates predicted that by August, only 28 divisions of howitzers would be 
available, although fewer than half of those would have the munitions 
needed. This was compared against 41 divisions’ worth of 18–prs and 43 
divisions’ worth of the heavy 60–pr guns.577 By the summer campaign, the 
decision to allow Coventry Ordnance Works to almost exclusively produce 
the 4.5s was showing as a bad decision.  
4.5–inch Howitzer Issues 
The failure of Coventry to mass produce the 4.5–inch howitzer has 
never been fully explained. As it was not produced under wartime contract 
by any other firm, except the 112 ordered from the Royal Gun Factory, 
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Coventry cannot have their experience judged by the experience of their 
peers. Part of the problem might have been tied to the departure of the 
head of the firm, Admiral Reginald Bacon, who had been called back to 
active service soon after the outbreak of war. One reason for the difficulty 
with the 4.5–inch howitzer in the field was that the rate of prematures was 
one in 5,000 rounds fired. This was in comparison to one in 27,650 for the 
18–pr. The problem was the fuze, although this still meant that it was 
statistically almost impossible for a 4.5–inch howitzer to make it to the 
point where it needed relining.578 The 4.5–inch howitzer had also been 
offered to the Russian forces. 300 had been promised in February, March, 
and April of 1916, although as the Director of Naval Ordnance stated ‘You 
will see, therefore, that it is most unfortunate that the howitzers selected to 
be given to the Russians should have been of the nature which has given us 
more trouble than any other gun or Howitzer in working up the supply of 
ammunition’.579 
Political Decisions 
In February 1915, shipyard workers on the Clyde went on strike for, 
among other things, a wage that would be able to meet the rise in labour 
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costs over industry as a whole due to wartime shortages. This industrial 
action was met through arbitration led by Sir George Askwith, the Chair of 
the Government Arbitration Committee.580 Lloyd George though at the 
same time appeared to have grander ideas. Lloyd George seemed to 
believe that the Government was in the midst of nationalizing the 
shipbuilding industry due to the strikes. In a letter written sometime very 
close to 15 March 1915 from Francis Dyke Acland, the Financial Secretary 
to the Treasury, to John Bradbury, the Permanent Secretary to the 
Treasury, Acland outlined that Walter Runciman as head of the Board of 
Trade was seriously considering taking over the armaments firms.581 It is 
unknown how far this plan actually progressed, but it must be taken into 
account when discussing the ‘shells crisis’ which came into public discourse 
about a month later. It is also significant that Lloyd George was given a 
copy, and although it is unknown when that copy was given, it was almost 
certainly at the time it was originally written.  
The issue of strikes during the war after the Clyde actions was settled 
relatively quickly. The Government committee that Askwith chaired 
recommended that industry be more sympathetic to labour and that labour 
in turn not strike. This would have never worked in peacetime, although 
the conditions had changed in a year of industrial war. In a meeting at the 
                                           
580 Paul Addison. Churchill on the Home Front 1900–1955. 1993, 156. 







Treasury from 17–19 March 1915, many of the most important unions 
were represented, including the Amalgamated Society of Engineers, the 
primary union for gunmakers. This conference confirmed that the Unions 
would agree not to strike on contracts for warlike stores during the war, 
although they were under no legal obligation to do so.582 As there was no 
legal requirement, this also meant that non–union shops were under no 
requirement or obligation not to strike, although by 1914 non–union shops 
were virtually non–existent in the warlike stores industries.  
Wear of Guns 
The shells crisis gives historians another view into the issues involved 
with guns themselves. A 16 March 1915 report shows that from August 
1914 through 27 February 1915 672,732 shells had been expended in 
France from 324 guns, or roughly three times the original amount taken to 
France. In addition, from that date until 16 March, 128,727 rounds had 
been fired. There were still 398,125 rounds left on hand in France, or 
roughly six weeks’ worth based on previous expenditure.583 Although this is 
interesting for the shells crisis, it also demonstrates that the guns were 
wearing out. Assuming every gun had fired an equal amount, which of 
                                           
582 WO 254/1. Contracts Precedent Book 94/G No 34. 







course would never be the case, by 16 March, the average 18–pr 
expenditure had been 2,473 rounds. In addition, based upon the 
expenditure of shell in the first two weeks of March, 397 rounds had been 
fired on average in just 17 days. The life of a barrel was assumed to be 
6,000 rounds at this point, so barrels would have to be replaced every 260 
days, with this meagre expenditure of 23 rounds a day. This meant that 
every 18–pr that went to France in 1914 would have to be replaced by 
August 1915. And these assumptions are based upon them not firing a 
single round before being delivered, although they had been in service for 
a decade by this point. It should be noted that the French army was able to 
complete missions militarily with 20 rounds per gun per day to keep within 
the needs of the service. The Commanding General of the BEF, Field 
Marshal Sir John French, had stated back to Whitehall that no less than 50 
per day would be sufficient in January 1915.584 50 rounds a day would mean 
even in quiet times, an 18–pr would wear out in 120 days. This 
expenditure was both not sustainable, and strategically a failure due to the 
gun wear. There is no doubt that French threw out the number for political 
reasons, as anybody familiar with the technical needs would have and did 
brush the number aside as impossible to fulfil in both shells and barrels, 
and not needed in the field.  
                                           







This wear rate was a substantial issue that seems to have eluded the 
Chancellor when the Government was calculating the needs of the army. 
For instance, a note dated 19 May 1915 from the Committee on Munitions 
showed that the Committee calculated the needs of munitions based solely 
on the total amount of guns in possession of the country as a whole and 
their delivery based upon no wastage.585 The exclusion of relining or other 
work to guns out of service was not calculated. This also meant that 
divisions were either below strength in their guns, or that the new divisions 
were not able to be engaged due to lack of artillery. Under strength units 
also had the accounting trick of having more rounds per operational gun 
than should have been. This was because the rounds for inactive guns 
would have been distributed to those who could have fired them. This 
would also have had an effect on the guns themselves, as to fire the same 
amount of munitions; fewer guns would have fired more rounds, thus 
wearing out single guns faster.  
Woolwich  
The demands on Woolwich were multifaceted. It was only the key 
producers at initial mobilization, but it also served as the sole manufacturer 
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that could conduct relining. Wearing out of gun barrels became its primary 
job in the spring of 1915. Its work came from two sources, first, natural 
wear, and second, blown barrels caused by unsuitable contractors of shell 
and fuze. Little could be done about the latter, as by the spring, quantity 
had taken over for quality, as mentioned earlier. Natural wear could be 
calculated, although it became exponentially more important as more 
divisions were put into combat.  
 Each gun after being relined, as well as all new guns needed to be 
proofed, or fired at 120% of service pressure, to verify quality. The 
restrictions on proof butts at government facilities become a burden by the 
spring of 1915. Woolwich only had 2 proof butts with which it had to test 
all new guns with several shots, as well as carrying out the tedious work of 
testing every lot of powder to confirm it was ballistically true to the 
specification. This was done by firing guns loaded with the powder from 
the lots with very precise measurements to confirm the powder produced 
the correct thrust, among other things. This affected gun production in 
various ways. First, it took up the precious pits at Woolwich where final 
gun inspection took place. Secondly, every powder size required a different 
gun, which also had to be within the first quarter of its life, which also 







Financial Decisions  
The largest financial decision in the opening months of the war in 
regards to ordnance was the Treasury’s appointment of Messrs J.P. 
Morgan & Co of New York, NY as sole commercial agents for his 
Majesty’s Government. This agreement was signed on 15 January 1915 in 
the Treasury.586 This consolidated six months of frustrating work to try to 
eradicate the speculators and war profiteers that the War Office 
representatives had encountered in the first moths of the war. Signing the 
document and appointing Morgans as the sole representatives meant that 
contracts could be negotiated in New York, and that those contracts were 
backed by the financial weight of Morgans, with their expenditure itself 
backed by holdings in the Bank of England, as per the agreement. 
Although vastly important for the provision of powder and shell for the 
BEF, Morgans were not terribly important in regards to artillery itself. 
Complete artillery was only purchased in a few select contracts and those 
were put into effect directly between the War Office and Chares Schwab’s 
Bethlehem Steel. It is much more difficult to calculate the effect of 
imported raw materials as well as finished steel ingots on the artillery trade, 
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as it is not even possible to trace the same within the domestic supply 
chain.  
 By the end of June 1915, $350,000,000 of war related goods had 
been shipped from the United States to the Allies.587 
Industrial Decisions 
Woolwich was probably as representative as any factory producing 
heavy ordnance during the first months of the war. Sir Charles Harris had 
commented in the 1902 First Account of the Committee of Public 
Accounts that during the Boer War 10% was the normal annual write–off 
for machinery. He commented in his 1915 report that from August 1914 
to March 1915 33% of the factory at Woolwich had to be written off as the 
machinery was being worked to destruction. A wearout rate of four times 
that of the previous war, and many more times that of peacetime showed 
not only the stretched nature of Woolwich, but also that the policies of the 
Murray Report were being put into true effect.588 In addition, Woolwich 
inspection staff had to make sure that every contract and every contractor 
received the most up–to–date drawings available. In the first year of the 
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war, ‘no fewer than 134,000 copies of sealed drawings have been prepared 
and sent out.’589  
Shoeburyness 
As was expected Shoeburyness simply could not cope with the 
needs of a mobilized industry, and the work of proofing was devolved to 
the manufacturer ranges. It was noted that 90% of new gun proof work was 
done at the ranges owned by the companies themselves. This was 
conducted by the assistant inspectors who had been stationed at the 
manufacturer facilities.590  
 
Production Rates 
Guns were rolling off the production lines, albeit at a restricted rate. 
It was planned that starting in April 1915, a full Army worth of field 
artillery could be produced every month until the British armies were 
complete in September 1915, with seven entire armies equipped with new 
equipment. To June 1915, 732 18–prs had been produced. To 
complement, 160 4.5–inch Howitzers, 36 60–prs, 40 Mark VII guns, 23 8–
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inch howitzers, and amazingly, 18 9.2–inch Howitzers had been 
produced.591 These numbers though represent a building rate that is 
constantly growing at an increasing rate. More of these guns were probably 
produced in June 1915 than in almost any other month. Nonetheless, it 
showed that the calculation that mobilization would take 18 months might 
be beaten by actual output. British industry had built enough field guns to 
outfit 15 divisions, or almost three times the number of divisions outfitted 
with 18–prs at the output of the war.  
Status by May 1915 
The early months of 1915 were somewhat quieter than they should 
have been. Contractors were supposed to be producing at their maximum 
rate, with the goal of the entire British armies being outfitted by the 
summer campaigns. This did not happen, for multiple reasons, although 
the largest single issue was the failure of industry and Government to 
maximize skilled and unskilled labour. This failure would make the 
technical problems take a secondary theatre to the political fighting that 
would erupt into the public domain under the guise of the ‘shells crisis’ in 
March 1915. The issues of labour would cause the creation of a new 
Ministry as well as the most significant challenge to the bureaucracy of how 
                                           







ordnance was procured since the crisis caused by the Crimean War in 
1855.  
The Ministry Period, May 1915 
The political instability caused by poorly calculated labour decisions 
brought about the most serious shock to the British armaments industry of 
the war in May 1915, with the creation of the Ministry of Munitions. The 
rise of David Lloyd George coincided with a fall of the War Office staffs, 
with the eventual demise of both Lord Kitchener and Stanley von Donop 
in a little over a year. The rise and fall of the great leaders of British 
armaments will be analysed in this chapter.  
Genesis of the Ministry of Munitions 
Chris Wrigley wrote in 1982 that ‘the Ministry of Munitions’ record 
is such that it is unlikely ever to be subject to drastic revisionism. The 
problem with much of the writing about the ministry is that it tends to 
overstate matters, presenting the ministry almost as a revolution in 
government’.592 Wrigley’s argument was based upon a long–standing 
entrenchment of the myth of the role of the ministry during the war, due 
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primarily to publishers only releasing one side of the story. This would 
remain entrenched until the works of David Edgerton in the 1990s. 
 The most important single event in the war for British munitions 
was the creation of the Ministry of Munitions, along with its first Minister, 
David Lloyd George, who was appointed on 25 May 1915.  
The genesis of a cabinet level ministry was the Treasury War 
Munitions Committee that was floated by David Lloyd George as a way of 
alleviating the labour shortages for munitions work. The creation of the 
Ministry was the final reward for the undermining and political 
manoeuvring of the opposition, especially Liberal David Lloyd George and 
Conservative (known as the Conservative and Unionist Party formally after 
1912) Andrew Bonar Law, even though technically Lloyd George as 
Chancellor of the Exchequer was squarely in the Asquith cabinet. As 
Leader of the Opposition, Bonar Law met with von Donop in April 1915 
to try to ‘ find out what the position really is as regards Cordite’ (emphasis 
in original).593 Bonar Law also took a great interest in the procurement of 
small arms in the war, although this is outside the scope of this study. 
Bonar Law though did converse with the then Director of Artillery, Col. 
von Donop, as early as 1912 on the comparison of British artillery with 
                                           







that of France in a confidential letter dated 29 January 1912.594 If Bonar 
Law was able to comprehend the technical matters under discussion with 
the D of A, he certainly would have been one of the most able minded 
politicians in high service with the British Government. The same file 
continued to show that in the 1912 discussions on the defence controversy, 
he was able to articulate a policy based upon a strong understanding of 
British policies in regards to manning, technology, and equipment.595  
Lloyd George had shown a great interest in undermining the status 
quo, with the War Office in charge of munitions and ordnance 
manufacture. Lloyd George believed that the War Office should be 
relieved of duty due to their lack of full mobilization of industry in the first 
month of the war. That he not only believed this, but wrote to Arthur 
Balfour in March 1915 with these views, shows that he postured for quite 
some time before the creation of the Ministry. Lloyd George also fought to 
make sure that von Donop had nothing to do with the new ministry, 
‘placing at the head of this new Executive of an energetic, fearless mind 
who will not be cajoled and bamboozled by von Donop nor bullied by 
anyone else.’596 It was peculiar that Lloyd George lobbied Balfour and 
Bonar Law for a change at the War Office, as they were the two 
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preeminent leaders of the Conservative party, who were in opposition at 
the time, especially as Lloyd George was the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
in a Liberal Government under Asquith.  
Kitchener saw the creation of a new committee appealing as it could 
help the labour issues that he had been complaining about since the start of 
the war and by March 1915 were getting worse.597 Kitchener was most 
worried about the creation of an additional agency with bidding power that 
could increase costs by bidding against others for resources. This was one 
of the long–standing fears of the War Office, and had led the Treasury in 
the 1880s to have the Director of Army Contracts manage all ordnance for 
the RN. With the devolution of naval contracts in 1909, this would make a 
third bidder in an increasingly squeezed environment. Lloyd George was 
pressed by Kitchener for answers that this new committee would not act in 
a way that Army Contracts would find interfering. He quoted an example 
in a letter to Lloyd George that a factory in Newcastle was fully built and 
ready for the output of shells except there was nobody to work it. 
Kitchener saw this as an affront to his ability to complete contracts, as the 
ever increasing army was starving him of the ability to actually produce for 
the said army.598 Lloyd George wanted more contracts placed with firms, 
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although Kitchener pointed out that the firms were already working at full 
capacity and increased orders would have to displace existing orders.  
Personalities 
It is difficult to distinguish in the correspondence between 
Kitchener, Lloyd George, von Donop and others in the spring of 1915 
between the quantitative problems of shells and the qualitative problems of 
artillery. Lloyd George was most interested in taking over expendables 
such as shells and to a lesser extent rifles. This might have been simply 
because the electorate could better understand these things whereas 
artillery was a high-tech industry that few actually knew about. The letters 
of all of the players do not differentiate, which can be confusing to students 
of the subject.  
Notes on Definitions 
Munitions was used as an overarching title for all equipment from 
artillery to small arms to ammunition and propellant. The increase of 
ammunition was a very different task from increasing heavy ordnance. 
First, only a handful of shops had the lathes, winders, and precision tools 
to build ordnance, whereas machine shops and other engineering 







produce shells when properly trained. These were two separate industries, 
which the political elites in their writing were unable or unwilling to 
differentiate between. Even Kitchener failed to differentiate in some of his 
work. Only von Donop made the point of articulating the differences in his 
correspondence, although nobody was listening.  
Labour 
The growing divide of skilled labour to operate the industries was 
becoming an increasingly difficult problem to manage. Skilled labour had 
been in short supply since the outbreak of war, although there was no easy 
task to make it right. In peacetime, labour issues never rose to the levels of 
the Ordnance Committee/Board, let alone the Master General of 
Ordnance or the political level. This lack of skill in managing a finite 
shortage of skilled labour almost certainly led to the decisions that were 
taken by those in Whitehall to let the manufacturers deal with it in their 
own ways. In early 1915, after von Donop had failed to get political 
assistance with this, he wrote several letters to the Chancellor to try to get 
more skilled workers. Not surprisingly, Lloyd George was unsympathetic 
to von Donop’s pleas.599 Almost all of the labour that had been provided to 
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industry was from two sources; skilled British female labour, and Belgian 
refugees who had come to Britain after the German invasion in August 
1914. The problem simply was that there was not enough skilled labour to 
go around. Businesses that had labour but were not on war contracts were 
not willing to give up their skilled labour for fear of not being able to bid 
for war work themselves as well as of how the loss would affect their post–
war position in their respective industries. The armaments firms however 
were initially unwilling to subcontract with these firms as the latter had no 
experience, as well as no understanding of the strict requirements of the 
ordnance trade, which simply was not commercially viable in the 
peacetime economy.  
The unwillingness of manufacturers to self–regulate a sort of labour 
sharing cooperative, along with the inability of the Government to legally 
force the transfer of workers from one plant, or even one contract, to 
another led to a frustrated spring 1915 in Whitehall. The Treasury, Home 
Office, Admiralty, War Office, Board of Trade, and Cabinet Office, or at 
least some factions generally within those departments, all wanted to 
control this valuable labour, but all for different reasons. 600  
Some, but not all of the shortage was caused by the volunteering of 
skilled workers to enlist in the military in the patriotic surge in 1914. This 








had a double edged effect, as many of these men were put into units such 
as the Ordnance Corps, who were then put in charge of maintaining the 
equipment that they had possibly built. Artificers and armorers were 
allowed in January 1915 to enlist up to the age of 60, in comparison to 45 
for all other trades.601 In theory this meant that if the skilled labour was 
used for this purpose, it would save labour for repair work in the United 
Kingdom. How many of these workers were actually assigned to be 
artificers though is not known, and is outside the scope of this thesis, 
although it is worth noting that these enlistments were not always a bad 
thing.  
By 14 April 1915, the War Office was discussing the issue of the 
earlier problem of skilled enlisted labour, and was proceeding on the basis 
of the ‘return from the Army of individual men of special skill urgently 
required for work on munitions of war’602 This took time, and it took 
human resources that were also in short supply to identify the need, the 
person, a replacement, and transporting the person back to the factories 
where they were needed. This process would never be able to bring about 
sweeping and quick corrections in the labour market, but it was certainly 
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better than nothing, and it was politically feasible, probably the most 
important feature for those in Whitehall.  
The issue of Labour epitomizes the issue of terminology within this 
study, as throughout the labour crisis of early 1915 the lack of 
differentiation between munitions, ammunition, and artillery was striking. 
In one note to Lloyd George from von Donop, the issue of labour was 
only mentioned as slowing down ammunition production.603 There was no 
mention of the effort of labour shortage on the production of artillery. Part 
of this was due to the sheer amount of manual labour required for the 
shells industry, as little of the process was automated, whereas the ability of 
the ordnance companies to surge in capacity for artillery manufacture was 
not as great, due to the need for very specialized equipment.  
The much larger issue was simply that the size of the orders placed 
had never been contemplated before. The last war, the Boer War, entailed 
only a partial mobilization of industry as the Boers themselves did not have 
the industrial base to fight an industrialized war. More importantly, the 
Royal Navy was not engaged in combat except for a few guns that were 
dismounted. The last time the Royal Navy or the British Army had actually 
fought a first–rate enemy was 60 years before, when the Anglo–French 
alliance fought in the Crimea. A pre–war policy on how to mobilize 
                                           







industry simply did not exist for the level needed to meet the intensity of 
even one front let alone a multiple front war, including the North Sea.  
Drink 
Alcoholism was seen as a major problem for many manufacturers. 
Areas around Birmingham and Glasgow seem to have been hardest hit by 
the lack of productivity that managers associated with long pub hours. The 
shipbuilding industry was claimed to have been especially heavily hit by 
alcohol–related absenteeism. The Defence of the Realm Act allowed the 
the altering of license hours, which was seen as a gift to managers, 
especially those in shipbuilding. Interestingly, the view was not universal. 
The Chief Superintendent of Ordnance Factories, Sir H.F. Donaldson, 
believed that it was an exaggerated view. From his experiences at 
Woolwich, the truth was if anything the opposite. Whilst some 
manufacturers were quoting to the Treasury 20 to 30 per cent absenteeism, 
Donaldson pointed out that in just one random example, his workers had a 
98.92 per cent attendance rate at Woolwich, the largest of the armaments 
factories.604 Donaldson went as far as to post the absences that were 
occurring at Woolwich as not being down to alcohol, but to football 
                                           







matches, especially on Saturday afternoons. It should be noted that 
Arsenal Football Club was founded in Woolwich.  
Donaldson also believed that a side effect of the allegations of high 
alcohol abuse was that they would make Britain look bad in the 
international press. He urged that the Government not crack down too 
heavily, as it would have the appearance of stigmatizing the entire 
workforce as being drunkards whilst Donaldson believed that the vast 
majority of workers were hard working, patriotic, and law abiding citizens.605 
The injustice of branding British workers on wartime contracts could have 
the opposite effect from that intended and infuriate those not guilty of 
absenteeism, and could even energize the enemy.  
Vickers sent a request to all its factories. Results back from these 
managers showed that the varied experiences were probably representative 
of the state of British industry as a whole. The ship works at Barrow 
suggested severely curtailing drink, not only at the company pubs, but at all 
pubs within 20 miles! The manager at Sheffield had a different perspective, 
suggesting that ‘it is difficult for them to say to what extent there would be 
any increase in efficiency and output’ and that beer was widely integrated 
into the culture of several shops, including ‘their Melting House, Forge 
Dept., Carburising Dept., and Treatment Dept., men have always been 








permitted to send out for beer during working hours and these 
Departments have not seriously suffered in consequence.’606 The general 
theme of the Vickers managers were that as the skill of the worker 
increased, the desire for excessive drink went down. This made perfect 
sense, as those on the lowest social and skill levels had the physically 
hardest jobs with the least reward. Highly skilled engineers and semi–
skilled workers did not have the problems that were being discussed at 
Whitehall.  
Armstrongs also submitted a survey to the Treasury. What was most 
important and striking in the analysis of the work week for those at the 
Scotstown Newcastle plant was the hours that were being worked. 
Armstrongs workers averaged 69 ¼ hours a week, trading between the 
night shift one week, at 12 hours a day for 7 days a week, and transferring 
on Saturdays to day shifts, which averaged 9 ½ hours a day. The Saturday 
after the night shift week was given off. It was even worse for forgemen, 
who worked on average 79 hours a week, as they worked through meals.607 
Armstrongs employees worked 13 out of 14 days a fortnight. With this 
schedule, it is not surprising that almost a year into the war, absenteeism 
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would start to become an issue, due to alcohol or not. Industry was 
working all out, and the employees were taking the brunt.  
Woolwich Transfer 
An example of how the transfer of power occurred was represented 
is that of patents. An important but overlooked piece of the transition was 
the transfer of patents, inventions and all other tasks that had been 
traditionally done by the War Office. This was supposed to transition with 
the initial creation, but it took much longer than Lloyd George wanted. An 
order in Council suspended the publication of inventions on 14 October 
1915 for the sake of security, but it was not until 1916 that the entire 
function was transitioned over. Part of this was due to the role that officers 
played in the judgment of the usefulness of inventions, which the War 
Office was not willing to turn over until forced. In the end, by May 1916 
the officers had been put at the full use of the Ministry, which had then 
deputed them to the Comptroller of Patents in Chancery Lane but even 
then it appears they were only seconded and not permanently 
transferred.608 This lack of permanence was seen as intentional by the 
Assistant Under–Secretary of State at the War Office, Bertram Cubitt.  
                                           
608 WO 32/9285. WAR OFFICE: General (Code 1(A)): Transfer to Ministry of 








The particular job of continuing artillery production under the 
Ministry of Munitions went to Eric Campbell Geddes, a former railroad 
executive with no experience in ordnance. Geddes was subsequently 
replaced two months later by Charles Ellis, who actually had experience in 
ordnance, as the Managing Director of John Brown & Company.609 As 
Director–General of Ordnance Supply, Ellis would have had the requisite 
technical knowledge of the job of procuring ordnance, especially heavy 
guns.  
What was most important, was that none of the senior civil staffs 
from the War Office contracting or financial divisions were transferred 
upon the creation to the Ministry of Munitions. It would not be until the 
end of the year that civilians that had previously run ordnance from the 
point of view of contracts were seconded to the department, and even then, 
only one principal was handed over, Mr. S Dannreuther, Esq.610 All other 
clerks remained, and importantly, the Director of Army Contracts 
remained under the War Office Financial Secretary.  
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The Battle of Woolwich 
One of the most difficult questions facing the cabinet was whether to 
keep the Royal Arsenal at Woolwich under the War Office, or to move it 
to the new civil Ministry of Munitions. The MGO was notified of Lloyd 
George’s desire to transfer the Ordnance Factories on 14 August 1915, 
when he received a memo from the Secretary of the Ministry of Munitions 
that had been created two days earlier.611 The transfer though was not a 
smooth transition, which in many regards was probably the best thing that 
could have happened for the British in winning the war. The Battle of 
Woolwich was one of the most political aspects of the industrialized war. 
The ability of von Donop, with the help of Lord Kitchener to fight a rear–
guard action, bought time for industry to stabilize. Without this 
engagement, it is unknown if Britain would have been able to fight the 
battles in France in 1916 with the same effect.  
For the transfer to take place, Lloyd George had to find a way to 
override the MGO and Kitchener, who were unwilling to transfer the 
Royal Arsenal away from War Office control. The easiest way forward was 
to slowly dissolve the powers of the War Office, first through the 
destruction of the Ordnance Board, which acted as the eyes and ears of the 
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MGO on the daily advising of ordnance issues. Lloyd George wrote the 
President of the Ordnance Board on 1 December 1915 that he ‘had come 
to the conclusion that in order to have a free hand to make the best 
arrangements for the discharge of the new responsibilities thus cast upon 
him, it was necessary to dissolve the Ordnance Board as at present 
constituted, with a view to such re–constitution and re–arrangement of the 
functions as might be found desirable’ ‘He accordingly informed the 
Secretary that the Ordnance Board was dissolved from the date of this 
letter’.612  
Lloyd George had already received an Order in Council on 16 June 
1915 ordering the ‘immediate transfer of the responsibility for designs, 
patterns, and specifications, for the testing of arms and ammunitions and 
for the examinations of inventions bearing on such munitions.’ The change 
was allowed due to the high level decision on 26 November 1915 to 
transfer the Board from the War Office to the Ministry of Munitions as 
per the Orders in Council. The Director of Artillery informed the board 
that the Government was transferring the Board, the Research 
Department, Experimental Establishment, Shoeburyness, and the 
Inventions Department to the Ministry of Munitions, and instructed the 
                                           








board to report to the Ministry of Munitions from 29 Nov 1915.613 What is 
important is this was done by the DofA and not the MGO. Technically, 
the Board reported directly to the MGO, and therefore the DofA had no 
authority over the Board or its transfer. As von Donop had no desire to 
comply with the Orders in Council, he was sidestepped by the Minister of 
Munitions. With this decision, Lloyd George effectively dismissed the 
MGO from the chain of command. The ability of Kitchener and von 
Donop to postpone the takeover though bought valuable time for the 
experts who knew what they were doing to finish mobilization as well as the 
delivery of almost all of the artillery on order from 1914.  
Lloyd George has been quoted as stating ‘Take Kitchener’s 
maximum; square it, multiply that by two, and when you are in sight of that 
double it again for good luck.’614 This rash mindset was one of the 
problems between him and Kitchener. For 18 pounders, this would have 
been 18,800,896 guns, or about one gun per three Britons at the time. The 
brash rhetoric from Lloyd George helped no one, and probably caused the 
War Office to dig in deeper to obstruct what they saw as irresponsible 
people taking over a task that the fate of the nation depended upon.  
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Donaldson and Transfer  
Hay Frederick Donaldson, the CSOF, was one of the few at the 
War Office administration who saw that the Ordnance Factories would 
have to be transferred. Donaldson saw this primarily as a financial issue, as 
the Ministry would be placing the majority of the orders in terms of value, 
which happened to be for shell. Donaldson’s view was that the transfer was 
a necessary evil of the war, and that little would change, except that they 
would report to a different political head. He also seemed to be the 
originator of the idea that the CSOF should be directly under the 
command of the Minister of Munitions, which was a higher position than 
in the War Office hierarchy. This was because he saw that the Ministry was 
essentially borrowing the Ordnance Factories, and that they would be 
returned intact to the Army Council once the war was over. Donaldson in a 
letter to von Donop on 17 August 1915 wrote that he was worried that the 
transfer would take the Master General of Ordnance out of the technical 
loop, and possibly marginalize the position as it would no longer have 
direct ties to the financial decisions. Donaldson, as the long serving civil 
servant and engineer that he was, foresaw problems with the relative order 
of precedence between orders for the War Office Ministry of Munitions, 







to ‘discuss the relative importance of the requirements and agree as to what 
should take precedence.’615 As Donaldson had been at the Ordnance 
Factories longer than anybody had been at the War Office, he 
remembered the issues of the Boer War and the strain placed on naval 
orders, which certainly influenced his decisions. He was also probably 
more aware than anybody else of the potential industrial bottleneck if and 
when the naval war intensified for Woolwich, as the only factory that had 
successfully relined a large naval gun in Britain.  
Donaldson’s recommendation of the transfer however had a very 
large caveat that he would still need the advice and support of the 
Ordnance Board and the Royal Artillery Committee as well as the 
expertise of Shoeburyness and other outposts. These were all directly 
under the command of the MGO, and therefore, Donaldson cleverly 
created a way that the CSOF could be transferred, but within a constraint 
that did not allow the MGO to be side–lined by the move.616  
Finally, the CSOF foresaw a problem occurring with any orders 
placed by the colonies or India, which legally would have to be placed by 
the War Office. In time of peace, this was not a problem as the War 
Office operated the Ordnance Factories, although the transfer would 
confuse this situation. Would a Ministry of Munitions-run Ordnance 
                                           








Factory be able to take orders from the War Office as necessary? This 
question was not fully answered, but the requirements of the colonies never 
became a major issue, as the Royal Artillery, equipped with regular 
contracts would supply artillery at least in the field for colonial units. 
Difficulties would have arisen if great amounts of repair to coastal 
ordnance or other ordnance had became necessary, but due to the 
consolidation of fighting away from the colonies, this did not occur.617  
Death of Kitchener  
The largest roadblock to Lloyd George’s takeover of the whole of 
ordnance manufacture and policy had been Lord Kitchener. Kitchener 
played a key role in maintaining the power of von Donop as the MGO 
even though the Ministry of Munitions had been biting away at his power 
since May 1915. Lloyd George’s papers comment that at every point of 
change, Kitchener and von Donop were there to slow down a politically 
motivated policy for what they believed to be the betterment of the war 
effort. The relationship by May 1915 was poisoned and by June 1916 there 
was outright war between the Ministry of Munitions and the War Office. 
Lloyd George’s Private Secretary at the Ministry, Christopher Addison, 
went as far as to state about von Donop that he was ‘either incompetent or 








a traitor. I am inclined for the latter view’.618 Von Donop had the exact 
same view about Lloyd George and his cronies. Nonetheless, Addison and 
Lloyd George had to deal with their ‘traitor’ as long as Kitchener had the 
confidence of the Prime Minister and the King.  
The loss of Kitchener represented the end of top cover for the 
professional staff of the War Office, and the beginning of the end for 
intelligent procurement. Arguably the most important event in June 1916 
for industry was the sinking of the HMS Hampshire. The cruiser sank with 
Lord Kitchener and his staff on 5 June off the western coast of the Scottish 
isle of Orkney. Included in the casualties was H.F. Donaldson, the 
longstanding Chief Superintendent of Ordnance Factories.  
 The death of Kitchener was important in the schedule of events, as 
it was one of three key events that occurred within a month of each other. 
The first was the naval Battle of Jutland, the second being the loss of HMS 
Hampshire, and the third, the preparation and start of the Battle of the 
Somme in France. Each of these must be viewed in context, like the 
ordnance industry as a whole. These individual events have never been 
viewed as having a key interrelationship, although each can be taken out of 
context without the view of impact they had on each other.  
 
                                           







Battle of Jutland 
The Battle of Jutland, 31 May–1 June 1916, was the only major 
naval engagement between the combined battle fleets of the Royal Navy 
and the Imperial German Navy. In terms of ordnance expended, the 
experiences of different ships were significant. The best academic analysis 
of this expenditure is from John Campbell’s 1986 work Jutland: An 
Analysis of the Fighting. Although now 30 years old, it has still been 
unrivalled in the technical analysis of the battle from both sides, and is also 
the most widely quoted work on the subject. According to Campbell, 
overall, 4,480 total heavy shells were fired by British ships of 12–inch and 
above size. This was broken down into 1,239 15–inch shells, 42 14–inch 
shells, 1,533 13.5–inch shells, and 1,666 12–inch shells. Further broken 
down by vessel, only six British ships were outfitted with the new 15–inch 
guns. One, Canada, mounted 14–inch guns, 15 were mounted with the 
13.5–inch guns, six were the short lived Mark XI 12–inch guns, and 9 were 
the Mark X/Mark XIII 12–inch guns which had flaws in choking. This 
compared to German expenditure of 2,424 12–inch shells and 1,173 11–
inch shells for a total of 3,597 heavy shells.619 
                                           
619 NJM Campbell. Jutland: An Analysis of Fighting. London. Conway Maritime Press. 







British ships had actually not fired that many shells considering the 
number of ships involved. 37 British capital ships fired shells at Jutland, 
although only 14 vessels fired over 100 rounds from a combination of their 
main guns in total. HMS New Zealand was the most heavilly engaged, 
firing 420 12–inch rounds.620 It is significant that no ship in the British fleet 
expended its entire magazine of rounds. As mentioned in the pre–war 
chapters, the life of guns was a well–documented statistic for those who had 
a need to know. Most importantly for the strategic industrial efforts, 
Jellicoe’s fleet had not fired enough to require replacement of their guns. 
Part of this was helped by the primary guns engaged being of the new 15–
inch type that had only been in service since 1914, and was an active 
production line, being produced in large numbers for vessels already laid 
down but not completed. The 13.5–inch guns were known for their long 
life span, which was discovered to be estimated at 450 rounds. These guns 
would not have had to be replaced unless the vessel had already been in 
heavy action, which had not really been the case. The 14–inch shells all 
came from one vessel, HMS Canada. Canada was originally an export built 
ship, but seized early in the war. The DNO stated in a 4 Feb 1915 report 
that once her 14–inch guns were worn out, they were to be bored out to 
                                           







15–inch.621 Matching up the serial numbers released earlier in 1915, the 
DNO showed that there were no spare guns for Canada. As this was a 
one–off gun, on one ship, it would not have been a worry, especially as 
only 42 rounds were fired from her during the battle.622  
Of the battle damage to guns caused by the enemy, one 15–inch gun 
from Warspite, and five 13.5–inch guns, two each from Lion and Princess 
Royal were out of action, and Marlborough had a premature.623 No 12–inch 
guns were damaged during the battle. As Warspite, Lion, and Princess 
Royal were three of the four highest recipients of shells in the British fleet 
to survive the battle, they would have already required a substantial amount 
of time in the dockyards to repair and refit. Princess Royal was in dry dock 
from 13 June until 15 July 1916. Lion spent 5 June–8 July in repair, with a 
two day exception to change yards, and Warspite was at Rosyth under 
repair from 1 June through 20 July.624 Therefore, each would have had 
plenty of time to remount guns from the reserve pool if repairs were not 
possible.  
The 12–inch guns were another matter. As many of the vessels were 
by now a decade old, their expected lifespans were coming near. The 
Colossus class and its 12–inch Mark XI high velocity guns were entirely 
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engaged, given with the problems of these guns, it would have been 
doubtful if they could have had replacements ready, as all 60 guns from the 
only class built were engaged. Any further engagement would have 
probably removed these ships from the order of battle. The Mark X 12–
inch mounted ships saw 70 of the 130 total mounted in all ship classes 
engaged, and 16 of those guns were lost along with Invincible and 
Indefatigable. The reserve pool of guns would have had enough to replace 
the needed guns, although Agincourt was a one–off design, similar but not 
interchangeable with the others of her size. Agincourt fired 144 rounds 
from her 14 guns during the battle.625 The other ships should have not been 
a worry. Technologically, they were obsolescent as first class warships, with 
the newer vessels being faster, having heavier broadsides, and with the 
introduction of oil fired ships with the Queen Elizabeth class in 1914, the 
older coal fired ships had an increasing list of disadvantages. In addition, 
their guns had a much shorter lifespan, as has been discussed in previous 
chapters relative to the newer guns. It probably would not have been worth 
relining these barrels at the expense of more pressing needs unless the 
German navy had won Jutland or somehow the newer vessels showed a 
serious design flaw, which was not the case.  
  
                                           







Battle of the Somme 
 In addition to naval engagements on the high seas, June 1916 was a 
time of high preparation for the Somme, which was to be the largest 
artillery bombardment ever conducted to that date by the British Army. 
Two years of contracts and gun building had finally fielded a British Army 
that was over 50 divisions. The reserve for some guns was quite thin, and 
even at the rate of firing in the spring of 1915 of 50 rounds a day, an 18–pr 
would wear out in 120 days. Although they were designed to be easily 
relined, there were 3,500 guns in the field with British divisions. The 6–
inch gun situation was even worse. The life by the Somme of these guns 
was 166 days, although it took five whole months to reline them, reproof, 
and get them back to France, and became one of the largest headaches of 
1916. This does not even mention over 1,000 4.5–inch howitzers, over 800 
60–pr guns, and a host of heavy howitzers and guns at Army level, which 
were the only weapons capable of reaching enemy supply lines.  
Increases in the BEF 
The War Office had calculated that the British Army could outfit 50 
divisions in the field by the end of April 1916. This analysis was not 







mobilization pace of British industry as well as the needs of the 
commanders in the field. It was not until 21 August 1915 that David Lloyd 
George formally put down the need for 100 divisions to his procurement 
staff. The need was actually for 80 divisions, although with a 25% wear 
factor, the 100 division requirement for guns was born. The 80 division 
number was not explained in the memo, except for that it would pertain to 
men and munitions, whilst equipment was for 100 divisions.626  
A memo that appears to have been written by MGO 6 November 
1915 states that ‘The advent of the New Ministry of Munitions has not as 
far as I can tell, been the cause of the increase in the supply of gun or rifle 
ammunition to the armies in the field except so far as the labour conditions 
have been improved by the action of the Munitions Act, although it cannot 
be denied that the enormous staff of the Ministry have helped indirectly to 
increase the output. The American orders have been chiefly instrumental 
in saving the situation and these orders were placed in October and 
November 1914.’627 The same letter mentions that by November, no 
Ministry of Munitions orders for essentially anything had arrived, including 
filled shells, fuzes, or gains.  
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Guns from the Commonwealth and India 
In addition, this was supplemented by June 2nd of 1915. 13–prs had 
been increased by 47 from India, and 12 from Canada; 18–prs by 240 
from India, 84 from Canada, 36 from Australia, 12 from New Zealand, 
and 511 manufactured since the war. 12 4.5–inch howitzers were brought 
from India, four from New Zealand, and 117 had been manufactured.16 
9.2–inch howitzers had been manufactured. No additional other guns or 
howitzers had been made or brought from the Dominions.628 
A note from 21 August 1915 states that several guns were being 
transferred from the RN to the British Army. Included in these was one 
12–inch gun on railway mountings which was to be delivered in the middle 
of September as well as eight 6–inch guns with 30–degree carriages. The 
report also showed that for the 18–prs in particular, 3,073 were still on 
order, and, with full deliveries, 4,580 would be completed, although 583 is 
also pencilled into the text.629 
Industrial Decisions 
Between July and December of 1915, industry was finally in full 
swing, as the contracts placed in October 1914 were finally reaching full 
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output. In the last six months of the year 1,904 18–prs were produced, 416 
4.5–inch howitzers, 104 60–prs, four 6–inch howitzers, 39 8–inch 
howitzers, 14 9.2–inch Mark I howitzers, and even four of the new Mark II 
9.2–inch howitzers, and one very heavy 15–inch howitzer.630  
 In addition to the deliveries to December 1915 listed above, 
between January and June 1916, 1,020 18–prs were delivered, 682 4.5–
inch howitzers, 293 60–prs, 184 6–inch howitzers, 18 8–inch Howitzers, an 
astounding 76 9.2–inch howitzers, and 16 12–inch howitzers of all types, as 
well as 11 15–inch howitzers.  
Vickers requested financial assistance in October 1915 for outlay of 
plant to produce new ‘guns’, which through the records appears to mean 
the 6–inch howitzers they were just starting to complete. The subsequent 
Ministry of Munitions conversations show that even five months into 
power, the Ministry still did not have a grasp of the gun–making industry. 
The Ministry approved a Vickers proposal to extend their plants at a cost 
of £800,000. This included £134,481 at Sheffield, which must be assumed 
to be the River Don plant. The oddity was that this loan was approved by 
both the Ministry and the Treasury knowing full well that it was based 
without estimates, and even included 25% for contingency. It is unknown 
what the expenditure was for, as by October 1915, production was at full 
                                           







capacity, and in subsequent months, 18–pr orders were winding down, 
allowing for capacity to be used for the new howitzers. In addition, it was 
decided to go against the advice of creating a proper pricing estimate based 
upon the battery of the howitzers already produced by the time the request 
was made.631 Overall, it showed a lack of understanding of business in 
general and at worst a reckless disregard for government spending on the 
other hand. With hindsight it was an even worse deal, as the debt was 
essentially cancelled in 1919 by the Treasury and Inland Revenue as part 
of a scheme to settle tax issues with the firm.632  
In comparison, the RGF and RCF combined received, to the end of 
December 1917, a total of £618,920 to extend their works for their 
wartime effort.633  
Repair Work 
Repair work was considered the key element of the Royal Factories 
according to the 1907 Murray Report, as mentioned in Chapter Two. This 
domain was according to the report the primary purpose of the arsenals 
after the mobilization of industry sometime after the first six months 
following the outbreak of war. There are many reports in the Board of 
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Ordnance papers, SUPP 6 at Kew, authorizing maintenance work, 
although these are contradicted by a set of papers held in the Ministry of 
Munitions reports that show every order for repair and deviation from 
pattern. The repair work conducted by the trade was exclusively for the 
purpose of fixing errors in manufacturing of the particular manufacturers. 
This shows that no repairs to battle damaged or worn guns were conducted 
by the trade. There were many errors as the war increased, and most of 
these came from items that would have either a) were caused by the speed 
of wartime output or b) would have never been granted a waiver for 
acceptance in peacetime. Incompetent mistakes such as mis–drilling 
breech screws were somewhat common, for both Land Service and Naval 
Service contracts.634 Much of this would have probably been due to the 
workforce quality drop. The reports do not give the dates of error, 
although the contracts given are mainly in the early 1914 and 1915 contract 
deliveries with delivery dates in the summer of 1915. If indeed the new 
workforce was still in training essentially, these stupid mistakes would have 
both delayed delivery and increased work for not only the relatively rare 
experienced workers to fix, but also for the inspectors.  
Inspectors were still a problem no matter the agency they reported 
to. By December 1916, there were still only about 100 certified inspectors 
                                           








under the Woolwich Inspection Department. When Gen. Minchin took 
over the inspection services, much of his initial work was to increase the 
inspectors, although by this time, the vast majority would have been 
required for munitions much more than ordnance.635 This staff though, had 
by August 1916 increased their amount of throughput of guns alone by 
1400 per cent since 1914.636 It might have been said best in an August 1916 
memo from the Inspection Department that stated ‘Guns, Shells, Fuzes, 
and all other Munitions to be of value must not only be dangerous to the 
enemy, but safe to the troops using them’637 
In addition, 100 18–prs had been repaired in the last half of 1915. 
This appears to be under–reported, considering the wear rate, which 
should have required a repair bill in excess of 1,000 field guns by this point 
in the war.638  
Foreign Suppliers 
Increasingly, the Ministry was tasked with managing a world–wide 
network of suppliers. With European capacity completely filled since the 
outbreak of hostilities, European governments were forced to look 
elsewhere. This was most pronounced in the world’s largest steelmaker, 
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the United States. Although a good amount has been written on the work 
of the committees sent from the Allies to the US in the early months of the 
war, much of it is not relevant to the procurement of artillery. Many of the 
orders for guns were ordered directly between the War Office and Charles 
Schwab, the director of Bethlehem Steel, in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania. 
There is little mention of artillery in the papers between the British 
Government and the American representative of Britain, and later the 
Allies as a whole: J.P. Morgan & Co. The timing of orders was quite 
important. As they were placed between August and November of 1914, 
the capacity of the Bethlehem plant was ring–fenced from a very early 
time. As well, this would start the delivery clock, which the traditional 
customer of Bethlehem, the United States Army Ordnance Corps, 
considered would take 18 months. Therefore, no American orders had a 
conceivable delivery date until sometime into 1916, and after shipping, 
could probably not be considered available for front–line use until the 
summer offensive in 1916.  
This worldwide capacity was a greater issue for some Allies than 
others. The Russian government placed massive orders in the US for all 







65 artillery pieces.639 The British government eventually acted as the 
intermediary between the American manufacturers and the Russians, 
bankrolling many of the orders. The British also took a great deal of 
political criticism from Russians over the Russian supply issues, which was 
one reason why Kitchener was on a diplomatic mission in June 1916. 
Procuring guns and munitions was now becoming a major issue in keeping 
the political alliance together.  
Inspection 
The one governmental failure in the war was that of the inspection 
department. Inspection of arms both at government facilities and at Trade 
plants was by its nature heavily dependent on former servicemen. A report 
published in 1906 showed that roughly 400 of the 1200 men employed by 
the government at Woolwich were prior servicemen. Over 10% of those 
were reservists who could be called up at any time. This high proportion 
gave invaluable operational experience to inspectors to fall back on and 
influence their decisions, but it also made them vulnerable to being called 
back in time of conflict, just like they had been in 1899–1902. The 
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department was, by the nature of its work, in a critical area for personnel 
drawdown just as it needed the opposite.640  
Deliveries under the Ministry 
The Ministry in the realities of operations was unable to deliver 
contracts of ordnance any faster than the previous War Office. In a list for 
ordnance ready since the Ministry took over until the end of March 1916, 
6–inch howitzers were being delivered to 206 versus 280 as scheduled, 82 
8–inch howitzers versus the scheduled 107, 66 9.2–inch howitzers versus 
75 planned, and 28 12–inch howitzers versus the 40 scheduled. The only 
thing that the Ministry had found to be delivering ahead of schedule was 
the 6–inch gun, for which  there had been 36 versus a scheduled 24, 
although eight of the 12 had come from an Egypt order that had been 
received from the Admiralty, and therefore not due to the Ministry for 
success.641 In reality, the Ministry came late to the game. The 18–pr peaked 
in October 1915 with 418 guns delivered that month alone. A year later, it 
was 45. 
Field Marshall W.R Robertson sent a note to Lloyd George on 21 
January 1916 that gave the availability of munitions to France by 1 May 
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1916, and the 18–prs were allotted almost 2,900 rounds per gun, or 
enough to halfway wear out a gun, although these numbers were granted by 
allowing just five rounds a day, one tenth the amount Field Marshall John 
French wanted in the spring of 1915. In addition, the inability to produce 
both guns and munitions for the 4.5–inch howitzers was becoming a grave 
problem, considering if the Russian order was fulfilled, just 145 rounds per 
gun would be left, again with a meagre 5 rounds per day. 642 
The spring of 1915 was the most critical period of the war for British 
munitions. The shortages of labour caused delays and quality issues that 
forced the War Office to transfer work of ordnance to the new Ministry of 
Munitions. Although the War Office delayed the transfer as much as 
possible, the eventual transfer of ordnance seemed inevitable. By the time 
the Battle of the Somme entered its final stages in late 1916, British 
ordnance issues had become one of attrition and replacement of used 
guns.  
Army Needs 
The needs of the British Army were defined by General Sir Douglas 
Haig in a letter to the War Office dated 24 June 1916. He outlined three 
layers of artillery, the divisional level, the corps level, and the army level. A 
                                           







corps contained two divisions, and an army contained three corps. The 
divisional level would require 48 18–prs and 16 4.5–inch howitzers. The 
corps level would require 24 60–prs, 60 6–inch howitzers (a weapon Haig 
considered obsolescent by this time), eight 6–inch guns, and 24 heavy 
howitzers, for a total of 116 per corps. Army howitzers included all railway 
mountings and the 9.2–inch and over guns and howitzers, and were to 
include 16 howitzers of which 50% were tractor drawn, and four guns. 
Haig’s statement in the same letter stated that ‘it is not practicable to 
eliminate at present any existing types, and that circumstances governing 
manufacture of guns, howitzers, and ammunition will probably necessitate 
the present variety of types remaining in use for the war.’643 This 
understanding of manufacturing limitations on military strategy seems to 
have set Haig apart from Gen. French, his predecessor. The 6–inch guns 
were provided by this point through the dismemberment of coastal 
batteries and their guns sent to be modified. By 30 September, 1916 35 
guns had been transferred, along with enough cradles.644  
The Army’s requirement by the 7th of July 1916 was for 72 divisions 
comprising 24 Corps, but just as importantly, with a reserve of 25% 645 Even 
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without an additional order, the initial orders in 1914 would have covered 
this amount for field artillery, with a slight reserve.  
Long Range Guns 
Probably the largest new need during this time period was a 
requirement for modern long range guns. GHQ in France on 24 June 
1916 sent a letter to the Director of Artillery for the operational need for a 
6–inch gun and a 9.2–inch gun for use in France. The description given by 
the Minister is indicative of the new way in which the Ministry, and Lloyd 
George in particular, operated.  His response stated that ‘the interpretation 
that I have put on the respective responsibilities of the two Departments is 
that the War Office are entitled to ask for any number of weapons of 
approved types that they may require, but that when new types are involved 
they should confine themselves to specifying the general conditions that the 
design should fulfill.’ 646 The 9.2–inch guns consisted of four reserve 9.2–
inch Mark X guns which were to have new guns built to replace the losses 
in reserves. As the likelihood of these guns being needed as reserve guns 
by either the Royal Navy or the Coastal Artillery would have been slim, this 
probably was a good decision.647 These 52,000 pound guns were turned 
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over to Vickers on contract 94/G/2791 to be placed on railway carriages 
sometime before 22 August 1916. The replacement guns were to be made 
out of four Italian tubes, for an unknown ship, that Vickers had lying in the 
factory. These were made to represent the Mark X, but were not 
interchangeable, and seemed to be made for replacement railway carriages. 
Therefore, the use of these reserve guns indeed removed four guns from 
the total reserve pool as their replacements could not be used for the 
purpose of the original guns and were to be renamed Mark XIV and 
issued serial numbers 453–456 for the convenience of the Ministry.648  
The slow realization by the Ministry that they were unable to 
provide much to the armies in the field without simply going to Vickers 
and accepting their design wholeheartedly and without delay demonstrated 
emphatically that the Ministry having design responsibilities was simply not 
suitable for purpose. The discussion was played out in letters between 
Lloyd George, Edwin Montagu, who took over as Minister after the 
elevation of Lloyd George in December 1916 to Prime Minister, and the 
Stanley von Donop, the Master General of Ordnance as the War Office 
representative in the letters.  
                                           








The 6–inch guns, which were based upon a lighter version of the 
Mark VII guns, also in 35 calibre, had a slightly longer range of 18,000 
versus 17,400 yards (on a field carriage) and were light enough to use in the 
field. The rehashed Vickers design seems to have been pulled off the shelf 
of many an R&D project done before the war, and placed on the already 
proven 8–inch howitzer carriage. What is of importance for the sake of this 
thesis is that manufacturing did not appear to take any role in the placing of 
these orders. This might have been because almost all orders that were 
placed for the new armies had been completed by July 1916. With guns in 
the field, there was less risk politically for any failure of an army–level 
weapon which at numbers of only 50 were not enough to be of any great 
importance if they failed. What also should be of significance is that these 
documents were classified until they were requested to be declassified in 
May 1942 to make room for more documents in Whitehall. This 
classification for so long was not due to any technical data in the sake of 
national security, for the gun design was not included in the papers, but the 
political discussions between a senior Minister and the Prime Minister 







been the only reason that this was classified and not included in the initial 
official records as well as the correspondence placed in the records.649  
The orders for increased 6–inch guns were not placed until 
November 1916, and would be one of the last major orders given during 
the war. The Ministry of Munitions, with permission of the Army Council, 
placed orders for 50 6–inch Mark VII guns for delivery between June and 
November 1917 and 270 6–inch 35 calibre Mark XIX guns, for delivery 
between August and the end of 1917. This order was to be considered 
below the priority of previous orders, and would not be allowed to 
interfere with howitzers, now the object of repair work, which meant that 
no orders were to go to the Royal Gun Factory.650 As Haig’s request and 
need was for 192 guns in total, a reserve of nearly 50% showed both the 
wear–out rate for guns in theatre as well as an ordering style of the Ministry 
to order more rather than less if given the choice.  
Ministry of Munitions Bureaucracy 
Lloyd George would remain the Minister of Munitions until 9 July 
1916. He had taken over the position of Secretary of State for War on 6 
June 1916, the day after Lord Kitchener was lost on the Hampshire. His 
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successor was Edwin Montagu, a former Under–Secretary of State for 
India before the war who had been the Financial Secretary to the Treasury 
under Lloyd George in the opening months of the conflict. The transition 
was not a significant one, as it appears not to have changed things in regard 
to artillery production. Montagu took over with the same style of anti-War 
Office rhetoric that Lloyd George had perfected.  
Lloyd George and others had always been cynical about the abilities 
of the War Office staffs. By 1916 the animosity had reached fever pitch, 
especially after the loss of Kitchener. In a note dated the same day as 
Kitchener’s death, 5 June 1916, Lloyd George wrote to Edwin Montagu 
that the fault for any dud shells lay in the hands of von Donop. Lloyd 
George took the distinct view of General Du Cane being the honest 
successor whilst von Donop was still being obstructionist, although 
documents in the same file showed that the MGO warned him of the 
problem over a year before, and the Ministry of Munitions had failed to 
act. It would have been very difficult for Lloyd George to argue that any 
material failures a year into the transformation were still the fault of the 
War Office, although he continued to.651  
Von Donop would remain as the Master General of Ordnance until 
6 December 1916, when he resigned and retired from active duty.  
                                           







The Ordnance Committee 
By January 1917, the wartime Ordnance Committee was in trouble. 
The group did not have the skill and long term experience to oversee the 
production of guns, although they still were able to effectively procure 
shells in extraordinary numbers. In January 1917 the Committee met and 
decided to ease the requirements for nickel steel to the specification for 
nickel chrome steel, which had been an inferior specification for a decade 
since it had been baselined upon the old carbon steel specification. This 
was against the policies of the pre–war Board and of the designs since 1907 
that required the new steel. As well, it showed that by 1917, the technical 
government bureaucrats were almost wholly pushed out of power or 
removed of all influence and independent thought. The Government had 
lost power as compared to the lobbying of the arms firms. The most visible 
sign of this was that the 18–pr tolerances were extended from .007 to .010 
inches.652 These tolerances would have been unacceptable in peacetime, 
and were unacceptable to all of the initial contracts written by the experts at 
the War Office as they had been shown to be detrimental to ordnance and 
a basis for cracking.  
                                           







The worst part of these decisions was that they made little sense. 
The Government had already acquired enough guns to outfit the entire 
British Army. The only guns that were still being actively produced were 
the 4.5–inch howitzers and the new heavy and very heavy howitzers that 
were replacing older models already in the field. There was no reason to 
introduce a weakening of specifications as British industry had already 
proven it could outfit the majority of the British Army domestically with 
artillery in a true crisis with the peacetime specifications. By 1917 the 
industrial base had matured to a wartime footing and the massive 
investment in plant was now available.  
The only other possible understanding was that this was aimed at the 
export market, although the flagging Russians were the only possible 
customer in January 1917, and no records exist that the Russians were even 
remotely interested in the 18–prs as they had no capacity for supply of 
their ammunition.  
State of Contracts in April 1917 
By the entry of the Americans into the war, most contracts for 
artillery had been fulfilled. What was still on order appears to be primarily 
for the Allied armies elsewhere. For example, $538,500 was still owed by 







an order placed at Midvale Steel by Morgans on behalf of the Ministry of 
Munitions. With the last Russian gun rolling off the line on 30 November, 
1917, the orders for Allied artillery equipment was essentially completed, 
and American factory capacity could be turned over to the American 
Governmental orders.653  
Relining Guns 
The relining of 6–inch guns had taken a key role in the industrial 
output by November 1916. It took five months from the time guns were 
condemned until they were back in service after relining and proof. With 
the average life being just 166 days, this led the Ministry to have a reserve 
of 100% of 6–inch guns. This extreme case meant that Woolwich would 
have to rebuild on average over one gun a day to keep up with the 
demands from France.654  
Subsequent Contracts 
On the business side though, the Ministry was in reality not actually 
ordering that much. In the contracts book from 9 December 1916–14 
April 1917, only a handful of relined barrels were ordered, and certainly 
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not enough to keep up with demand, and only then for 18–prs and 6–inch 
guns. In addition, only one order for guns was placed, for the almost 20 
year old 6–inch Mark VII.655 The Ministry was not demonstrating any 
thought about stockpiling, or using the industrial base that had been so 
important to mobilize for shells a year earlier. It might also though show 
that the furnaces at Woolwich were producing a much larger percentage of 
the steel necessary for relining from their own furnaces instead of the 
traditional route of outsourcing these to the second tier of suppliers such as 
Darlington or Firth.  
Final Deliveries 
The final amounts for new deliveries through the end of June 1917 
are astounding. 5,025 18–prs, 1,789 4.5–inch guns, 989 60–prs, 45 6–inch 
guns, 1,289 6–inch howitzers, 417 8–inch howitzers, 276 9.2–inch 
howitzers, 68 12–inch howitzers of all types, and 12 15–inch howitzers.656  
In addition, at least 845 18–prs, 101 4.5–inch howitzers, 240 60–prs, 
66 6–inch guns 50 6–inch howitzers, 32 8–inch howitzers, 33 9.2–inch 
howitzers, and 2 12–inch howitzers were repaired in the war to 30 June 
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1917. In most cases, in three years of war, more guns had been repaired 
than had been in the entire arsenal in August 1914.657  
  








CHAPTER ELEVEN: CONCLUSION 
Although this is not a comparative study, it should be noted that 
Germany consistently during the war replaced its drive band designs on 
shells from copper to soft iron.658 This meant that the rifling in German 
guns would have worn out much more rapidly than their French and 
British counterparts. This is important as it might have influenced the 
ability of the German fleet to rearm their dreadnoughts as their industrial 
might by 1916 was being strangled by the blockade which was having 
follow–on effects. As copper was not able to be imported, substitutions 
were being used, which caused increased wear, decreased efficiency, and 
forced industrial decisions as to the priorities for gun makers.  
On the other side, Britain was never forced to make these sorts of 
decisions. The Royal Navy was able to keep the sea lanes open enough to 
get all the supplies needed for the ordnance industry. Copper was never in 
such short supply that designs were curtailed, and the relaxation of 
specifications that occurred in early 1917 does not appear to have any 
direct cause due to raw materials. Much of this could be credited with 
Canadian and American supplies, as well as a direct sea route to the South 
American copper fields, but it cannot be understated how important being 
                                           







able to use weapons as designed was. It allowed much more accurate 
artillery over a longer life which put shells where they were aimed more of 
the time. It also meant that the repair work at Woolwich was much less 
than it could have been. The best example of how this could have been 
was Krupp, which ‘mended more guns than it made new ones’ and also 
had excessive amounts of prematures, 2,300 field guns and 900 howitzers 
in 1915 alone.659  
This seems to vindicate the British design and business policies 
before and during the initial months of the war. British guns were more 
effective against the enemy than their own, which could not be said for 
their German counterparts. In a succinct representation, the British 
comparison to their German counterparts shows that British industrial 
policy was indeed efficient and effective, as it took into account all 
elements: design, capability, capacity, industrial culture, probable 
environments for use, efficient tactics, intelligent tradeoffs, probable 
restriction of raw materials in wartime, and most importantly, the safety of 
crews which allowed for a culture of trust between gunners and their 
equipment. The policies created in the two decades before the outbreak of 
war in 1914 took into effect lessons learned from conflict abroad, with 
increased naval reserves and a need for shared service wartime capacity, 
                                           







paired with an understanding by both services that the most effective gun 
might not be the one that could fire with the most speed. The ability of the 
guns to fire more rounds in an efficient life, paired with an increased 
research and design over a long period controlled primarily by the 
Government, allowed for efficient learning of lessons that could be 
incorporated into designs for new guns.  
The system of ‘business as usual’ worked. The War Office was able 
to write contracts early in the war for amounts well in excess of the 
probable needs, even though even these numbers proved to be below the 
political needs of the war as was seen in May 1915. Industry was able to 
deliver on contracts, even if they were often late. Importantly though, they 
arrived in time to British troops in the field and were never without guns, 
which is more than could be said for shells, rifles, and other ordnance, and 
for that matter, non–warlike stores. This had as much to do with the size of 
expenditure on those items and industry as a whole as with the actions of 
the War Office staffs.  
The Admiralty policies set before the war, just after the experiences 
in South Africa, also showed that they were well thought out and managed. 
The Royal Navy was never knowingly pushed off the seas due to guns 
failing or the inability to mount reserve guns. The realization of weakness 







not affect the supremacy of the Royal Navy in maintaining the sea–lanes for 
trade. This in itself allowed for much of the strategy utilized by the Allies 
on all fronts of the war. If Britain had gone to war with the guns of 1909, 
there might not have been the same conclusion. Although the long lead 
time of naval guns meant they had a negligible effect on the overall industry 
of artillery tubes, the Trade did not have to make the hard decisions as to 
what contracts to complete first, as had been the case in the Boer War.  
Arguably the most important element, however, in the success of 
British policy was people. Britain had a culture of scientific promotion that 
should not be forgotten. Ordnance in particular was managed by officers 
who had experience from combat or years at sea. The Ordnance 
Committee/Board had the independence to conduct experiments without 
political or service meddling in the results. These experiments in turn had 
a direct influence on how to make the next generation of ordnance. The 
financial and audit staff of the War Office and the Admiralty had 
independence in conducting accurate and uninfluenced reports which were 
shared and learned from between the political and civil staff levels of 
government.  
British policy between 1900 and 1914 placed the armed forces of 
Great Britain on a level that was sufficient for the needs of the service. It 







industry must be able to produce the material needed for the ordinary 
operations of a peace–time military at a cost that is reasonable to the 
taxpayer. Second, industry must be able to produce the material needed 
for the extra–ordinary operations of war at a rate that is reasonable to the 
user, in this case the Royal Navy and the British Army. Britain was able to 
achieve both of these outcomes. The secret was in taking on problems 
through the perspective of British needs as a whole, through joint dialogue, 
planning, design, and procurement. This system, although dented several 
times between 1900 and 1914, enabled both forces to fully utilize the 
capacity of the industry available as well as have the right equipment at the 
right time for the right price. In procurement, that is the ultimate goal. In 
that regard, British industrial policy concerning the ordnance industry 
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MUN 7/75 Effect on Ministry contracts of US government decision to tax 
munitions manufacture. 
MUN 7/81 Control of armament firms. 
MUN 7/85 Demarcation of responsibilities between Contracts and Supply 
Departments. 
MUN 7/95 Drafting of standard form for assisted contracts. 
MUN 7/97 Arrangements between Mr. E. Moir, Ministry of Munitions 
representative in USA, and JP Morgan and Co., commercial agents 
for British Government in USA. 
MUN 7/98 Report by Mr. E.W. Moir to the Minister on American 
organisation and supply situation. 
MUN 7/105B Relations between Munition Contracts, Supply, and Finance 
Departments. 
MUN 7/106 Disposal of plant and machinery, and list of assisted contracts. 
MUN 7/110 Rates of profit for munition manufactures. 
MUN 7/111 Changes in contract procedure in certain Ministry branches. 
MUN 7/117 Alteration in procedure for payments by the Ministry to 
contractors extending works for war purposes. 







MUN 7/125 Alterations in arrangements for contract tendering. 
MUN 7/126 Appointment of Ministry representatives to boards of 
directors of contracting firms. 
MUN 7/127 Ministry of Munitions and Admiralty claims upon Messrs. 
Vickers with regard to royalties payable under agreements to Messrs. 
Krupp of Germany. 
MUN 7/135 Investigation of costs of sub–contractors. 
MUN 7/148 Miscellaneous papers of Sir Philip Hanson, Director–General 
of Munitions Contracts and Assistant Secretary, American Branch, 
mainly concerning munitions supplies to Russia. 
MUN 7/150 Minutes of meetings of Contract Board. 
MUN 7/170 Prices agreed with armament firms on supply of guns and 
equipment for guns. 
MUN 7/209 Revision of form of tender for munitions contracts. 
MUN 7/246 Proposals for use of one standard propellant for use in guns 
or howitzers. 
MUN 7/324 Registry procedure at Inspection Department, Woolwich 
Arsenal, and the Central Registry, Whitehall Gardens. 
MUN 7/353 Preparation of gun steel test pieces. 
MUN 7/375 Establishment and disposal of proof range for newly–repaired 
guns at Meanwood, Leeds, Yorks. 
MUN 7/376 List of variations from approved artillery designs. 
MUN 7/377 List of variations from approved artillery designs. 
MUN 7/398 Extension to gun–forge at Woolwich Arsenal. 
MUN 7/401 Suggested adoption by USA of British patterns of 4.5,’ 8’ and 
9 2’ howitzers. 
MUN 7/424 Suggestions from ordnance firms for increasing output of 
artillery. 
MUN 7/439 Papers on:– Provision of long–range guns. 
MUN 7/440 Papers on:– War Office requirements in design and supply of 
6' and 9.2' guns. 
MUN 7/442 Papers on:– Design, storage, etc. of 12’ high–velocity guns. 
MUN 7/458 Storage of drawings at Bodleian Library, Oxford. 








SUPP – Records created or inherited by the Ministry of Supply and 
successors, the Ordnance Board, and related bodies. 
 
Ordnance Establishments: Headquarters and Factory Records  
SUPP 5/924 Metallurgical Researches: Experiments to determine the 
relative action of Mercury and Mercury vapour on various metals 
and alloys: report RL No 1 dated 4.5.09. 
SUPP 5/926 Metallurgical Researches: Use of sheared samples for 
preparation of test specimens: report RGF No 10 dated 4.3.10. 
SUPP 5/927 Metallurgical Researches: Case hardening experiments with 
Cyanide baths and other Carburising materials: Report RGF No 13 
dated 29.5.11. 
SUPP 5/1032 Accounting notebooks. 
SUPP 5/1036 List of senior staff 1888–1926 and historical enquiries. 
 
Ordnance Board, etc., Proceedings, Reports and Memoranda  
SUPP 6/60 Annual reports of the president. 1901. 
SUPP 6/61 Annual reports of the president. 1902. 
SUPP 6/62 Annual reports of the president. Note: Appendix 1903. 
SUPP 6/63 Annual reports of the president. 1904. 
SUPP 6/64 Annual reports of the president. Note: Appendix 1904. 
SUPP 6/65 Annual reports of the president. 1905. 
SUPP 6/66 Annual reports of the president. 1906. 
SUPP 6/67 Annual reports of the president. 1907. 
SUPP 6/163 Annual report of the president. 1908. 
SUPP 6/164 Annual report of the president. 1909. 
SUPP 6/165 Annual report of the president. 1910. 
SUPP 6/166 Annual report of the president. 1911. 
SUPP 6/167 Annual report of the president. 1912. 
SUPP 6/168 Annual report of the president. 1913. 
SUPP 6/169 Annual report of the president. 1914. 
SUPP 6/170 Annual report of the president. 1915. 
SUPP 6/171 ORDNANCE BOARD. Minutes. 1908. 
SUPP 6/200 ORDNANCE COMMITTEE. Minutes. 1–1176. 
SUPP 6/264 Annual reports of proceedings 1915–1916. 







SUPP 6/266 Annual reports of proceedings 1917. 
SUPP 6/267 Annual reports of proceedings 1918. 
SUPP 6/543 Special Committee on Horse and Field Artillery Equipment: 
reports (also contains Ordnance Committee report no 1). 
SUPP 6/544 Extracts from proceedings Royal Artillery Committee. 
SUPP 6/643 Recommendations of commissions, etc, relating to army 
affairs, abstracts. 
SUPP 6/657 Committee on production possibilities of the shops and 
machinery of the Royal Arsenal, Woolwich, parts I and II: minutes. 
SUPP 6/752 ORDNANCE COUNCIL. Proceedings. 203–241. 
 
T–Records created or inherited by HM Treasury  
T 1/12267 Papers registered in 1918. 
T 1/12275 Papers registered in 1919. 
T 1/12290 Papers registered in 1919. 
 
War Office and successors 
 
Registered Files (General Series)  
WO 32/3401 FACTORIES: Royal Ordnance (Code 49(A)): Payment for 
Armistice Holidays: Ministerial instructions. 
WO 32/4293 FACTORIES: Royal Ordnance (Code 49(A)): Re–
consideration of the terms of the report by the Donaldson 
Committee on the supply and attainments, and the selection of 
subordinate staff and their duties in connection with the economic 
results of Workshop Management, 1903. 
WO 32/4294 FACTORIES: Royal Ordnance (Code 49(A)): Visits of 
members to the Army Council to investigate complaints. 
WO 32/4731 PUBLICATIONS: General (Code 24(A)): Staff Manual, 
War, 1912. 
WO 32/4734 FACTORIES: Royal Ordnance (Code 49(A)): Government 
and Workshops Committee; Report. 
WO 32/4900 FACTORIES: Royal Ordnance (Code 49(A)): Future of 







WO 32/6480 FACTORIES: Royal Ordnance (Code 49(A)): Formation of 
Joint Committee to consider transfer to War Department of naval 
buildings at Woolwich used for storage of explosives. 
WO 32/7063 CIVIL STAFFS (OUTSTATIONS): General (Code 47(A)): 
Pay and conditions of service in Ordnance Factories. Deputation of 
Amalgamated Society of Engineers to War Office. 
WO 32/7064 CIVIL STAFFS (OUTSTATIONS): General (Code 47(A)): 
Proposed substitution of full market rates of wages for present rate 
plus privileges. 
WO 32/8965 REGIMENTAL DRESS AND BADGES: Officers (Code 
43(M)): Reports on new pattern Staff forage cap. 
WO 32/8986 FACTORIES: Royal Ordnance (Code 49(A)): 2nd Interim 
Report on Cost of Ordnance Factories Production Question of 
abolition of heavy hammer. 
WO 32/9041 FACTORIES: Royal Ordnance (Code 49(A)): Proposals 
regarding reorganisation of clerical staff. 
WO 32/9042 FACTORIES: Royal Ordnance (Code 49(A)): Report of 
Ward Committee on clerical staff. 
WO 32/9043 FACTORIES: Royal Ordnance (Code 49(A)): 
Implementation of recommendations of Ward Committee on new 
establishment for clerical staff Recommendations and opinions 
concerning various members of staff. 
WO 32/9275 FACTORIES: Royal Ordnance (Code 49(A)): Report of 
Fair Wages Advisory Committee on minimum wage for workers at 
Admiralty and War Office establishments. Deputation from United 
Government Workers Federation. 
WO 32/9282 FACTORIES: Royal Ordnance (Code 49(A)): Transfer of 
control of ordnance factories to Ministry of Munitions Proceedings 
of conference. 
WO 32/9285 WAR OFFICE: General (Code 1(A)): Transfer to Ministry 
of Munitions responsibility for designs, specifications, etc. for testing 
of arms and ammunition Taking out of patents by officers and men 
and civilians employed by the War Office. 
WO 32/11336 FACTORIES: Royal Ordnance (Code 49(A)): Release of 








Reports, Memoranda and Papers (O and A Series) 
WO 33/2960 Report of the Committee appointed to consider methods of 
inspection and delivery of naval ordnance and naval ordnance 
stores. 
 
Papers of Various Private Collections  
Major General Sir Stanley von Donop Papers 
WO 79/73 Diary of events from 1.5.1915 to 30.6.1916 concerning supply 
of munitions and relations between Ordnance Board and Ministry 
of Munitions together with correspondence, memoranda, etc. 
bearing on same. 
WO 79/74 Correspondence and papers arising mainly from the 
controversy concerning the supply of munitions for the Army and 
the creation of a separate Ministry for this purpose. Also includes 
some papers relating to the rejection by the War Office in 1919 of 
von Donop's request to publish his notes. 
WO 79/75 Correspondence and papers arising mainly from the 
controversy concerning the supply of munitions for the Army and 
the creation of a separate Ministry for this purpose. Also includes 
some papers relating to the rejection by the War Office in 1919 of 
von Donop's request to publish his notes.: with particular reference 
to the publication of Lloyd George's War Memoirs in 1933. 
WO 79/76 Extracts from Hansard, 1915–1916, concerning the supply of 
munitions with accompanying notes by von Donop. 
WO 79/77 Correspondence, memoranda, notes of meetings etc, 
concerning munition requirements and another copy of diary. 
WO 79/78 War Office: papers of various private collections: Major–
General Sir Stanley von Donop, Master General of the Ordnance. 
WO 79/79 von Donop's notes concerning arrangements for the supply of 
munitions following the outbreak of war in 1914 Part I. 
WO 79/80 von Donop's notes concerning arrangements for the supply of 
munitions following the outbreak of war in 1914: Part II. 
WO 79/81 von Donop's record of events concerning munitions supply 








WO 79/82 Correspondence, memoranda etc concerning the setting up of 
a Ministry of Munitions and its relations with the War Office Part I. 
WO 79/83 Correspondence, memoranda etc concerning the setting up of 
a Ministry of Munitions and its relations with the War Office Part II. 
WO 79/84 Various Cabinet and other papers concerning munitions supply 
and a copy of von Donop's notes on the subject prepared for the 
War Office in 1920 following an application by Sir George Arthur, 
Bt., to use them in connection with his book on Lord Kitchener. 
WO 79/85 Minutes of evidence taken before the Royal Commission on 
the Private Manufacture and Trading in Arms; Major General Sir 
Stanley von Donop, Major General Hon Sir Francis R Bingham. 
 
Army Ordnance Corps: Orders and Papers  
WO 111/1 Corps Orders, Monthly 1901. 
WO 111/2 Corps Orders, Monthly 1902. 
WO 111/3 Corps Orders, Monthly 1903. 
WO 111/4 Corps Orders, Monthly 1904. 
WO 111/5 Corps Orders, Monthly 1905. 
WO 111/6 Corps Orders, Monthly 1906. 
WO 111/7 Corps Orders, Monthly 1907. 
WO 111/8 Corps Orders, Monthly 1908. 
WO 111/9 Corps Orders, Monthly 1909. 
WO 111/10 Corps Orders, Monthly 1910. 
WO 111/11 Corps Orders, Monthly 1911. 
WO 111/12 Record of important events, changes, decisions, etc., by 
Commanding Officer, Headquarters, Woolwich. 1905–1914. 
WO 111/13 Record of important events, changes, decisions, etc., by 
Commanding Officer, Headquarters, Woolwich. 1915–1919. 
 
Finance Department and predecessors: Precedent Books  
WO 113/17 Officers: pay, allowances etc – alphabetically by subjects. 
 
Miscellaneous Unregistered Papers, First World War  
WO 161/22 New Armies: Arms and ammunition. 








War Office and Ministry of Supply: Contracts Precedent Books  
WO 254/1 Contracts Precedent Book. 
WO 254/3 A–F. 
WO 254/4 I–P. 
WO 254/6 P–W. 
 
Directorate of Army Contracts and predecessors: Annual Reports 
WO 395/1 Annual Reports 1873–1903. 
WO 395/2 Annual Reports 1903–1908. 
WO 395/3 Annual Reports 1909–1914. 
 
Plans and Photographs Department, National Maritime Museum, 
Woolwich UK 
Vickers Ordnance [Box prefixes VAO and VOR]. 
 
Parliamentary Archives, Westminster 
David Lloyd George Papers. 
LG/C/1 Chancellor of the Exchequer Correspondence. 
LG/C/3 Chancellor of the Exchequer Correspondence. 
LG/C/5 Chancellor of the Exchequer Correspondence. 
LG/D/17 Ministry of Munitions Correspondence. 
LG/E/1 Secretary of State for June Correspondence. 
LG/F/9 Prime Minster Correspondence. 
LG/F/191 Prime Minister Domestic. 
  
Andrew Bonar Law papers 
BL/37 Leader of the Party. Paper. 
BL/38 Leader of the Party. Papers– pre–war. 
 





























Vickers Ltd. Records, University of Cambridge Library, Cambridge 
Vickers 628 Sir Trevor Dawson. Correspondence and notes on the subject 
of Sir Trevor Dawson's contribution to the development of Vickers. 
Vickers 648 Eskmeals and Ridsdale gun ranges. Correspondence and 
papers relating to the gun ranges at Eskmeals and Ridsdale. 
Vickers 800 Correspondence with the War Office re Horse and Field 
Artillery Equipments. Published copies of Correspondence between 
Vickers Maxim and the War Office concerning the company's rights 
in Horse and Field Artillery Equipments, 1901-04. 
Vickers 894 Guns manufactured at Elswick Works. 'Guns manufactured at 
Elswick Works', compiled by T Thirlwell, Armaments Division 
Drawing Office, Elswick Works. 
Vickers 1148 Vickers Ltd: List of wartime contracts. 
Vickers 1149 Vickers Ltd: List of wartime contracts. 
Vickers 1185 Patents for Inventions : Abridgements of Specifications : 
Class 92 1905-1908.  
Vickers 1471 Vickers Sons & Maxim / Vickers Ltd: minute book of 
General Meetings 'No 4'. 
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